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Foreword of Vice-President Katainen 
and Commissioner Thyssen
The Europe 2020 strategy is the European 
strategy for creating smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth since 2010. It has been 
instrumental in preparing strategic choices 
for the European Commission’s work. It led 
to the creation of the European Semester, 
which has become a powerful instrument to 
provide guidance for the Member States in their 
structural reforms and sustainable fiscal policies.
This publication by Eurostat provides up-to-date 
data in the areas covered by the Europe 2020 
strategy which is important for our policymaking 
and helps to monitor progress towards the 
strategy’s objectives.
The first years of the Europe 2020 strategy 
coincided with the financial and economic crisis, 
and progress towards the targets has been 
mixed.  Already today, we have achieved our 
objectives for 2020 regarding greenhouse gas 
emissions and final energy efficiency, while being very close to reaching our education 
targets. More recently, we have seen continued progress regarding employment. The 
situation is improving in almost all Member States and the employment target is also 
within reach. More still needs to be done to invest in research and innovation and to 
fight against poverty and social exclusion. The Commission will keep up its efforts to 
support these positive trends with all of its different policy initiatives: from the smart 
use of EU budgetary resources to providing the right regulatory incentives. A forceful 
implementation also at national level will help achieve progress.
To achieve the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy, the Commission will also 
continue to boost investment, pursue structural reforms in Member States and ensure 
responsible fiscal policies. The implementation of the Investment Plan for Europe is an 
important part of this strategy and we are grateful for Eurostat’s crucial role in having 
provided more clarity and transparency on public accounting rules in Europe.
    
Jyrki Katainen Marianne Thyssen  
Vice-President Commissioner  
European Commission  European Commission 
Jobs, Growth, Investment  Employment, Social Affairs, 
and Competitiveness Skills and Labour Mobility 
 Responsible for Eurostat
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Foreword of Eurostat’s  
acting Director-General
Eurostat — the statistical office of the European 
Union — plays a key role in informing 
governments, businesses and members of the 
public about important economic, social and 
environmental developments at EU level, in 
particular with regard to key European policy 
initiatives. For this purpose, Eurostat produces 
annual flagship publications, which provide 
statistical analyses related to these initiatives and 
other relevant topics.
Our flagship publication ‘Smarter, greener, more inclusive? — Indicators to support the 
Europe 2020 strategy’ presents the progress of the EU and its Member States towards 
the targets of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
The current 2017 edition builds upon and updates the previous releases. Based on 
data mostly produced by the European Statistical System (ESS), it is structured along 
five thematic areas. They are: employment, R&D and innovation, climate change and 
energy, education, poverty and social exclusion. 
The strategy’s headline indicators provide a description of long-term trends. Additional 
contextual indicators, offered to broaden the general picture, shed light on the 
specific segments of society. They highlight the driving forces behind a given headline 
indicator or provide interesting insights into issues closely related to the main targets.
Impartial and objective statistical information is essential for evidence-based political 
decision-making. Eurostat is fully committed to supporting the implementation and 
monitoring of the Europe 2020 strategy by producing and supplying high quality 
statistical data. 
We hope that this publication will bring our data closer to users by explaining topics of 
daily interest and importance for our societies.
Mariana Kotzeva 
Acting Director-General of Eurostat
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Nine headline indicators and additional sub-
indicators support the monitoring of the Europe 
2020 strategy’s eight targets. The development 
of these indicators since 2008, the baseline year 
for monitoring the Europe 2020 strategy, shows 
a rather mixed picture. Substantial progress has 
been made in the areas of climate change and 
energy, as well as in education. However, there is 
still some way to go to meet the targets on R&D 
investment, employment and poverty alleviation, 
although more recent developments for the latter 
two are promising.
The Europe 2020 strategy 
Europe 2020 is the EU’s agenda for jobs and 
growth for the current decade. It emphasises 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth as a way 
to strengthen the EU economy and prepare its 
structure for the challenges of the next decade. 
The strategy strives to deliver high levels of 
employment, productivity and social cohesion in 
the Member States while reducing the impact on 
the natural environment. 
To reach this objective, the EU has adopted eight 
ambitious targets in the areas of employment, 
research and development (R&D), climate change 
and energy, education, and poverty reduction, to 
be reached by 2020. These have been translated 
into national targets to reflect the situation and 
possibilities of each Member State to contribute 
to the common goals. A set of nine headline 
indicators and additional sub-indicators provides 
an overview of how fast the EU is progressing 
towards its overall targets and how far it still has to 
go to reach them. 
Since 2008, substantial progress has been 
made in the area of climate change and energy 
through reduced greenhouse gas emissions 
and increased use of renewable energy sources. 
Positive developments are also visible in the area 
of education, where the EU is within reaching 
distance of both headline targets. While the EU 
remains at a significant distance from its targets 
on R&D investment, employment and poverty 
alleviation, the most recent developments in the 
latter two areas are encouraging and the targets 
are still within reach for 2020.
The analysis in this 2017 edition of ‘Smarter, 
greener, more inclusive?’ aims to shed light on 
the trends in the headline indicators over the 
past seven years, from 2008 up to 2015 or 2016 
(depending on data availability).
Employment rate
71.1 % of the EU population aged 
20 to 64 were employed in 2016, 
up from 70.1 % in 2015. This is by 
far the highest share that has been 
observed since 2002. As a result, 
the distance to the Europe 2020 employment 
target of 75 % narrowed to 3.9 percentage points. 
Compared with other major economies in the 
world, the EU’s employment rate lags behind 
some countries such as Japan, the United States, 
Russia and China.
A considerably lower employment rate was 
observed for young people aged 20 to 29 than 
for those aged 30 to 54. The employment gap 
between these two cohorts has been increasing 
over the past years. Older people (aged 55 to 
64 years) were another vulnerable group on the 
labour market. Although their employment rate 
has grown continuously over the past decade, 
it still remains low compared to younger age 
groups. The gender employment gap has 
narrowed for all age groups since 2002. In 2016, 
the largest gap was observed for the age group 30 
to 34 (14.3 percentage points). 
Other factors influencing integration into the 
labour market are educational attainment levels 
and country of origin. Just slightly more than 
half of those with at most primary or lower 
secondary education in the EU were employed in 
2016, compared to 83.4 % for those with tertiary 
Overview of trends in the Europe 2020 
headline indicators
Executive summary
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Table 0.1: Europe 2020 headline indicators, EU-28, 2008 and 2012–2016
Topic Headline indicator 2008 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Target
Employment 
Employment rate age group 20–64, 
total (% of population) 70.3 68.4 68.4 69.2 70.1 71.1 75.0 
   •  Employment rate age group 20–64, 
females (% of population) 62.8 62.4 62.6 63.5 64.3 65.3 :
   •  Employment rate age group 20–64, 
males (% of the population) 77.8 74.6 74.3 75.0 75.9 76.9 :
R&D Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (¹) (% of GDP) 1.84 2.01 2.03 2.04 2.03 : 3.00 
Climate 
change and 
energy
Greenhouse gas emissions (²) 
(Index 1990 = 100) 90.6 82.1 80.5 77.4 77.9 : 80.0 
Share of renewable energy in gross 
final energy consumption (%) 11.0 14.4 15.2 16.1 16.7 : 20.0 
Primary energy consumption 
(Million tonnes of oil equivalent) 1,692 1,585 1,570 1,508 1,530 : 1 483
Final energy consumption 
(Million tonnes of oil equivalent) 1,180 1,106 1,106 1,060 1,082 : 1 086
Education
Early leavers from education and training, 
total (³) (% of population aged 18–24) 14.7 12.7 11.9 11.2 11.0 10.7 < 10.0
   •  Early leavers from education and 
training, females (³)  
(% of population aged 18–24)
12.7 10.9 10.2 9.6 9.5 9.2 :
   •  Early leavers from education and 
training, males (³) 
(% of population aged 18–24)
16.6 14.5 13.6 12.8 12.4 12.2 :
Tertiary educational attainment, 
total (³) (% of population aged 30–34) 31.1 36.0 37.1 37.9 38.7 39.1 ≥ 40.0
   •  Tertiary educational attainment, 
females (³) (% of population aged 30–34) 34.3 40.2 41.4 42.3 43.4 43.9 :
   •  Tertiary educational attainment, 
males (³) (% of population aged 30–34) 28.0 31.8 32.8 33.6 34.0 34.4 :
Poverty 
and social 
exclusion 
People at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion, EU-27 (⁴) (Million people) 115.9 122.2 121.4 120.7 117.6 : 96.2 (⁵)
People at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion, EU-28 (⁴) (Million people) : 123.6 122.7 121.9 118.8 :  
People at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion, EU-28 (⁴)(⁶) (% of population) 23.7 24.7 24.6 24.4 23.7 : :
   •  People living in households with 
very low work intensity, EU-28 (⁶) 
(% of population aged 0–59)
9.2 10.5 10.9 11.2 10.6 : :
   •  People at risk of poverty after social 
transfers, EU-28 (⁶) (% of population) 16.5 16.8 16.7 17.2 17.3 : :
   •  Severely materially deprived people, 
EU-28 (⁶)(⁷) (% of population) 8.5 9.9 9.6 8.9 8.1 7.8 :
(¹) 2015 data are provisional.
(²) Total emissions, including international aviation, but excluding 
emissions from land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF).
(³) Break in time series in 2014 (switch from ISCED 97 to ISCED 2011).
(⁴) The indicator ‘people at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ 
corresponds to the sum of persons who are: at risk of poverty 
after social transfers, severely materially deprived or living in 
households with very low work intensity. Persons are only 
counted once even if they are present in several sub-indicators.
(⁵) The overall EU target is to lift at least 20 million people out of the 
risk of poverty and exclusion by 2020. Due to data availability 
issues, the target is evaluated only for the EU-27. 
(⁶)  EU-27 data for 2008.
(⁷)  Data for 2016 are estimates and provisional.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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education. The employment rate of non-EU 
nationals (aged 20 to 64) was 14.5  percentage 
points lower than the overall rate in 2016. People 
who migrated to the EU to join their families or 
for international protection were among the 
groups with the lowest employment rates in the 
labour market.
Gross domestic expenditure on research 
and development (R&D)
R&D expenditure in the EU stood 
at 2.03 % of GDP in 2015, compared 
with 2.04 % in 2014. Gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D as a percentage 
of GDP increased slightly between 
2008 and 2012, as a result of depressed GDP 
growth and a wider EU effort to boost public 
expenditure on R&D, and has stagnated around 
2 % of GDP since then. This means that by 2015, 
the EU was still 0.97 percentage points below its 
2020 target, which calls for increasing combined 
public and private R&D expenditure to 3 % of 
GDP. The EU is still lagging behind its Asian and 
American competitors in terms of R&D intensity, 
with only the best performing Member States 
surpassing the United States.
Business enterprise remains the largest R&D 
performing sector in the EU, accounting for 64.0 % 
of total R&D expenditure. The business sector 
has also recorded the largest increase since 2002. 
The higher education and government sectors 
contribute less to total R&D expenditure, at 23.2 % 
and 12.0 %, respectively. Although the R&D shares 
of these two sectors have grown at a slower 
pace, they have been more resilient to economic 
fluctuations.
Greenhouse gas emissions, share of 
renewable energy in gross final energy 
consumption, and energy efficiency
By 2015, emissions of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) across the EU had 
fallen by 22.1 % compared with 
1990 levels. This represents a slight 
increase in emissions compared 
to 2014, when emissions were 22.6 % below 1990 
levels. However, the EU is expected to exceed its 
Europe 2020 target of reducing GHG emissions by 
20 % by 2020. All sectors, except fuel combustion 
in transport and international aviation, contributed 
to the reductions between 1990 and 2015. 
Although energy industries were responsible for 
the largest reductions in absolute terms over this 
time period, it was still the sector responsible for 
the largest share of total emissions in 2015.    
The EU’s GHG emissions per capita are below the 
levels observed in many other major economies 
such as Australia, Canada and the United States. 
Despite large variations of per capita GHG 
emissions globally, between 1990 and 2013, 
a trend towards greater convergence can be 
observed: per-capita emissions have decreased 
in the EU, in the United States and Australia, while 
increasing in poorer countries, with the biggest 
increases taking place in China and South Korea.
The share of renewable energy in gross final 
energy production, the Europe 2020 strategy’s 
second climate change and energy target, 
increased from 16.1 % in 2014 to 16.7 % in 2015. 
Therefore, the EU remains 3.3 percentage points 
below the Europe 2020 renewable energy target 
of 20 %. Solid, liquid and gaseous biofuels still 
provide the biggest share of total renewable 
energy in the EU, also being the largest renewable 
energy source used in transport and for heating 
and cooling. Hydropower remains the dominant 
renewable energy technology in the electricity 
sector. However, the shares of wind and solar 
energy have increased substantially thanks 
to effective support schemes and large cost 
reductions. Compared to other economies in 
the world, in particular most emerging and 
industrialised countries, the EU’s renewable energy 
share is relatively high. 
The EU has also made substantial progress 
towards its energy efficiency objective. The 2020 
target for final energy consumption has already 
been achieved. With respect to primary energy 
consumption, the EU must achieve a further 
reduction of 3.1 % until 2020 to reach the Europe 
2020 target of increasing its energy efficiency 
by 20 % compared with projections. In 2015, the 
EU consumed 10.7 % less primary energy than 
in 2005, but 1.4 % more than in 2014.  Energy 
efficiency policies have helped achieve substantial 
Executive summary
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reductions in primary energy consumption, but 
some of the reductions can also be attributed 
to lower economic output and warmer than 
average years, such as 2013 and 2014. Globally, 
only one major economy has reduced primary 
energy consumption more than the EU: Japan 
consumed 16 % less primary energy in 2015 than 
it did in 2005.
Early leavers from education and training 
and tertiary educational attainment
The share of early leavers from 
education and training, defined as 
the share of 18 to 24 year olds with 
at most lower secondary education 
and not in further education and 
training, has fallen continuously since 2002, both 
for men and women. In 2016, the indicator stood 
at 10.7 %, compared with 11 % in 2015. Thus, 
Europe is steadily approaching its headline target 
for 2020, which envisages reducing the rate of 
early leavers from education and training to less 
than 10 %. 
Young men are more likely to leave education and 
training early compared to women, even though 
the gap has been narrowing since 2004. Figures 
for women are already below the overall EU target, 
standing at 9.2 % in 2016. Residents not born in 
the reporting country are more likely to leave 
formal education early compared to natives. 
Early leavers from education and training face 
particularly severe problems in the labour market. 
In 2016, about 58 % of 18 to 24 year old early 
leavers from education and training were either 
unemployed or inactive. This share has increased 
by 12 percentage points compared to 2008.
Improvements can also be observed in the share 
of 30 to 34 year olds who have completed tertiary 
education, which increased between 2015 and 
2016 from 38.7 % to 39.1 %. Provided that this 
positive trend continues, the EU seems to be on 
track to meeting its target of increasing that share 
to at least 40 % by 2020. However, the EU’s tertiary 
attainment rate still lags behind the rates of some 
other major world economies such as South 
Korea, Japan, Canada and the United States.
Disaggregated by gender, the data reveal that 
growth in the share of tertiary graduates has 
been considerably faster for women, who already 
met the Europe 2020 target in 2012 and by 2016 
reached 43.9 %. Progress has been slower for men: 
by 2016 only 34.4 % of 30 to 34 year old men have 
attained tertiary education.
People at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion
The Europe 2020 strategy 
aims to reduce the number 
of people at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion by 20 million 
by 2020, as compared with the 2008 level (1). The 
development of risk of poverty or social exclusion 
in the EU over the past decade has been marked 
by two turning points: in 2009, when the number 
of people at risk started to rise because of the 
delayed social effects of the economic crisis and 
in 2012, when this upward trend reversed. In 2015, 
118.8 million people were affected by poverty or 
social exclusion in the EU-28, which was around 
one million more than in 2010, but three million 
less than in 2014. Although the share of poor or 
socially excluded people has recently decreased 
and is approaching the levels observed before 
the economic crisis in 2008, almost every fourth 
person (23.7 % of the population) in the EU 
remained at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 
2015, which means that the gap to the EU target 
was 22.9 million people. Additional efforts would 
be necessary to further enhance the positive trend 
in the indicator for poverty and social exclusion 
and to meet the Europe 2020 goal.
The most widespread form of poverty in the EU 
is monetary poverty. In 2015, about 86.6 million 
people, representing 17.3 % of the total EU 
population, were at risk of poverty after social 
transfers. The second most common form of 
A
B
C
(1) Due to the structure of the survey on which most of the key social data is based (European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions), a large part of the main social indicators available in 2010, when the Europe 2020 Strategy was adopted, referred to 2008 
data for the EU-27 as the most recent data available. This is why monitoring of progress towards Europe 2020 headline targets takes EU-27 
data from 2008 as a baseline year (see European Commission, Social Europe — Current challenges and the way forward, Annual Report of 
the Social Protection Committee (2012), Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2013, p. 12).
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the amount of materially deprived people first 
increased from 2009 to 2012, and has decreased 
since then. Thus, developments in the headline 
indicator were mainly driven by changes in the 
number of severely materially deprived people.
Across all three dimensions of poverty, the most 
vulnerable groups appear to be the same, namely 
young people, the unemployed and inactive, 
single parents, households consisting of only one 
person, people with low educational attainment, 
foreign citizens born outside the EU and people 
residing in rural areas. Of all the groups examined, 
the unemployed and single parents with one or 
more dependent children faced the highest risk 
of poverty.
poverty was severe material deprivation, affecting 
almost 40.3 million people or 8.1 % of all EU 
citizens. The third dimension of poverty and social 
exclusion covered by the headline indicator ‘very 
low work intensity’ affected over 39.6 million 
people in 2015. This equalled 10.6 % of the total 
population aged 0 to 59 in the EU. People may 
be simultaneously affected by two or more forms 
of poverty, but are only counted once for the 
headline indicator.
The three dimensions of poverty and social 
exclusion captured by the headline indicator have 
developed unevenly since 2010. Monetary poverty 
has been moderately but steadily increasing 
and the overall amount of people living in 
households with very low work intensity has not 
changed drastically since 2010. At the same time, 
Introduction
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The 2017 edition of Eurostat’s annual ‘flagship 
publication’ entitled ‘Smarter, greener, more 
inclusive? — Indicators to support the Europe 2020 
strategy’ provides statistical support for the Europe 
2020 strategy, the EU’s agenda for jobs and growth 
for the current decade, and monitors progress 
towards its headline targets. The publication 
presents the most recent official statistics 
disseminated by Eurostat, with the aim of providing 
statistical analyses related to important European 
Commission policy frameworks and relevant 
economic, social and environmental phenomena. 
Impartial and objective statistical information is 
essential for evidence-based political decision-
making and defines Eurostat’s role in the context of 
the Europe 2020 strategy (1). It involves developing 
and choosing relevant indicators to support the 
strategy, producing statistical data and assuring the 
indicators’ quality.
The analysis in the five thematic chapters is based 
on the Europe 2020 headline indicators developed 
to monitor the strategy’s targets. Other indicators 
focusing on specific subgroups of society or on 
related issues that show underlying trends are also 
used to deepen the analysis and present a broader 
picture. The data used mainly come from official 
ESS sources such as the EU Labour Force Survey 
(EU LFS) or the EU Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU SILC), as well as from administrative 
sources. Data on EU-28 aggregates and individual 
Member States are presented and, where available, 
comparisons are made with the members of 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and 
candidate countries, as well as non-European 
countries such as the United States and Japan. For 
some of the headline indicators, maps presenting 
the performance of Europe’s regions and their 
progress towards the national Europe 2020 targets 
are included, even though the targets only apply 
on a national level.
The thematic chapters analyse past trends, 
generally since 2002 or 2008, up to the most 
recent year for which data are available (2015 or 
2016). They aim to document and analyse the 
trends shown by the headline indicators and the 
distance to the Europe 2020 targets, while also 
using supplementary indicators to provide the 
broader context. The chapters include references to 
analyses published by the European Commission 
on the future efforts required to meet the targets. 
Most recent data on the headline indicators and 
information on the Europe 2020 strategy are 
available on a dedicated section of Eurostat’s 
website: Europe 2020 headline indicators (2).
1. Providing statistical support to Europe 2020
(1) European Commission, Europe 2020 — A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 final, Brussels, 2010.
(2) See: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/europe-2020-indicators/europe-2020-strategy/headline-indicators-scoreboard 
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The Europe 2020 strategy was adopted by the 
European Council on 17 June 2010 (3) as the 
successor to the Lisbon strategy. It emphasises 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth as a way 
of strengthening the EU economy and preparing 
its structure for the challenges of the next decade. 
2.1 Three key priorities and eight targets
The Europe 2020 strategy puts forward three 
mutually reinforcing priorities to make Europe 
a smarter, more sustainable and more inclusive 
place to live: 
• Smart growth, through the development of an 
economy based on knowledge, research and 
innovation. 
• Sustainable growth, through the promotion 
of resource-efficient, green and competitive 
markets. 
• Inclusive growth, through policies aimed at 
fostering job creation and poverty reduction. 
In a rapidly changing world, these priorities 
are deemed essential for making the European 
economy fit for the future and for delivering 
higher employment, productivity and social 
cohesion (4). Under the three key priorities, the EU 
adopted eight targets (see Figure 0.1): 
• Smart growth: covered by the target on R&D 
and two targets on education
• Sustainable growth: covered by three targets on 
climate change and energy 
• Inclusive growth: covered by the targets 
on employment and on poverty and social 
exclusion.
The targets are monitored using a set of nine 
headline indicators and additional sub-indicators 
related to various dimensions of the data (such 
as the multidimensional concept of poverty and 
social exclusion). For a detailed overview of the 
indicators, see Table 0.1 in the Executive summary. 
The strategy’s objectives and targets are further 
Targets Flagship initiatives
Smart growth • Increasing combined public and private 
investment in R&D to 3 % of GDP
• Reducing school drop-out rates to less than 
10 %
• Increasing the share of the population aged 
30–34 having completed tertiary education to 
at least 40 %
• Innovation Union
• Youth on the move (ended in December 
2014)
• A digital agenda for Europe
Sustainable 
growth
• Reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at 
least 20 % compared to 1990 levels
• Increasing the share of renewable energy in 
final energy consumption to 20 %
• Moving towards a 20% increase in energy 
efficiency
• Resource efficient Europe
• An industrial policy for the globalisation era
Inclusive growth • Increasing the employment rate of the 
population aged 20–64 to at least 75 %
• Lifting at least 20 million people out of the risk 
of poverty and social exclusion
• An agenda for new skills and jobs
• European platform against poverty and social 
exclusion
Figure 0.1: The Europe 2020 strategy’s key priorities, headline targets and flagship initiatives
2. The Europe 2020 strategy
(3) European Council conclusions, 17 June 2010, EUCO 13/10, Brussels, 2010.
(4) European Commission, Europe 2020 — A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM (2010)2020 final, Brussels, 2010.
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supported by thematic flagship initiatives (see 
Figure 0.1). 
The eight targets belong to five thematic areas: 
employment, education, poverty and social 
exclusion, climate change and energy, and R&D 
and innovation (see Figure 0.2). These five areas 
are strongly interlinked. For example, higher 
educational levels are associated with improved 
employability and increasing the employment 
rate helps to reduce poverty. A greater capacity 
for R&D and innovation across all sectors of the 
economy, combined with increased resource 
efficiency, would improve competitiveness and 
foster job creation. Investing in cleaner, low-
carbon technologies would help the environment, 
contribute to the fight against climate change 
and create new business and employment 
opportunities (5). 
The EU targets have been translated into national 
targets. These reflect each Member State’s 
situation and the level of ambition they are 
able to reach as part of the EU-wide effort for 
implementing the Europe 2020 strategy. However, 
not in all cases are the national targets sufficiently 
ambitious to cumulatively reach the EU-level 
targets. For instance, the fulfilment of all national 
targets in the area of employment would bring 
the overall EU-28 employment rate up to 74 %, 
which would still be one percentage point below 
the Europe 2020 target of 75 %. Similarly, even if 
all Member States met their national targets on 
R&D expenditure, the EU would still fall short of 
its target of 3 % R&D intensity, reaching only 2.6 % 
by 2020 (6). 
2.2 Seven flagship initiatives
To ensure progress towards the Europe 2020 
goals, a broad range of existing EU policies and 
instruments are used, including the single market, 
the EU budget and external policy tools. The 
ten priorities of the Commission (7) (see section 
‘3.3 Ten priorities for the EU’) guide the EU 
policies and help ensure progress towards smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth. The strategy 
itself identified seven policy areas where jobs and 
growth were put forward through the following 
seven flagship initiatives (8): ‘Innovation Union’, 
‘Youth on the move’ (9), ‘Digital agenda for Europe’, 
(5) European Commission, Europe 2020 — A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 final, Brussels, 2010 (p. 11).
(6) European Commission, Taking stock of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2014) 130 final, Brussels 
(p. 12–16).
(7) Jean-Claude Juncker, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth Fairness and Democratic Change, Strasbourg, 15 July 2015.
(8) For more information on the flagship initiatives see the Europe 2020 website: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-
nutshell/flagship-initiatives/index_en.htm 
(9) The ‘Youth on the move’ flagship initiative ended in December 2014.
Europe 2020
R&D and innovation
Employment Education
Climate change
and energy
Poverty and
social exclusion
Figure 0.2: Europe 2020 strategy thematic areas
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(10) The Resource Efficiency Scoreboard, comprising about 30 indicators, is disseminated via a dedicated section on Eurostat’s website.
(11) European Commission, Taking stock of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2014) 130 final, Brussels.
(12) Id., p. 21.
(13) European Commission, Results of the public consultation on the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2015) 
100 final, Brussels, 2015.
(14) Ibid.
(15) European Commission, 2016 European Semester: Annual Growth Survey, COM(2015) 690 final, Brussels.
(16) European Commission, 2017 European Semester: Annual Growth Survey, COM(2016) 725 final, Brussels. 
(17) For more information on the Stability and Growth Pact see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/node/4287/ 
‘Resource efficient Europe’ (10), ‘An industrial policy 
for the globalisation era’, ‘Agenda for new skills 
and jobs’ and ‘European platform against poverty 
and social exclusion’. 
2.3 Taking stock of Europe 2020 — how to 
pursue smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth?
In March 2014, the Commission published a 
Communication ‘Taking stock of the Europe 
2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth’ (11). The mid-term evaluation revealed that 
progress towards the Europe 2020 targets and 
flagship initiatives had been mixed: while the EU 
was on course to meet its targets on education, 
climate and energy, it was still far from fulfilling 
the employment, research and development, and 
poverty reduction targets (12). 
Between May and October 2014, the Commission 
held a public consultation seeking stakeholders’ 
views on the lessons to be learned from the 
first years of the strategy’s implementation. 
The main conclusions drawn from the public 
consultation (13), published in 2015, were:
• ‘Europe 2020 is seen as a relevant overarching 
framework to promote jobs and growth at EU 
and national level. Its objectives and priorities 
are meaningful in the light of current and future 
challenges.
• ‘The five headline targets represent key catalysts 
for jobs and growth and help to keep the 
strategy focused.
• ‘Most of the flagship initiatives have served their 
purpose, yet their visibility has remained weak.
• There is scope and a need to improve the 
delivery of the strategy through enhanced 
ownership and involvement on the ground’  (14).
In the 2016 Annual Growth Survey (15), the 
Commission stated that it will make the best 
use of the Europe 2020 strategy and its tools by 
improving its implementation and monitoring in 
the context of the European Semester.
In the 2017 Annual Growth Survey (16), the 
Commission called on Member States to redouble 
their efforts along the so-called virtuous triangle 
of economic policy: boosting investment, 
pursuing structural reforms and ensuring 
responsible fiscal policies. Emphasis was placed 
on the importance of ensuring social fairness to 
deliver more inclusive growth, as well as on the 
need to strengthen competitiveness, innovation 
and productivity.
2.4 The European Semester: annual cycle 
of policy coordination
The success of the Europe 2020 strategy crucially 
depends on Member States coordinating 
their efforts. To ensure this, the European 
Commission has set up an annual cycle of 
coordination of economic policies known as 
the European Semester. Its main purpose is 
to foster structural reforms, to create more 
jobs and growth in line with the Europe 2020 
strategy, to boost investment, to ensure sound 
public finances (avoiding excessive government 
debt) and compliance with the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) (17) and to prevent excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances in the EU.
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Figure 0.3 presents the different steps of the 
European Semester policy cycle. These include:
• Adoption of the Annual Growth Survey (AGS) (18) 
by the European Commission, which sets out 
overall economic and social priorities for the EU 
and its Member States.
• Publication of the Commission’s Alert 
Mechanism Report (AMR) (19), the draft Joint 
Employment Report (20) and recommendations 
for the euro area (21), accompanied by a Staff 
Working Document. 
• Publication of a country report by the 
Commission services for each Member State, 
analysing its economic and social situation 
and progress with implementing the country-
specific recommendations and progress 
towards the Europe 2020 strategy. For the 
Member States selected in the Alert Mechanism 
(18) For more information on the Annual Growth Survey see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2017-european-semester-annual-
growth-survey_en 
(19) For more information on the Alert Mechanism report see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2017-european-semester-alert-
mechanism-report_en 
(20) For more information on the Draft Joint Employment Report see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2017-european-semester-draft-
joint-employment-report_en 
(21) For more information on the 2017 Recommendation for the Euro Area see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2017-european-
semester-recommendation-euro-area_en 
Figure 0.3: The European Semester 
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Figure 0.3: The European Semester 
Report, it also includes the ‘in-depth review’ of 
possible imbalances.
• Submission of the National Reform Programmes 
(NRPs) and Stability and Convergence 
Programmes (SCPs) (22) by each Member State, 
presenting concrete reforms and measures 
towards implementing the country-specific 
recommendations and the Europe 2020 
strategy. 
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• Adoption of the proposals for country-
specific recommendations for each Member 
State (except those under a stability support 
programme) by the Commission, followed 
by a formal Council endorsement of the 
country-specific recommendations. The 
recommendations focus on the issues which 
require the most urgent attention in the next 
12 to 18 months due to their macro-and 
socioeconomic significance. They are consistent 
with the Europe 2020 strategy.
(22) For more information on the National Reform Programmes and Stability and Convergence Programmes see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/
strategy/european-semester/european-semester-timeline/national-reform-programmes-and-stability-convergence-programmes_en 
Source: European Commission
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3.1 Strengthening economic governance
To ensure progress towards the Europe 2020 
goals, a broad range of existing EU policies and 
instruments are used, including the single market, 
the EU budget and external policy tools. Central 
to tackling the weaknesses revealed by the 
economic crisis and to achieving the Europe 2020 
objectives of growth and competitiveness is the 
promotion of enhanced economic governance. 
On top of and closely linked to the European 
Semester, two important elements in this respect 
are the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure 
(MIP) (23)(24) and the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
(EDP) (25) based on the Stability and Growth Pact. 
In June 2015, the President of the European 
Commission, in close cooperation with the 
President of the Euro Summit, the President of 
the Eurogroup, the President of the European 
Central Bank, and the President of the European 
Parliament, presented a report titled ‘Completing 
Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union’ (26), 
also known as the Five Presidents’ Report (27). 
It proposed a roadmap for strengthening the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by taking 
actions on four fronts: economic, financial, fiscal 
and political. As laid out in the roadmap, a number 
of immediate steps should be taken by mid-2017. 
The roadmap supports the implementation of the 
Europe 2020 strategy by proposing concrete steps 
towards ‘job creation, growth and prosperity for all 
citizens’.  
As a follow-up to the Five President’s 
report, the European Commission issued a 
Communication ‘On steps towards completing 
the Economic and Monetary Union’ (28). It laid 
out a plan for strengthening the European 
Semester by better integrating European and 
national dimensions, placing a stronger focus on 
employment and social performance, promoting 
convergence by benchmarking and pursuing 
best practices, as well as by supporting structural 
reforms through the provision of EU funds and 
technical assistance.  
At the start of the 2017 annual cycle of 
the European Semester, together with the 
‘Recommendation on the economic policy of 
the euro area for 2017–2018’ (29) the Commission 
issued a Communication ‘Towards a positive fiscal 
stance for the euro area’ (30). This sets out the case 
for a more expansionary fiscal policy for the euro 
area at this point in time to support the ongoing 
recovery and overcome the risk of a ‘low growth, 
low inflation’ situation. It emphasises that the 
quality and composition of public finances as well 
as the very different situations of Member States 
in terms of fiscal space or consolidation needs 
should be taken into account when designing 
a growth-friendly fiscal policy. In particular, 
Member States in the excessive deficit procedure 
and others still needing to progress towards 
their medium-term budgetary objective should 
continue to do so, whereas Member States with 
fiscal space should be encouraged to carry out a 
more expansionary fiscal policy.
(23) An MIP scoreboard of 14 indicators provides information for the identification of external and internal macroeconomic imbalances. 
(24) For more information on the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure see the dedicated Statistics Explained page:  http://ec.europa.eu/
eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/The_Macroeconomic_Imbalance_Procedure_(MIP)_introduced 
(25) An overview of the current situation concerning the ongoing excessive deficit procedures, as well as documentation on the closed 
procedures can be found on the Europe 2020 dedicated website: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/european-semester_en 
(26) European Commission, The Five Presidents’ Report: Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, 22 June 2015.
(27) The report was prepared by the president of the European Commission, in close cooperation with the presidents of the Euro Summit, the 
Eurogroup, the European Central Bank and the European Parliament.
(28) European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Central Bank on steps 
towards Completing Economic and Monetary Union, COM(2015) 600 final, Brussels, 2015.
(29) European Commission, Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area, COM(2016) 726 final, 
Brussels, 2016.
(30) European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions towards a positive fiscal stance for the euro area, COM(2016) 727 final, Brussels, 2016.
3 Europe 2020 in a broader policy perspective
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On 31 May 2017, as a follow-up to the White 
Paper on the future of Europe of 1 March 2017, 
the Commission adopted a Reflection Paper on 
the deepening of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (31). This document includes avenues to 
reinforce further the European Semester.
3.2 The 2030 Agenda for sustainable 
development
The Europe 2020 strategy gives recognition 
to the economic, social and environmental 
dimensions of sustainable development by 
drawing attention to education, research and 
development and innovation, low carbon 
emissions, climate resilience and environmental 
impact, and job creation and poverty reduction. 
In a broader policy perspective, the Europe 2020 
strategy plays an important role in addressing 
the internationally adopted 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development and thus putting the 
European Union on the right track to achieving a 
sustainable future.
Box 0.1: The Sustainable Development Goals
Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere 
Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and 
improved nutrition and promote sustainable 
agriculture 
Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-
being for all at all ages 
Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality 
education and promote lifelong learning 
opportunities for all 
Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all 
women and girls 
Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable 
management of water and sanitation for all 
Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, 
sustainable and modern energy for all 
Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and 
sustainable economic growth, full and productive 
employment and decent work for all 
Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote 
inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and 
foster innovation 
Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among 
countries 
Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements 
inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable 
Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and 
production patterns 
Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate 
change and its impacts* 
Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the 
oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable 
development 
Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote 
sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, 
sustainably manage forests, combat 
desertification, and halt and reverse land 
degradation and halt biodiversity loss 
Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies 
for sustainable development, provide access to 
justice for all and build effective, accountable and 
inclusive institutions at all levels 
Goal 17. Strengthen the means of 
implementation and revitalise the global 
partnership for sustainable development
* Acknowledging that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the primary international, 
intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change.
(31) European Commission, Reflection Paper on the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union, COM/2017/0291 final, Brussels, 2017.
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The 2030 Agenda was formally adopted by 
world leaders at the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Summit in September 2015. The 
document, titled ‘Transforming our world: the 
2030 agenda for sustainable development’ (32), 
consists of a declaration, a set of 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs; see Box 0.1 for a full 
list) and 169 related targets, a section on the 
means of implementation and on the follow-
up and review of the 2030 Agenda. The EU was 
instrumental in shaping the global 2030 Agenda, 
which is fully consistent with Europe’s vision and 
has now become the world’s blueprint for global 
sustainable development.
In March 2017, at its 48th session, the United 
Nations Statistical Commission (UNSC) adopted 
a global indicator framework for monitoring 
progress towards the SDGs. The global list 
consists of 244 indicators to measure progress 
towards the 169 targets of the SDGs. In 
November 2016, the European Commission 
released the Communication ‘Next steps for a 
sustainable European future: European action 
for sustainability’ (33), outlining its approach 
to achieving the 2030 Agenda. It presents the 
EU’s answer to the 2030 Agenda and includes 
two work streams. The first work stream is to 
fully integrate the SDGs in the European policy 
framework and current Commission priorities, 
assessing where we stand and identifying the 
most relevant sustainability concerns. A second 
track is related to reflection work on further 
developing the EU’s longer term vision and the 
focus of sectoral policies after 2020, preparing for 
the long-term implementation of the SDGs.
Eurostat has been leading the process of 
developing a reference indicator framework for 
monitoring the Sustainable Development Goals in 
an EU context. To achieve this, it has been working 
closely with European Commission Directorate 
Generals and with the consultation of Commission 
services and experts from Member States’ national 
statistical institutes. Several bodies have been 
consulted, including Council Committees, the 
(32) United Nations, Transforming our World: the 2030 agenda for sustainable development, A/RES/70/1, 25 September 2015.
(33) European Commission, Next steps for a sustainable European future: European action for sustainability, COM(2016) 739, Brussels, 2016.
(34) For more information on the investment plan see: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/jobs-growth-and-investment_en 
(35) For more information on the digital single market see: https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market_en 
(36) For more information on the energy union see: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union-and-climate_en 
(37) For more information on the internal market see: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/internal-market_en 
(38) For more information on the Economic and Monetary union see: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-
economic-and-monetary-union_en 
(39) For more information on the EU-US free trade agreement see: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/balanced-eu-us-free-trade-agreement_en
(40) For more information on justice and fundamental rights see: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/justice-and-fundamental-rights_en
(41) For more information on migration policy see: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/migration_en 
(42) For more information on the EU as a stronger global actor see: https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/stronger-global-actor_en 
(43) For more information on making the EU more democratic see: https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/democratic-change_en  
Box 0.2: The ten European Commission priorities
1.  A new boost for jobs, growth and 
investment (34)
2.  A connected digital single market (35)
3.   A resilient Energy Union with a forward-
looking climate change policy (36)
4.   A deeper and fairer internal market with a 
strengthened industrial base (37)
5.   A deeper and fairer Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) (38)
6.   A reasonable and balanced free trade 
agreement with the United States (39)
7.   An area of justice and fundamental rights 
based on mutual trust (40)
8.  Towards a new policy on migration (41)
9.  Europe as a stronger global actor (42)
10.  A Union of democratic change (43) 
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European Statistical Advisory Committee (ESAC), 
non-governmental organisations, academia and 
other international organisations. 
The EU SDG indicator set received a favourable 
opinion by the European Statistical System 
Committee in May 2017. The list comprises 100 
indicators, structured along the 17 SDGs and 
covering the social, economic, environmental 
and institutional dimensions of sustainability as 
represented by the Agenda 2030. Each SDG is 
presented through a set of five to six indicators 
reflecting its broad objective and ambition, and 
additional multi-purpose indicators to track 
two or more targets across goals. The indicator 
set looks at how the EU policies contribute to 
the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. In this 
respect, it complements from an EU perspective 
the UN global indicators, which refer instead to 
the goals and targets as specified in the 2030 
Agenda. Although the EU SDG indicator set has 
been aligned as far as appropriate with the UN list 
of global indicators, it does not intend to cover all 
aspects of the SDGs or to fully reproduce the UN 
global list. Instead, it includes indicators relevant 
to the EU which allow SDGs to be monitored in 
the context of long-term EU policies, such as the 
Europe 2020 strategy, the 10 Commission priorities, 
the Circular Economy Package or other policies or 
initiatives reported in the staff working document 
‘Key European action supporting the 2030 Agenda 
and the Sustainable Development’ (44).
For more information on the SDGs, both on 
the process at UN level as well as from the 
European perspective, please refer to the Eurostat 
publication ‘Sustainable development in the 
European Union — A statistical glance from the 
viewpoint of the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals’ (45), as well as to the forthcoming first 
edition of the Eurostat EU SDG monitoring report, 
based on the approved EU SDG indicator list. 
3.3 Ten priorities for the EU
Before being elected president of the European 
Commission in July 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker 
presented his political agenda, highlighting ten 
priority areas, in a document entitled ‘A New Start 
for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth Fairness 
and Democratic Change’ (46) (see Box 0.2). These 
are referred to as ‘political guidelines’ for the 
European Commission and address some of the 
key challenges facing the European economy and 
society. Emphasis is placed on achieving concrete 
results in the identified priority areas whereas 
other policy areas are left to Member States 
who are considered better equipped to form 
effective policy responses at national, regional and 
local level.   
In September 2016, the Commission released a 
report on Progress on the European Commission’s 
10 Priorities (47). As outlined in the document, in its 
first year the investment plan for jobs and growth, 
which has the ambition to mobilise at least EUR 315 
billion for investment over three years, has raised 
EUR 116 billion in new investments across 26 of 
the EU Member States. Since its first year in office, 
the European Commission has been working on 
the Energy Union, the Digital Single Market and a 
Capital Markets Union, among others. Important 
progress in further cutting mobile roaming charges 
and adopting new EU data protection rules was 
made in 2016. A roadmap for deepening the 
Economic and Monetary Union was presented in 
the Five Presidents’ Report (European Commission, 
2015). The Commission has worked towards a 
coordinated European response to the challenges 
of increased movement of migrants and refugees 
and has supported most affected Member States 
with a financial assistance of EUR 91 million under 
the national programmes for the period 2014–2020. 
The EU has also taken actions for responding to the 
terrorist threat, strengthening EU’s external borders 
and tackling radicalisation through the creation 
(44) Commission Staff Working Document, Key European action supporting the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals, SWD(2016) 
390 final, Brussels, 2016.
(45) Eurostat, Sustainable development in the European Union — A statistical glance from the viewpoint of the UN Sustainable Development Goals, 
Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2016.
(46) Jean-Claude Juncker, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth Fairness and Democratic Change, Strasbourg, 15 July 2015.
(47) European Commission, State of the Union 2016: Towards a better Europe— A Europe that protects, empowers and defends, 2016.
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of the new European Boarder and Coast Guard, 
Europol’s new European Counter-Terrorism Centre 
and the Radicalisation Awareness Network’s Centre 
of Excellence, to name a few examples. 
3.4 White Paper on the future of Europe
At the Rome Summit on 1 March 2017 the 
Commission presented a White Paper (48), setting 
out a broader vision for the future of the EU and 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The 
White Paper outlines the main demographic, 
economic and political challenges the EU will be 
facing in the future and presents five scenarios of 
the potential state of the Union in 2025. 
• Scenario 1: Carrying On — The EU-27 ‘focuses 
on delivering its positive reform agenda’ in the 
spirit of the Juncker Commission’s New Start for 
Europe from 2014 and the Bratislava Declaration 
from 2016 (49).
• Scenario 2: Nothing but the Single Market — 
The EU-27 is ‘gradually re-centred on the single 
market’ as Member States are not able to find 
common ground on many policy areas.
• Scenario 3: Those Who Want More, Do More — 
The EU-27 proceeds as today, but in addition 
it ‘allows willing Member States to do more 
together in specific areas’ such as defence, 
internal security, taxation or social matters. 
• Scenario 4: Doing Less, More Efficiently — The 
EU-27 ‘focuses on delivering more and faster in 
selected policy areas, while doing less’ where it 
is perceived to have more limited added value. 
• Scenario 5: Doing Much More Together — 
‘Member States decide to share more power, 
resources and decision-making across the board’.
The White Paper aims to open an honest debate 
on how the Union should evolve in the years 
to come. To facilitate this process, the European 
Commission will host a series of ‘Future of Europe 
Debates’ across Europe’s cities and regions to 
harness opinions of citizens on the desired 
way forward and will further contribute to the 
discussions with a series of reflection papers. 
This process allow a collective view on a course 
of action to be reached in time for the European 
Parliament elections in June 2019.
The White Paper has been supplemented by 
five reflection papers on specific issues that are 
important for the future of the European Union 
with 27 Member States  — the social dimension of 
Europe, harnessing globalisation, the deepening of 
the economic and monetary union, the future of 
European defence and the future of EU finances.
(48) European Commission, White Paper on the future of Europe. Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2015, COM(2017) 2025, Brussels, 2017.
(49) The Bratislava Declaration, Bratislava, 16 September, 2016.
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Employment and other labour market-related 
issues are at the heart of social and political 
debate in the EU. Paid employment is crucial 
for ensuring sufficient living standards and it 
provides the necessary foundation for people 
to achieve their personal goals and aspirations. 
Moreover, employment contributes to economic 
performance, quality of life and social inclusion, 
making it a cornerstone of socioeconomic 
development and well-being. 
The EU’s labour force is shrinking as a result of 
demographic changes that have led to a greater 
share of older people than younger people in 
the population. Because of these changes, a 
smaller number of workers are now supporting a 
growing number of dependent people, putting 
the sustainability of Europe’s social model, welfare 
systems, economic growth and public finances 
at risk. In addition, the economic crisis exposed 
structural weaknesses in the EU’s economy. At 
the same time, global challenges are intensifying 
and competition from developed and emerging 
economies such as China and India is increasing (1). 
To face the challenges of an ageing population 
and rising global competition, the EU needs 
to make full use of its labour potential. The 
Europe 2020 strategy, through its ‘inclusive 
growth’ priority, places a strong emphasis on 
job creation. One of its five headline targets 
addresses employment, with the aim of raising 
the employment rate of 20 to 64 year olds to 75 % 
by 2020. This goal is supported by the so-called 
‘Employment Package’ (2), which seeks to create 
more and better jobs throughout the EU. 
The EU’s employment target is closely interlinked 
with the other strategy goals on research and 
development (R&D) (see the chapter on ‘R&D 
and innovation’, page 55), education (see the 
chapter on ‘Education’, page 107) and poverty 
and social exclusion (see the chapter on 
‘Poverty and social exclusion’, page 129). Better 
educational levels increase employability and 
higher employment rates can in turn contribute 
to economic performance and poverty alleviation, 
thus addressing the strategy’s inclusive growth 
objective. Moreover, boosting R&D capacity and 
innovation could improve competitiveness and 
thus contribute to job creation. 
This chapter analyses progress towards the 
EU’s employment target, which is monitored 
through the headline indicator ‘Employment 
rate — age group 20 to 64’. This is complemented 
by contextual indicators on the characteristics 
of the labour force and on employment and 
unemployment trends. The analysis looks into the 
structure of the EU’s labour force and its long-
term influence on employment in relation to the 
strategy’s main target groups such as young, older, 
low-skilled workers, women and migrants. The 
chapter also covers short-term factors related to 
the economy’s cyclical development (represented 
by GDP growth) such as employment growth of 
different economic sectors, non-standard work 
contracts and youth unemployment. Finally, 
the analysis investigates inefficiencies in the 
labour market by examining over-qualification 
rates, labour force and employment trends by 
educational attainment, job vacancy rate and 
long-term unemployment.
1.1 Employment — why does it matter?
Europe 2020 strategy target on 
employment 
The Europe 2020 strategy sets out a 
target of ‘increasing the employment 
rate of the population aged 20 to 64 to 
at least 75 %’ by 2020 (3).
(1) European Commission, Europe 2020 — A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 final, Brussels, 2010 (p. 5, 7, 17); 
European Commission, An Agenda for new skills and jobs: A European contribution towards full employment, COM(2010) 682 final, Strasbourg, 
2010 (p. 2).
(2) European Commission, Towards a job-rich recovery, COM(2012) 173 final, 2012.
(3) European Commission, Taking stock of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2014) 130 final. 
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‘Activity’, ‘employment’, ‘unemployment’ 
and ‘labour force’ — main definitions 
People are classified as employed, unemployed 
and economically inactive according to the 
definitions of the ILO (4). On the EU level, the two 
main sources for the respective data are the EU 
Labour Force Survey (EU LFS) (5) and National 
Accounts (including GDP) (6). 
The EU LFS is a large sample survey of private 
households, excluding the population living in 
institutional households (such as workers’ homes 
or prisons). The survey classifies respondents 
as employed, unemployed or economically 
inactive based on information collected through 
the survey questionnaire, relating mainly to their 
activity during a reference week. The EU LFS data 
refer to the resident population, so the results 
relate to the country of residence of people in 
employment, rather than to their country of 
work (7). 
‘Labour force’ refers to the economically 
active population. This is the total number of 
employed and unemployed people. Persons in 
employment are those who, during the reference 
week, did any work for pay or profit, or were not 
working but had a job from which they were 
temporarily absent. The term ‘work’ is defined as 
any work for pay or profit during the reference 
week, even for as little as one hour. Pay includes 
cash payments or payment in kind (payment in 
goods or services rather than money), regardless 
of whether or not payment was received in the 
week the work was done. Anyone who receives 
a wage for on-the-job training that involves the 
production of goods or services is counted as 
being in employment. Self-employed and family 
workers are also included. 
Employment rates represent share of employed 
persons in the total population in the same age 
group and are typically published for the age 
group 15 to 64 years. However, in a majority 
of Member States it is rare to attain secondary 
education while working, even part-time. 
Therefore, 15 to 19 year olds who are still in 
education or training are in the main not seeking 
employment. Students that attain higher levels of 
education tend to enter the labour market later. 
This is in line with the strategy’s headline targets 
on education that promote further education (see 
the chapter on ‘Education’, page 107). As a result, 
the lower age limit of the Europe 2020 strategy’s 
employment target has been raised to 20 years (8). 
The upper age limit for the employment rate 
is usually set to 64 years, taking into account 
statutory retirement ages across Europe (9). 
Unemployed persons comprise people aged 15 
to 74 (10) who were: 
1.  Without work during the reference week, 
meaning they neither had a job nor were 
at work (for one hour or more) in paid 
employment or self-employment. 
2.  Available to start work, meaning they were 
available for paid employment or self-
employment before the end of the two weeks 
following the reference week. 
3.  Actively seeking work, meaning they had 
taken concrete steps in the four-week period 
ending with the reference week to seek paid 
employment or self-employment or who found 
a job to start within at most three months. 
The unemployment rate is the number of 
unemployed persons as a percentage of the 
labour force representing the total number of 
people who are employed and unemployed. 
(4) For more information see the ILO website: http://www.ilo.org/global/lang--en/index.htm
(5) For more information on the EU LFS, see: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey
(6) For more information see: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts
(7) This difference may be significant in countries with large cross-border flows.
(8) João Medeiros & Paul Minty, Analytical support in the setting of EU employment rate targets for 2020, Working Paper 1/2012, European 
Commission (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion), Brussels, 2012 (p. 12).
(9) European Commission (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs), The 2012 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary 
projections for the EU27 Member States (2010–2060), 2012 (p.  99).
(10) To take into account people that would like to (or have to) work after the age of 64 but are unable to find a job, the upper age limit for the 
unemployment rate is usually set to 74. As a result, the observed age group for unemployed persons is 15 to 74 years. 
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(11) João Medeiros & Paul Minty, Analytical support in the setting of EU employment rate targets for 2020, Working Paper 1/2012, European 
Commission (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion), Brussels, 2012 (p.  58).
(12) European Commission (Directorate-General for Justice), Age and Employment, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 
2011 (p.  50).
The youth unemployment rate is the 
unemployment rate of people aged 15 to 24; 
for the purpose of this chapter the analysis is 
extended to 15 to 29 year olds, which is the age 
group addressed by the EU Youth Strategy. In 
contrast, the youth unemployment ratio is 
the percentage of unemployed young people 
compared to the total population of that age 
group (not only the active, but also the inactive 
such as students). 
The long-term unemployment rate is the 
number of people unemployed for 12 months or 
longer as a percentage of the labour force. 
The economically active population is the 
sum of employed and unemployed persons. In 
contrast, inactive persons are those who, during 
the reference week, were neither employed nor 
unemployed. The activity rate is the share of 
the population that is economically active. The 
earliest age that a person can leave full-time 
compulsory education in the EU is 15 (11) and in 
many EU Member States this is also the minimum 
employment age (12). Therefore, activity rate 
measures the economic activity of people aged 15 
years or older. 
In 2015 the 
employment rate in the 
EU reached 71.1 %. As 
a result, the distance 
to the Europe 2020 
employment target of 
75 % narrowed to 3.9 
percentage points.
In 2016, seven Member States — Lithuania, 
Germany, the Czech Republic, Sweden, 
Ireland, Estonia and Latvia — had already 
met their respective national employment 
targets.
Employment rates across the EU tend to 
show a north–south divide on a country as 
well as a regional level. Some of the best 
performing countries such as Germany, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom also 
record high regional employment rates.
In Scandinavian and western European 
countries employment rates tend to be 
higher in rural areas. Whereas in most Baltic, 
southern, central or eastern Member States 
cities exhibit higher employment rates.
Considerably lower employment rates are 
observed for women than men. The gender 
employment gaps are widest for women in 
age groups associated with having caring 
responsibilities for children, dependent 
family members or grandchildren.
People with low educational attainment 
form one of the most disadvantaged 
groups in the labour market, exhibiting low 
employment rates. 
Educational attainment levels and 
knowledge of their host country’s language 
have a strong influence on how well non-EU 
citizens integrate into the labour market. 
People who migrated to the EU to join their 
families or for international protection are 
among the most disadvantaged groups in 
the labour market.
1.2 EU employment on the rise again —  
signs of gradual recovery
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The headline indicator ‘Employment rate — age 
group 20 to 64’ shows the share of employed 20 
to 64 year olds in the total EU population (13) (see 
Figure 1.1). 
In 2016, 71.1 % of the EU population aged 20 to 64 
were employed. This is by far the highest share 
that has been observed since 2002. However, it 
is still 3.9 percentage points behind the EU 2020 
employment target of 75 %. The target excludes 
people below the age of 20 because many 15 to 
19 year olds are still in education or training and 
are not seeking employment. As a result they tend 
to show low activity rates  — only 20.3 % were part 
of the labour force in 2016 (14).
Not all people are economically active. In 2016, 
6.5 % of the population were unemployed, the 
remaining 22.5 % were inactive, meaning they 
were not (actively) looking for work.
(13) The reason for choosing this age group over the ‘usual’ working-age population 15 to 64 years old is explained in the section ‘“Activity”, 
“employment”, “unemployment” and “labour force” — main definitions’ earlier in this chapter.
(14) Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsa_pganws).
1.2.1 North–south divide in employment 
rates across the EU
In 2016 employment rates among Member 
States ranged from 56.2 % in Greece to 81.2 % in 
Sweden (see Figure 1.2). Northern and central 
European countries recorded the highest rates; 
eight countries even exceeded the 75 % EU 
employment target. With employment rates 
below 65 %, Mediterranean countries dominated 
the lower end of the scale. Employment rates 
in EFTA countries Iceland and Switzerland were 
higher than in any EU Member State. 
Between 2008 and 2013, employment fell in 
most EU countries, since then it recovered for 
all Member States except Luxembourg, which 
experienced rising employment between 2008 
and 2013 and a small decline of 0.4 percentage 
points since 2013. However, in 16 Member States 
2020 target
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Figure 1.1: Employment rate age-group 20 to 64, EU-28, 2002–2016
(%)
Europe 2020 headline indicator 
Source: Eurostat (online data code: t2020_10)
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the employment rates were still below their 2008 
levels in 2016. This indicates these countries may 
still have not fully recovered from the impacts of 
the crisis on their labour markets. The strongest 
falls were recorded in Greece (– 10.1 percentage 
points), Cyprus (– 7.7 percentage points) and 
Spain (– 4.6 percentage points). However, all 
these countries were back on a ‘growth path’ by 
2016. Since 2008 employment rates have grown 
the most in Malta (10.4 percentage points) and 
Hungary (10.0 percentage points). 
To reflect different national circumstances, the 
common EU target has been translated into 
national targets (15). These range from 62.9 % for 
Croatia to 80.0 % for Denmark, the Netherlands 
and Sweden. In 2016, seven Member States 
had already met their national employment 
targets. Lithuania surpassed its national target 
(15) See ‘Europe 2020 Targets’ 
by 2.4 percentage points, with an employment 
rate of 75.2 %. Germany, the Czech Republic, 
Sweden, Ireland, Estonia and Latvia also recorded 
employment rates above their national targets. Of 
the remaining Member States, Malta was closest 
to its national target, with 0.4 percentage points 
below. Greece and Spain were the most distant, 
at 13.8 and 10.1 percentage points below their 
national targets, respectively. 
Compared with the world’s other main 
economies, the EU employment rate lies in the 
middle of the range (see Figure 1.3). In most non-
EU G20 countries, the employment rate ranged 
between 74.3 % for Japan and 61 % for Mexico. 
Three countries experienced lower levels in 2016: 
Saudi Arabia (52.5 %), India (49.9 %) and South 
Africa (43.7 %).
Figure 1.2: Employment rate age-group 20 to 64, by country, 2008 and 2016
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1.2.2 Highest employment rates recorded 
in regions in north-western and central 
Europe
The differences in the employment rate across 
Member States, shown in Figure 1. 2, are also 
reflected in the cross-country regional distribution 
of employment rates (at NUTS 2 level). Map 1 
(overleaf) shows that the highest regional 
employment rates were mainly recorded in 
north-western and central Europe, particularly 
in Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands, Austria and the Czech Republic. 
In 2016, the Finnish region ‘Åland’ had the 
highest employment rate in the EU, at 86.2 %, 
followed by ‘Stockholm’ (Sweden) and ‘Berkshire, 
Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire’ (United 
Kingdom), both 83.4 %. At the other end of the 
scale, the lowest rates were observed around 
the Mediterranean, in particular in southern 
Italy and Spain, and in Greece, as well as in the 
French overseas regions and the outlying Spanish 
autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla). In 2016, the 
Italian regions Campania, Calabria and Sicilia had 
the lowest employment rates in the EU of less 
than 45 %. 
Map 2 (overleaf) shows the change in regional 
employment rates since 2008. Among the 275 
NUTS 2 regions for which data are available, 43 % 
experienced a fall in their employment rates over 
the observed period. Among the hardest hit 
were several regions in Greece, with reductions 
of 8 percentage points or more. In contrast, 
employment rates increased in 154 regions from 
2008 to 2016. Growth rates of 4 percentage points 
or more were observed in 57 of these regions, 24 
of which were in Germany. Increases of more than 
8 percentage points were recorded for regions 
in Hungary (Észak-Alföld, Észak-Magyarország, Dél-
Dunántúl, Dél-Alföld), Malta, the United Kingdom 
(Inner London — West), Germany (Berlin), Romania 
Figure 1.3: Employment rate age-group 15 to 64, by country, 2008 and 2016 (¹)
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(1) International data for the age group 20–64 are not available, 
therefore this graph refers to the age group 15–64.
(²)  Non standard age group 16-64.
(³)  2008 data refer to non standard age group 15-72.
(⁴)  2015 data instead of 2016.
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(¹⁰) 2010 data instead of 2008.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsi_emp_a) and the International Labour Organisation (ILOSTAT)
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(16) Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfst_r_ergau).
(Nord-Est), Poland (Dolnoslaskie) and France 
(Corse). 
1.2.3 Urban areas in Baltic, southern and 
eastern Member States reporting higher 
employment rates
Employment rates vary not only between regions, 
but also by degree of urbanisation. This reflects 
differences in economic performance, industrial 
structure and the skill composition of the local 
population. In 2016, the EU employment was 
almost equally distributed among more and less 
densely populated areas, with cities recording an 
employment rate of 71.1 %, towns and suburbs 
71.2 % and rural areas 70.8 % (for age group 20 
to 64) (16). However, in most western European 
countries (Belgium, Germany, France, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Austria) 
employment rates tend to be higher in rural 
areas. In contrast, most Baltic (Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania), southern (Spain, Italy, Cyprus and 
Malta) and central or eastern Member States 
(Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Romania 
and Croatia) exhibit higher employment rates in 
cities. The exceptions are Greece, which records 
higher employment rates in rural areas (60.1 %) 
than in cities (54.5 %), Slovenia (70.8 % in rural 
areas, 68.9 % in cities) and Portugal, which also has 
slightly higher employment rates in rural areas 
than in cities, 70.7 % and 69.2 % respectively. In the 
Nordic EU countries, the Czech Republic, Slovenia 
and Ireland, the urban-rural employment rates 
differ only slightly. This pattern is also roughly 
mirrored in the differences in poverty by degree of 
urbanisation (see also the chapter on ‘Poverty and 
social exclusion’, page 129).
1.2.4 Lower employment rates of younger 
and older people 
In 2016, the employment rate of people aged 
30 to 54 was significantly higher than for the 
overall working-age population aged 20 to 
64 (see Figure 1.4). In contrast, considerably 
lower employment rates were observed for 
young people aged 20 to 29. In addition, the 
employment gap between the young cohort 
and those aged 30 to 54 years has widened in 
recent years. This may reflect the generally less 
secure position of young people in the labour 
market, which makes youth employment more 
sensitive to the macro-economic situation than 
adult employment. Another important root 
cause might be the structural characteristics of 
school-to-work transitions. These structural factors 
include, among others, unsatisfactory outcomes 
of education and training systems, segmentation 
of labour markets affecting young people in 
particular, as well as the low capacity of public 
Figure 1.4: Employment rate, by age group, EU-28, 2002–2016
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Map 1.1: Employment rate age-group 20 to 64, by NUTS 2 regions, 2016
(% of population aged 20–64)
Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfst_r_lfe2emprt)
Administrative Boundaries: © EuroGeographics © UN-FAO © Turkstat
Employment rate age-group 20 to 64, by NUTS 2 regions, 2016
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Map 1.2: Change in employment rate age-group 20 to 64, by NUTS 2 regions, 2008–2016 (1)
(percentage points difference between 2016 and 2008, population aged 20–64)
(¹)  Breaks in time series between 2008 and 2016 for several regions (too numerous to list); change 2010–2016 for London (UK) and Slovenia.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfst_r_lfe2emprt)
Administrative Boundaries: © EuroGeographics © UN-FAO © Turkstat
(¹) Breaks in time series between 2008 and 2016 for several regions (too numerous to list); change 2010-2016 for London (UK) and Slovenia.
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(17) European Commission, Youth Employment, European Semester Thematic Fiche, 2016 (p. 1).
(18) European Commission (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion), Employment and Social Developments in Europe 
2015, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2016. 
(19) Source: Eurostat (online data code: tsdde420).
(20) See footnote 18.
(21) See footnote 18, p. 57.
(22) Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsa_ergan).
employment services to provide tailored services 
to young people and limited outreach to young 
people in the most vulnerable situations (17). 
The lowest employment rate among the working-
age population was reported for the group aged 
55 to 64 years. However, employment in this 
group has risen more or less continuously since 
2002. Growth has been even more pronounced 
for older women (19.8 percentage points) than 
for older men (13.8 percentage points) since 2002. 
These increases could be linked to structural 
factors such as cohorts with better educational 
attainment moving up the age pyramid as well 
as recent pension reforms, such as increases in 
the pensionable age, the age for early retirement 
and length of contribution. This has led to longer 
working lives for both women and men (18). 
The duration of working life is measured as the 
number of years a person aged 15 is expected 
to be active in the labour market. Over the past 
years, this has risen in the EU by 2.5 years, from 
32.9 years in 2002 to 35.4 years in 2015. The rise 
was higher for women (3.3 years) than for men 
(1.7 years). However, in 2015 men could still expect 
to stay in work much longer (37.9 years) than 
women (32.8 years) (19). Other factors that have 
extended working life include flexible working 
time and work organisation, access to training for 
older workers and long-term care and childcare 
provision (20).
These trends reaffirm the Europe 2020 strategy’s 
focus on 55 to 64 year old men and women 
as a way of boosting the overall employment 
rate: ‘A longer working life will both support the 
sustainability and the adequacy of pensions, as 
well as bring growth and general welfare gains for 
an economy. Higher employment rates among 
older people are also a precondition for the EU’s 
ability to reach the 2020 target, just as adequate 
pension systems are a precondition for achieving 
the poverty reduction target’ (21) (see also the 
chapter on ‘Poverty and social exclusion‘, page 129). 
Interestingly, for a majority of Member States (19 
countries in total), and most notably for Spain, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Bulgaria, the rise in 
the employment rate for older people (aged 55 
to 64) between 2006 and 2016 was associated 
with a fall in the employment rate for younger 
people (aged 20 to 24) (22). In this context, the 
higher employment rates for the older age groups 
are likely to contribute to increases in the overall 
employment rate unless it is counterbalanced by 
bigger increases in youth unemployment or youth 
inactivity.
Employment rates for younger and older 
people are considerably lower than the average 
employment rates. However, while employment 
rates for the elderly are rising, young people are 
one of the most vulnerable groups on the labour 
market.
1.2.5 Women still have lower employment 
rates but the gender employment gap is 
shrinking
Despite women becoming increasingly well 
qualified and even out-performing men in terms 
of educational attainment (see also the chapter 
on ‘Poverty and social exclusion’, page 129), the 
employment rates and activity rates of women 
are lower than those for men. But for all age 
groups, the gender employment gap — the 
difference in employment rates between men and 
women  — has been decreasing (see Figure 1.5). 
A number of structural factors influencing the 
participation of women in the labour market may 
account for why they have been ‘catching up’ with 
men. These include changes in social values and 
attitudes, policies enabling women to reconcile 
paid work with household responsibilities such 
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(23) European Commission, An Agenda for new skills and jobs: A European contribution towards full employment, COM(2010) 682 final, 2010 (p. 5).
(24) European Commission, Towards a job-rich recovery, COM(2012) 173 final, 2012 (p. 10).
Figure 1.5: Gender employment gap, by age group, EU-28, 2002–2016 (¹)
(Difference between employment rates of men and women, in percentage points)
Age group 50–64
Age group 25–49
Age group 20–24
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(¹) Break in series in 2005.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsa_ergan)
Box 1.1: Employment policies targeting women 
One of the priorities of the flagship initiative 
‘An Agenda for new skills and jobs’ is to create 
new momentum for flexicurity policies aimed 
at modernising labour markets and promoting 
work through new forms of flexibility and 
security. Under the flexibility component, 
‘Flexible and reliable contractual arrangements’, 
the flagship initiative calls for ‘putting greater 
weight on internal flexibility in times of 
economic downturn’. According to the 2010 
European Commission Communication ‘An 
Agenda for new skills and jobs: A European 
contribution towards full employment’ (23), 
‘Flexibility also allows men and women 
to combine work and care commitments, 
enhancing in particular the contribution of 
women to the formal economy and to growth, 
through paid work outside the home.’ 
The security component is addressed by the 
EU employment package ‘Towards a job-rich 
recovery’ under its objective of restoring the 
dynamics of labour markets. As laid down in the 
2012 European Commission Communication 
‘Towards a job-rich recovery’ (24), this calls for 
‘security in employment transitions’, such as the 
transition from maternity leave to employment: 
‘the integration of women in the labour market 
[deserves particular attention], by providing 
equal pay, adequate childcare, eliminating all 
discrimination and tax-benefit disincentives that 
discourage female participation, and optimising 
the duration of maternity and parental leave.’ 
More recently, the European Pillar of Social 
Rights sets out a number of key principles and 
rights to support fair and well-functioning 
labour markets and welfare systems. There 
are three main categories of the pillar: 1) Equal 
opportunities and access to labour market; 2) 
Fair working conditions; and 3) Social protection 
and inclusion. Many of the principles support 
higher labour market participation of women, 
and notably those related to gender equality, 
work-life balance, childcare and support to 
children and long-term care. 
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as child care provision, flexible working hours, 
reduction in financial disincentives and pension 
reforms (25). European employment policies 
promoting new forms of flexibility and security 
are addressing the specific situation of women to 
help raise their employment rates in line with the 
headline target (see Box 1.1).
However, despite an increasing share of women 
in the EU labour force, their absolute numbers 
are still fewer than men. In 2016, the gender 
employment gap was highest for 30 to 34 year 
olds, at 14.3 percentage points. This age group 
also showed the highest activity rate gap between 
men and women at 14.5 percentage points. This is 
not surprising as this is the age when women are 
more likely to take responsibility for childcare and 
household duties than men. In addition to caring 
responsibilities, women can face strong financial 
disincentives in tax-benefit systems when entering 
the labour market or wanting to work more. Time 
out of the labour force for these reasons might 
also affect employment in later years because 
finding a job becomes more difficult the longer 
a person is not employed. This might partially 
explain why gender employment gaps in 2016 
were smaller for younger cohorts. 
Gender gaps in older age cohorts are also 
particularly high, which may be a result of a cohort 
effect (women who had not participated in the 
labour force when they were young moving 
up the age pyramid) or reflect the lack of care 
facilities for grandchildren or dependent parents. 
Women are more likely than men to take on care 
responsibilities for elderly or dependent family 
members with long-term care needs and are 
therefore more likely to reduce their working 
hours or leave the labour market. In addition to 
care responsibilities, difficulties in finding a job 
after prolonged unemployment can further affect 
the employment rate of older female cohorts (26).
1.2.6 Higher education levels increase 
employability 
Educational attainment levels are another reason 
why employment rates vary between different 
labour groups. 
Employment rates are generally higher for 
more educated people (see Figure 1.6). In 
2016, the employment rate among tertiary 
education graduates was much higher than 
the EU average total (71.1 %). In contrast, just 
slightly more than half of those with at most 
(25) European Commission (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion), Employment and Social Developments in Europe 
in 2015, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 (p. 22).
(26) European Commission, Labour market participation of women, European Semester Thematic Fiche, 2016.
Figure 1.6: Employment rate age group 20 to 64, by educational attainment level, 2002–2016 (¹)
(%)
Tertiary education (ISCED levels 5–8)
Upper secondary and post-secondary 
non-tertiary (ISCED levels 3–4)
Less than primary, primary and lower
secondary (ISCED levels 0–2)
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(¹)  Breaks in time series in 2005 and 2014 (switch from ISCED 1997 to ISCED 2011).
Source: Eurostat (online data code: tsdec430)
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primary or lower secondary education were 
employed. The employment rate for people 
with upper secondary or post-secondary 
non-tertiary education was in between these 
levels and slightly above the overall EU average 
employment rate.
These findings underline the importance 
of education for employability (see Box 1.2). 
Increasing educational attainment and equipping 
people with skills for the knowledge society are, 
therefore, a major focus of European employment 
policies addressing Europe 2020 headline targets 
on employment and education (see the chapter 
on ‘Education’, page 107). 
1.2.7 Employment rates among non-EU 
migrants are comparatively low
Economic migration is becoming increasingly 
important for the EU’s ability to deal with a 
shrinking labour force and expected skills 
shortages. According to European Commission 
estimates, without net migration the working-
age population aged 15 to 64 will shrink by 12 % 
in 2030 and by 33 % in 2060 compared with 
2009 levels (27). 
Country of origin can impact the labour market 
performance of individuals. Migrant workers from 
countries outside the EU tend to occupy low-
skilled and insecure jobs with temporary contracts 
and poorer working conditions. Much lower 
employment rates are reported for this group 
than for EU citizens (see Figure 1.7) (28). In 2016, the 
employment rate of non-EU nationals aged 20 
to 64 was 14.5 percentage points below the total 
employment rate (see Box 1.3). Migrants are also 
among the first to lose their jobs during economic 
setbacks. In addition, in the past few years, the EU 
experienced an unprecedented inflow of asylum 
seekers, with submitted asylum applications 
reaching 2.2 million in 2015 and the first nine 
months of 2016 (30). However, asylum seekers are 
not a homogeneous group. Their integration into 
the labour market depends highly on their level of 
education and the knowledge of the host-country 
language. Nevertheless, refugees are a small 
group among non-EU migrants (7 %). In 2014, 
more than half of non-EU born migrants aged 
15–64 came to the EU for family reasons, followed 
by those that came for work (25 %) or study (7 %). 
The lowest employment rates were observed for 
those who migrated for family reunification and 
refugees, 53 % and 56 % respectively (31).
Box 1.2: Employment policies 
and education 
Investing in skills is also a priority of the 
EU employment package ‘Towards a 
job-rich recovery’. Under its objective of 
restoring the dynamics of labour markets, 
the European Commission calls for better 
monitoring of skill needs and ‘a close 
co-operation between the worlds of 
education and work’. 
It also addresses youth employment, 
calling for ‘security in employment 
transitions’, such as the transition of 
young people from education to work. 
It also reaffirms the EU’s commitment 
to tackle the dramatic levels of youth 
unemployment, ‘by mobilising available 
EU funding’ and by supporting the 
transition to work ‘through youth 
guarantees, activation measures targeting 
young people, the quality of traineeships, 
and youth mobility’ (29).
(27) European Commission, An Agenda for new skills and jobs: A European contribution towards full employment, COM(2010) 682 final, 2010 (p. 9).
(28) European Commission (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion), Employment and Social Developments in Europe 
2015, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 (p. 177).
(29) European Commission, Towards a job-rich recovery, COM(2012) 173 final, 2012 (p. 10).
(30) See footnote 28, p. 15.
(31) See footnote 28, p. 114 ff.
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(32) European Commission, Towards a job-rich recovery, COM(2012) 173 final, 2012 (p. 18).
Box 1.3: Employment policies addressing migration 
‘In the longer term, and especially in view of 
the EU’s demographic development, economic 
immigration by third-country nationals is a key 
consideration for the EU labour market’ (32). The 
EU employment package ‘Towards a job-rich 
recovery’ specifically addresses the relevance of 
migration for tackling expected skills shortages: 
‘With labour needs in the most dynamic 
economic sectors set to rise significantly 
between now and 2020, while those in low-
skills activities are set to decline further, there 
is a strong likelihood of deficits occurring in 
qualified job-specific skills.’ Various directives 
help non-EU citizens to work and study in the 
EU. Among them, the EU Blue Card gives highly-
qualified workers from outside the EU the right 
to live and work in an EU country, provided they 
have higher professional qualifications, such 
as a university degree, and an employment 
contract or a binding job offer with a high salary 
compared to the average in the EU country 
where the job is. The EU Blue Card applies in 25 
of the 28 EU countries. 
Figure 1.7: Employment rate age group 20 to 64, by citizenship, EU-28, 2006–2016
(%)
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Other EU-28 country
Non EU-28 country
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Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsa_ergan)
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Employment rates are a result of the interplay 
between the supply of and demand for workers 
in the labour market. Workers supply labour 
to businesses and businesses demand labour 
from workers, both in exchange for wages. 
Consumers play an important role in businesses’ 
labour needs through their demand for products 
and services, which in turn is influenced by the 
economy’s cyclical development. Labour supply 
is characterised by the number of working-age 
people available to the labour market (determined 
by demographic structure) and the skills they offer 
(approximated by their education and training). 
However, the demographic structure of the 
economically active population, and its education 
levels, are two important factors that are hard to 
influence in the short term. 
The EU is confronted with a growing, but 
ageing population, driven by low fertility rates 
and a continuous rise in life expectancy. This 
ageing, already apparent in many Member 
States, will lead to a higher share of older people 
and a lower share of people aged 20 to 64 in 
the total population in the coming decades 
(see Figure 1.8). According to the European 
Commission Demography report 2015 (33), this 
(33) European Commission (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion & Eurostat), Demography report — 2015 edition, 
Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2015 (p. 43).
1.3 EU’s labour force is shrinking because  
of an ageing population 
Long-term changes in the 
demographic structure 
of the EU population add 
to the need to increase 
employment rates. Despite 
a growing population, the 
EU’s low fertility rates and 
rising life expectancy are 
shrinking its labour force and increasing 
its old-age dependency ratio. Higher 
employment rates, especially for women, 
older workers and young people, are 
therefore needed to compensate for the 
expected decline of the working-age 
population (aged 20 to 64) by 1.9 million 
people by 2020.
Figure 1.8: Population age structure, by major age groups, EU-28, 2002, 2016, 2020, 2030 (¹)
(%)
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(¹)  2020 and 2030 data stem from Eurostat population projections (base year 2015). 
Source: Eurostat (online data codes: demo_pjan and proj_15npms)
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means that despite a growing population, the 
EU labour force is shrinking, which may lead to 
future labour shortages. This is a potential threat 
to economic growth, which may have to rely 
solely on productivity gains in future. It may also 
increases the burden on the employed population 
to provide for the rising social expenditure 
requirements of an ageing population.
Over the past two decades the total EU 
population has grown from 475 million in 1990 to 
more than 510 million in 2016 (34). Between 2002 
and 2016 the number of older people aged 65 and 
above increased by 25 %. The rise was particularly 
steep for the group aged 80 or over. The working 
age population aged 20 to 64 years grew only 
slightly, by 3 % over the same period. In contrast, 
the number of 0 to 19 year olds fell by 6 %. 
While the most recent projections (35) predict 
rapid growth in the number of older people, the 
population aged 20 to 64 years is expected to 
start shrinking in the next few years as more baby 
boomers born between 1946 and 1964 enter 
their 60s and retire. As a result, the share of 20 
to 64 year olds is expected to gradually decline 
from 60 % in 2015 to 59 % in 2020. This equals a 
reduction of 2 million people. At the same time, 
the number of older people aged 65 or over will 
grow by about 9 million, meaning that in 2020 
every fifth person in the EU will be 65 or above. 
As Figure 1.8 shows, these trends will continue at 
an even faster rate in the following decade. The 
population aged 20 to 64 is expected to shrink 
further and those aged 65 or over are expected to 
make up almost a quarter of the total population 
in 2030. 
The baby boomer generation was the result of 
high fertility rates in several European countries 
over a 20- to 30-year period to the mid-1960s. 
They continue to comprise a significant part of 
the working population, however, the first of this 
large group are now reaching retirement age. As a 
result of these demographic changes the old-age 
dependency ratio has increased from 23.9 % 
in 2002 to 29.3 % in 2016 (36). This ratio shows 
the share of the population aged 65 and above 
compared with the population of 20 to 64 year 
olds. This means that while there were 4.2 people 
of working age for every dependent person over 
65 in the EU in 2002, this number had fallen to 3.4 
people by 2016. By 2030, the old-age dependency 
ratio is projected to reach 39.1 %, meaning there 
will be fewer than three people of working age for 
every dependent person over 65 (37). 
These trends underline the importance of making 
the most of the EU’s labour potential by raising 
the employment rate for men and women 
over the coming years. To meet labour market 
needs in a sustainable way, efforts are needed 
to help people stay in work for longer. Particular 
attention needs to be given to women, older 
workers and young people. With regard to young 
people, it is important to help them find work as 
soon as they leave education and ensure they 
remain employed. 
(34) Note that the total population figures presented here differ from the population concept used in the EU LFS, which only covers resident 
persons living in private households, excluding the population living in institutional households (such as workers’ homes or prisons). The 
data are based on Eurostat data tables (demo_pjan) and (proj_15npms).
(35) Eurostat, Population projections data, EUROPOP2015 main scenario.  
(36) Source: Eurostat (online data code: tsdde510).
(37) Source: Eurostat (online data code: tsdde511).
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Employment (and unemployment) rates are 
closely linked to the business cycle. Usually this 
is expressed in terms of GDP growth, which can 
be seen as a measure of an economy’s dynamism 
and its capacity to create jobs. Figure 1.9 illustrates 
this relationship, showing similar patterns for 
GDP growth, employment growth and the 
share of newly employed people in total 
employment (38). 
As Figure 1.9 illustrates, GDP growth brought 
about a job-rich recovery in 2016 with 
employment picking up by 1.5 %. However, 
GDP growth is not necessarily associated with 
employment growth. In 2010 and 2011, GDP 
growth picked up as well, while employment 
remained at a standstill. This pattern of ‘jobless 
growth’ stems from the fact that GDP grew mostly 
because of an increase in productivity and hours 
(38) People who started their job within the past 12 months.
1.4 Employment and unemployment trend
Following the recovery 
in GDP and employment 
growth, the share of newly 
employed people is at its 
highest level since 2009.
Between 2008 and 
2016, employment grew fastest in the 
professional, scientific and technical 
sector and the administrative sector, but 
declined the most in the construction and 
agricultural sectors. 
Over the past few years increases in part-
time work and fixed-term contracts have 
been observed. Young people have been 
the most affected, with 16.0 % of 15 to 24 
year olds involuntarily employed on time-
limited contracts and 8.4 % involuntarily in 
part-time work in 2016.
With an unemployment rate of 18.7 % in 
2016, young people aged 15 to 29 were 
clearly at a disadvantage compared with the 
overall population.
Figure 1.9: GDP growth, employment growth and newly employed persons, EU-28, 2003–
2016 (¹)
(GDP growth and employment growth: percentage change over previous period; newly employed 
persons: share of persons aged 20 to 64 whose job started within the last 12 months in total 
employment)
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(¹) Employment growth and newly employed persons: break in time series in 2005.
Source: Eurostat (online data codes: nama_10_gdp, lfsa_pganws and lfsa_enewasn)
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worked, leaving little room for employment 
growth (39). 
The link between GDP growth and employment 
growth is also reflected in the share of newly 
employed people as a share of total employment. 
This dropped considerably in 2009, following 
the contractions in GDP and employment in the 
same year. In 2016, following the recovery in GDP 
and employment growth, the share of newly 
employed people was at its highest level since 
2009 (13.9 %).
1.4.1 Professional, scientific and technical 
sector and administrative sector show 
strongest signs of jobs recovery 
Jobs growth is unevenly distributed across 
economic sectors and strongly dependent 
on general economic conditions as well as 
developments within these sectors. Overall, 
employment across all EU economic sectors (40) 
rose slightly between 2008 and 2016 (see 
Figure 1.10). High-end occupations related to 
professional, scientific and technical activities 
grew the fastest. Traditional service sectors also 
experienced employment growth. 
However, the construction, agriculture and 
manufacturing sectors, which were also heavily 
affected by the economic crisis, showed the 
strongest declines between 2008 and 2016. 
Because these sectors are male-dominated, it 
is plausible that men have been affected more 
strongly by the decline in these sectors than 
woman (41).
1.4.2 Involuntary non-standard work 
contracts most widespread among 
young people 
In 2016, 13.3 % of employees aged 20 to 64 in 
the EU were working on a fixed-term contract. 
Temporary employment has been relatively stable 
around 13 % over the past decade, with a slight 
upward tendency. It was most widespread among 
young people, with 43.8 % of 15 to 24 year olds 
working on a time-limited contract. Temporary 
employment was much lower among 25 to 54 
year olds at 12.1 % and for older people aged 55 to 
64 at 6.7 % (42). 
The significant over-representation of young 
people in temporary work reflects not only 
changes in labour market demand, but also 
(39) European Commission (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion), Employment and Social Developments in Europe 
2012, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2012 (p. 57).
(40) See Statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE).
(41) Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsa_egan2).
(42) Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsa_etpgan).
Figure 1.10: Employment growth by economic sector, EU-28, 2008–2016
(%)
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Total: All NACE activities
M: Professional, scientific and technical activities
N: Administrative and support service activities
I: Accommodation and food service activities
Q: Human health and social work activities
P: Education
H: Transportation and storage
G: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
O: Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
C: Manufacturing
A: Agriculture, forestry and fishing
F: Construction
Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsa_egan2)
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the risk that young people stay trapped in a series 
of temporary contracts (44).
In 2016, 18.8 % of all employees aged 20 to 64 in 
the EU worked on a part-time contract. More than 
a quarter (28.5 %) were in involuntary part-time 
employment. The share of involuntary part-time 
employed in total employment rose from 4.4 % 
in 2008 to 5.4 % in 2016. As with involuntary 
temporary employment, young people are 
affected the most (see Figure 1.12). For all age 
groups the share of women in involuntary 
part-time employment exceeded that of men. 
The gender gap is widening with age, from 
4 percentage points for 15 to 20 year olds to 
5.1 percentage points for the 50 to 64 age group. 
The expansion of involuntary part-time work in 
recent years indicates that an increasing number 
of people undertake part-time employment 
not by choice, for example, for more flexible 
arrangements that allow better reconciliation 
between work and private life, but because 
they cannot find a full-time job (45). Involuntary 
part-time employment is another sign of labour 
structural features of educational systems and 
cultural norms. In many Member States, for 
instance, young people prefer temporary work 
because they are participating in education and 
training or because of public policies promoting 
autonomy from an early age (for example, 
monthly support allowance, availability of 
affordable housing and free education) (43). 
However, for many people a fixed-term contract, 
rather than a permanent one, is not always 
a personal choice. In this respect, data on 
involuntary temporary employment provides 
a better insight into the overexploitation of 
fixed-term contracts. In 2016, 8.7 % of employed 
20 to 64 year olds were involuntarily working on 
temporary contracts (see Figure 1.11). Again, the 
share was much higher for young people aged 
15 to 24, at 16.0 %. Despite some fluctuations, the 
overall trend since 2006 indicates growing use of 
involuntary fixed-term contracts. Although fixed-
term contracts could act as a stepping stone for 
young graduates to permanent jobs, there is also 
Figure 1.11: Involuntary temporary employees, by age group, EU-28, 2008 and 2016 (¹)
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Source: Eurostat (online data codes: lfsa_etgar, lfsa_etgaed and lfsa_eegaed)
(43) European Commission (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion), Employment and Social Developments in Europe 
2011, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2012 (p. 33).
(44)  Id., p.  91.
(45) European Commission (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion), Employment and Social Developments in Europe 
2015, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 (p. 90).
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Young people aged 15 to 24 generally face a 
higher risk of being unemployed. In 2016, their 
unemployment rate was more than double the 
rate for the entire age group of 15 to 74 year 
olds. The risk of unemployment is particularly 
high for low-educated young people who have 
completed only lower secondary education 
(early leavers from education and training; see 
the chapter on ‘Education‘, page 107). However, 
the group of unemployed persons aged 15 to 
24 is not necessarily large, as many young 
people are studying full-time and are therefore 
neither working nor looking for a job. The youth 
unemployment ratio, which reflects the share 
of unemployed for the whole population of the 
same age group, is much lower and rose from 
6.9 % in 2008 to 7.8 % in 2016. 
In the context of the Europe 2020 strategy, 
it is important that young people maximise 
their professional working lives by engaging in 
employment as soon as possible and staying 
employed. This is specifically addressed through 
the flagship initiative ‘Youth on the Move’ 
(see Box 1.4).
market segmentation, which could have important 
implications for income and potentially increase the 
risk of poverty and social exclusion (46).
1.4.3 Younger people are at higher risk of 
unemployment 
In 2016, 8.4 % of 20 to 64 year old EU residents 
were unemployed, which is a 2.2 percentage 
point improvement compared to 2013 when the 
unemployment rate peaked at 10.6 %. However, the 
unemployment rate does not include people who 
became discouraged and stopped looking for work 
because they are not considered part of the labour 
market. Nevertheless, they still represent a potential 
additional pool of the work force. In 2016, 8.8 million 
people in the EU were available and would have 
liked to work but were not seeking employment. This 
equals 2.3 % of the population aged 15 to 74 (47) (48). 
Like employment, a clear link exists between 
unemployment and education: unemployment 
rates are generally lower for people with higher 
education levels. In 2016, only 5.1 % of 15 to 74 year 
olds with tertiary education were unemployed, 
whereas 16.1 % of people with at most lower 
secondary education were looking for a job (49).
(46) European Commission (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion), Employment and Social Developments in Europe 
2015, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 (p. 90).
(47) The target population of the EU LFS are resident persons living in private households, excluding the population living in institutional 
households (such as workers’ homes or prisons).
(48) Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsi_sup_a).
(49) Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsa_urgaed).
Figure 1.12: Involuntary part-time employment, by age group, EU-28, 2008 and 2016 (¹)
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Source: Eurostat (online data codes: lfsa_epgar and lfsa_epgaed)
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(50) European Commission, Youth on the Move: An initiative to unleash the potential of young people to achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth in the European Union, COM(2010) 477 final, 2010 (p. 3).
Figure 1.13: Unemployment rate by age group, EU-28, 2002–2016 (¹)
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(¹)  Break in time series in 2005.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsa_urgaed)
Box 1.4: Policies tackling youth unemployment 
The Europe 2020 flagship initiative ‘Youth on the 
Move’ emphasises that ‘youth unemployment 
is unacceptably high’ in the EU, and that ‘to 
reach the 75 % employment target for the 
population aged 20 to 64 years, the transition 
of young people to the labour market needs to 
be radically improved’. To this end, the flagship 
initiative focuses on four main lines of action as 
laid down in the 2010 European Commission 
Communication ‘Youth on the Move: An initiative 
to unleash the potential of young people to 
achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
in the European Union’ (50):
• Lifelong learning, to develop key 
competences and quality learning outcomes, 
in line with labour market needs. This also 
means tackling the high level of early school 
leaving. 
• Raise the percentage of young people 
participating in higher education or 
equivalent to keep up with competitors in 
the knowledge-based economy and to foster 
innovation. 
• Improve learning mobility programmes and 
initiatives, to support the aspiration that by 
2020 all young people in Europe should have 
the possibility of spending a part of their 
education abroad, including via workplace-
based training. 
• Urgently improve the employment situation 
of young people, by presenting a framework 
of policy priorities for action at national and 
EU level to reduce youth unemployment by 
facilitating the transition from school to work 
and reducing labour market segmentation. 
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1.5 Skills mismatches in the labour market
qualifications. The demand for a skilled labour 
force is likely to continue; the most recent 
forecasts from Cedefop indicate that between 
2016 and 2025 about 15 million jobs requiring high 
educational attainment will be created, while low-
qualified jobs will decline by more than 6 million 
(see Figure 1.14). 
Overall, the Cedefop forecasts show a parallel rise 
in skills from both the demand and the supply 
side until 2025. Skill levels are expected to change 
faster for the labour force than those required 
by the job market. For instance, the share of 
the labour force holding only primary or lower 
secondary education is expected to decrease 
from 20.7 % in 2016 to 16.8 % in 2025, whereas 
the share of positions for people with low-level 
qualifications are projected to fall from 18.8 % to 
15.4 %. However, this parallel development does 
not prevent potential skills mismatches, such as 
over-qualification (see section 1.5.2).
1.5.2 Higher over-qualification rates for 
most Member States
Skill mismatch is most commonly seen as the 
inability of employers to fill vacancies despite 
high unemployment. But it is not only a problem 
A well-functioning labour market depends 
largely on matching the labour force’s skills and 
qualifications to those demanded by employers. 
Although some skills mismatch is inevitable, 
high and persistent mismatches can be costly 
for employers, workers and society at large (51). 
Matching educational outcomes and labour 
market needs is a key component of the Europe 
2020 strategy (see Box 1.5). ‘Equipping people 
with the right skills for employment’ has been 
identified as one of four priorities of the flagship 
initiative ‘An Agenda for new skills and jobs’. In 
particular, the impact of the economic crisis and 
persistently high unemployment have increased 
the need to better understand where future skills 
shortages are likely to lie in the EU (52). 
1.5.1 Changes in labour force skills 
outpacing changes in employment trends
According to estimates from the European Centre 
for the Development of Vocational Training 
Cedefop (53), the distribution of skills in the 
labour force largely matched the qualification 
requirements of the labour market in 2016. 
However, labour supply exceeded demand for 
all qualification types, with the difference being 
particularly high for the low- and medium-level 
Improving qualification 
levels is essential to meet the 
growing demand for a highly 
skilled labour force in the EU. 
Recent projections show the 
EU is relatively on track to 
match educational achievements to labour 
market needs, with labour supply exceeding 
the demand for all qualifications types.
In 2016, 10.8 million people worked in 
occupations below their qualification level. 
Data on job vacancies point to a possible 
deterioration in the job-matching process 
from 2010 to 2014. Unemployment rose 
while job vacancies remained stable or 
increased. However, in between 2014 and 
2016 the labour market expanded, showing 
falling unemployment rates and increasing 
vacancy rates.
Since 2013 long-term unemployment has 
been declining but still accounts for nearly 
half of all unemployment.
(51) European Commission, Education and Training Monitor 2015, Brussels, 2015 (p. 14).
(52) European Commission, An Agenda for new skills and jobs: A European contribution towards full employment, COM(2010) 682 final, Strasbourg, 
2010 (p. 8).
(53) The Cedefop skills forecasts are available at http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/events-and-projects/projects/forecasting-skill-demand-
and-supply/data-visualisations 
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Box 1.5: Matching skills and labour market needs
Improving the matching process between 
labour supply and demand by adapting 
educational and training systems to produce 
the skills required on the labour market is a key 
priority of the Europe 2020 strategy’s flagship 
initiative ‘An Agenda for new skills and jobs’. 
It proposes a bundle of measures aimed at 
strengthening the EU’s capacity to anticipate 
and match labour market and skill needs. These 
include labour market observatories bringing 
together labour market actors and education 
and training providers, measures enhancing 
geographical mobility throughout the EU, and 
actions towards better integration of migrants 
and better recognition of their skills and 
qualifications (54). 
The 2016 New Skills Agenda for Europe launches 
a number of actions to ensure that the right 
training, the right skills and the right support 
is available to people in the European Union. 
It will aim to make better use of the skills that 
are available and to equip people with the 
new skills needed to help them find quality 
jobs and improve their life opportunities. The 
Commission invites Members States, social 
partners, the industry and other stakeholders 
to work together to: a) improve the quality 
and relevance of skills formation; b) make 
skills more visible and comparable; and c) 
improve skills intelligence and information for 
better career choices. Actions include: a Skills 
Guarantee, renamed ‘Upskilling Pathways: New 
Opportunities for Adults’, to help adults acquire 
a minimum level of literacy, numeracy and 
digital skills and/or acquire a broader set of skills 
by progressing towards an upper secondary 
qualification or equivalent, and a review of the 
European Qualifications Framework and the 
related annexes for a better understanding 
of qualifications and to make better use of all 
available skills in the European labour market.
(54)  European Commission, Towards a job-rich recovery, COM(2012) 173 final, 2012 (p. 18).
Figure 1.14: Labour force and employment trends by qualification, EU-28, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 
2025
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for those hiring or looking for a job, it also affects 
most of the labour force, for example in times of 
weak employment demand more people take 
jobs below their qualification or skills level. This 
can hamper economic productivity and individual 
potential, especially when more highly educated 
people are trapped in jobs without opportunities 
to continually develop and use their skills (55). 
According to the Cedefop survey results, in 2014 
about 25 % of highly qualified first job entrants 
were overqualified for their position (56). These 
figures challenge the labour market relevance 
of skills and qualifications (57). Furthermore, 
concerns have been raised that the intensified 
skill mismatch might undermine the long-term 
potential of the EU skilled labour force (58).
Figure 1.15 shows the over-qualification rate by 
country. Over-qualification refers to the situation 
where a person has a level of skill or education 
higher than is required for his or her job. Over-
qualification may be measured in several ways. 
In this chapter, the over-qualification rate is 
defined as the share of persons with at least upper 
secondary education working in elementary 
occupations among all employed persons 
with the same level of education. Elementary 
occupations do not require any particular formal 
education but consist of simple and routine tasks 
which mainly require the use of hand-held tools 
and often some physical effort (59).
In 2016, 10.8 million people with at least upper 
secondary education worked in elementary 
occupations. This equals a share of 4.8 % of all 
those employed. Among Member States the share 
of overqualified workers ranged in 2016 from 9.9 % 
in Latvia to 2.2 % in Portugal (see Figure 1.15). In 
nine Member States the share declined between 
2008 and 2016 and was the strongest in Austria 
Figure 1.15: Over-qualification rate, by country, 2008 and 2016 (¹)
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(55) Cedefop, #ESJsurvey INSIGHTS No 2 — Safeguarding education investments: Mitigating overqualification in the EU, 2015.
(56) Cedefop, Matching skills and jobs in Europe, Insights from Cedefop’s European skills and jobs survey, 2015 (p. 2).
(57) European Commission, Education and Training Monitor 2015, Brussels, 2015 (p.14).
(58) See footnote 56.
(59) ILO definition, see http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco88/9.htm. 
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and Bulgaria, by 1.6 percentage points. At the 
other extreme, the share rose by more than 
one percentage point in five countries (Ireland, 
Belgium, France, Hungary, Croatia and Italy). 
There are many reasons why people may have 
to take on a job below their qualification level. 
Young workers, mostly females, are at higher 
risk, although gender differences vary between 
countries. This higher risk may be attributed 
to competition for jobs and the relatively high 
proportion of young workers in non-standard 
employment (60). Tertiary education graduates 
who hold a degree in certain fields such as 
humanities, languages and arts, other social 
sciences, but also business and law are also 
more likely to work in occupations below their 
qualification level. In addition, the characteristics 
of a particular job can be a factor. Individuals in 
non-standard contract jobs and those employed 
in smaller-sized firms are more likely to see their 
education underutilised. Over-qualification is a 
wide-spread phenomena among international 
as well as EU-born migrants (61). This might be a 
result of migrants lacking country-specific skills to 
capitalise on their formal qualifications on the job 
(for example, language skills), but also imperfect 
recruitment policies and problems of recognition. 
Last but not least, overqualified people are more 
likely to have been unemployed before accepting 
their current job (62). 
1.5.3 Signs of economic expansion with 
increasing job vacancies and decreasing 
unemployment
Job vacancy statistics provide an insight into the 
demand side of the labour market, in particular 
the unmet labour demand. A job vacancy is 
defined as a paid post that is newly created, 
unoccupied or about to become vacant. The 
employer must be taking active steps and be 
prepared to take further steps to find a suitable 
candidate from outside the enterprise. The 
employer must also intend to fill the position 
either immediately or within a specific time 
period. A vacant post that is only open to internal 
candidates is not treated as a ‘job vacancy’. 
Quarterly job vacancy statistics are used 
for business cycle analysis and for assessing 
mismatches in labour markets. Of particular 
interest is the relationship between vacancies and 
(60) International Labour Organisation, Skills mismatch in Europe: statistics brief, Geneva, 2014 (p. 15).
(61) European Commission (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion), Employment and Social Developments in Europe 
2015, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 (p. 186).
(62) Cedefop, #ESJsurvey INSIGHTS No 2 — Safeguarding education investments: Mitigating overqualification in the EU, 2015.
Figure 1.16: Beveridge curve, EU-28, 2006–2016 (¹)
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unemployment. The so-called Beveridge curve 
reflects their negative correlation (see Figure 1.16). 
During economic contractions there are few 
vacancies and high unemployment, while during 
expansions there are more vacancies and the 
unemployment rate is low. 
Structural changes in the economy can cause the 
Beveridge curve to shift. During times of uneven 
growth across regions or industries — when 
labour supply and demand are not matched 
efficiently — the vacancy and unemployment 
rates can rise at the same time. Conversely, they 
can both decrease when the matching-efficiency 
of the labour market improves. This could be, 
for example, due to a better flow of job vacancy 
information thanks to the internet. Empirical 
analysis of the curve can be challenging because 
both movements along the curve and shifts 
can take place at the same time with different 
intensities. 
Data for the period 2008 to 2009 show a 
movement along the Beveridge curve, mirroring 
the impacts of the economic crisis on job 
vacancies and unemployment. Since 2010, 
however, movements of the Beveridge curve itself 
point to a possibly substantial deterioration in 
the matching process: unemployment has been 
growing, while the job vacancy rate has remained 
stable or has also been increasing. This was the 
case in the fourth quarter of 2013 and the first 
quarter of 2014. This indicates unemployment has 
become more structural (64). This poorer matching 
at the European level may reflect disparities across 
Member States: most of the job vacancies have 
been created in countries with comparatively 
low unemployment. In the period 2014 to 2016 
an upward movement along the Beveridge 
curve can be seen, illustrating an expansionary 
phase with falling unemployment rates and 
increasing vacancy rates. EU policies that address 
job vacancies aim to improve the functioning of 
the labour market by trying to match supply and 
demand more closely.
1.5.4 Slight easing in long-term 
unemployment 
Long-term unemployment poses a serious 
challenge to the EU because of its negative social 
and financial implications for individuals and 
society as a whole (see Box 1.6). On an individual 
level, in the absence of an adequate and well-
functioning social protection system, long-term 
unemployment could reduce income, increase 
the risk of poverty and social exclusion and affect 
health. It can also lead to deterioration of skills and 
(63) Council Recommendation of 15 February 2016 on the integration of the long-term unemployed into the labour market, (2016/C 67/01).
(64) European Commission (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion), Employment and Social Developments in Europe 
2011, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2012 (p.  29).
Box 1.6: Tackling long-term unemployment in the EU
Addressing long-term unemployment is a 
key employment challenge of the European 
Commission’s jobs and growth strategy. On 
15 February 2016, the Council adopted the 
Commission’s Proposal for a Recommendation 
on the integration of the long-term 
unemployed in the labour market (63). The 
Council Recommendation puts forward three 
key steps: 1) encouraging the registration of 
long-term unemployed with an employment 
service; 2) providing each registered long-
term unemployed with an individual in-depth 
assessment to identify their needs and potential 
at the very latest at 18 months of unemployment; 
and 3) offering a job integration agreement 
to all registered long-term unemployed at 
the very latest at 18 months. In October 2016 
the employment ministers of all EU Member 
States endorsed a framework to monitor the 
implementation of the Council Recommendation. 
The first data collection will take place in  
mid-2017.
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human capital, hindering future employability, 
productivity and earnings (65). At the societal level, 
prolonged unemployment harms economic 
growth and social cohesion. High rates of long-
term unemployment could have further and long-
lasting consequences for the EU labour market 
and economy given that probability of moving 
from unemployment to inactivity increases with 
the time spent unemployed (66).
In 2016, 9.6 million people or 4 % of the active 
population in the EU were in long-term 
unemployment. In the last years since 2013, the 
unemployment rate dropped by 1.1 percentage 
points. Nevertheless, long-term unemployment 
emerges as the main employment legacy of the 
crisis as the proportion of long-term unemployed 
among all unemployed rose from 36.9 % in 2008 
to 46.4 % in 2016. 
Figure 1.17: Long-term unemployment rate, by sex, EU-28, 2005–2016
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(65) European Commission (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion), Employment and Social Developments in Europe 
2015, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 (p. 26).
(66) Ibid.
(67) European Commission, Taking stock of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM (2014) 130 final, 2014 (p. 12).
(68) Id., p.  9.
(69) Id., p. 12.
1.6 Outlook towards 2020
Overall, in 2016 the EU was 3.9 percentage points 
below its employment target value of 75 %, to 
be met by 2020. According to the 2014 European 
Commission Communication ‘Taking stock of 
the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth’, even if all countries were 
to meet their national Europe 2020 targets, the 
overall EU employment rate would only grow to 
74 %, just below the 2020 target (67). Ageing of 
the working population and the associated rise in 
economic dependency adds a sense of urgency 
to the need to improve the functioning of the 
labour market. The EU risks undermining its growth 
potential and future prosperity unless it is ‘able to 
put more people to work and ensure they work 
more productively and for a longer time, in line 
with the increase in life expectancy and healthy life 
years’ (68). While a large share of young and well-
educated people will be available to work (also see 
the chapter on ‘Education’, page 107), achieving 
the Europe 2020 employment target will require 
greater use of the potential labour force, including 
women, older people and so far inactive adults 
such as migrants (69). 
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The EU youth unemployment rate is more than 
double the overall unemployment rate (18.7 % 
compared with 8.6 %). Bringing young people 
into the labour market is crucial to avoid eroding 
competence or insufficient skill acquisition (70). 
Increasing the relevance of education and 
supporting a secure transition from education 
to employment — as emphasised in the 
flagship initiatives ‘An Agenda for new skills and 
jobs’ (71) and ‘Youth on the Move’ (72), and the 
EU employment package ‘Towards a job-rich 
recovery’ (73) — are key policy steps towards 
improving the employment prospects of young 
people. The ‘Youth Employment Package’ 
proposes specific recommendations on how to 
fight youth unemployment and enable young 
people to gain access to jobs, traineeships 
or apprenticeships. In particular it includes a 
Recommendation to Member States to implement 
a Youth Guarantee to ensure that all young 
people up to age 25 receive a quality offer of 
a job, continued education, an apprenticeship 
or a traineeship within four months of leaving 
formal education or becoming unemployed. 
The implementation of a Youth Guarantee 
scheme receives EU funding support. The ‘Youth 
Employment Initiative’ reinforces and accelerates 
measures outlined in the Youth Employment 
Package, particularly focusing on young people 
not in education, employment or training 
in regions with a youth unemployment rate 
above 25 %.
Increasing the labour force participation of 
women would require comprehensive family 
policies, which improve the compatibility of 
child-rearing and employment. Universal access 
to high-quality childcare services for children, 
availability of part-time work and access to 
parental leave are proven as particularly effective 
in this respect (74). Highly relevant EU actions in this 
direction also include the promotion of new forms 
of flexibility and security on the labour market 
as outlined in the flagship initiative ‘An Agenda 
for new skills and jobs: A European contribution 
towards full employment’ (75) and addressed by 
the EU employment package ‘Towards a job-rich 
recovery’ (76).
Integrating older people and migrants into the 
labour market might be challenging because 
a large portion tend to have low education 
levels (77). Against future projections for increased 
demand for high-skilled labour, these groups are 
therefore more likely to join the less skilled part 
of the labour force. In this respect, it would be 
imperative for Member States to design and put 
in place active labour market policies combined 
with targeted policy measures for lifelong 
learning and comprehensive integration. Enabling 
mobile people to better capitalise on their 
formal qualifications would also enhance their 
employability and improve growth prospects.
(70) European Commission (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion), Employment and Social Developments in Europe 
2015, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2016 (p. 28).
(71) European Commission, An Agenda for new skills and jobs: A European contribution towards full employment, COM(2010) 682 final, 2010 (p.  8).
(72) European Commission, Youth on the Move: An initiative to unleash the potential of young people to achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth in the European Union, COM(2010) 477 final, 2010 (p. 3).
(73) European Commission, Towards a job-rich recovery, COM(2012) 173 final, 2012 (p. 10).
(74) See footnote 70, p. 16.
(75) See footnote 71, p. 5.
(76) See footnote 73.
(77) European Commission, Taking stock of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2014) 130 final, 2014 (p. 12).
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Research and development (R&D) and innovation 
are key policy components of the Europe 2020 
strategy. Innovative products and services not only 
contribute to the strategy’s smart growth goal but 
also to its inclusiveness and sustainability objectives. 
Introducing new ideas to the market promotes 
industrial competitiveness, job creation, labour 
productivity and the efficient use of resources. 
R&D and innovation contribute to a well-
functioning knowledge-based economy. Most 
importantly, they are central to providing the 
scientific and technical solutions needed to 
meet global societal challenges such as climate 
change and clean energy, security and active 
and healthy ageing. For instance, technological 
advances in materials science and digitalisation, 
are driving rapid progress in renewable energy 
and energy efficiency as well as other sectors 
important for sustainable development and 
mitigating climate change such as transport, 
construction, manufacturing, agriculture and 
consumer goods (1). However, development of 
new technologies alone will not be enough to 
solve many of the ‘grand’ societal challenges. 
Fundamental transformations in businesses and 
manufacturing processes, provision of services, 
the way society organises itself and other 
non-technological innovations will be equally 
important.
The challenges facing society also threaten the 
well-being of the population and can have dire 
social, economic and environmental implications 
inside and outside the EU. Research and 
innovation can not only help in addressing these 
challenges, but also in exploiting the new market 
opportunities they offer. 
A number of important EU policy strategies 
and initiatives address such win-win situations. 
Horizon 2020 — the EU’s research and innovation 
programme for the period 2014 to 2020 — is 
helping to bring ideas from the lab to the market 
by providing nearly EUR 75 billion (4) of funding 
for research projects aimed at tackling societal 
challenges, generating excellence in science and 
fostering industrial leadership (5). 
The EU Action Plan for the Circular Economy (6), 
included in the Circular Economy package, 
proposes actions that will contribute to ‘closing 
the loop’ of product life cycles through greater 
recycling and re-use, and will bring benefits 
for both the environment and the economy. 
Similarly, the Roadmap to a Resource Efficient 
Europe (7) supports the shift towards a resource-
efficient, low-carbon economy, while bringing 
new economic opportunities, sources of growth 
and jobs, and increased competitiveness through 
improved efficiency. 
As highlighted in the European Commission 
publication Open Innovation, Open Science and 
2.1 R&D and innovation  — why do they matter?
Europe 2020 strategy  
target on R&D
The Europe 2020 strategy sets the 
target of ‘improving the conditions 
for innovation, research and 
development’ (2), in particular with the 
aim of ‘increasing combined public and 
private investment in R&D to 3 % of GDP’ 
by 2020 (3).
(1) The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate, Better Growth Better Climate, Chapter 7, 2014, Washington, (p. 3).
(2) European Council conclusions 17 June 2010, EUCO 13/10, Brussels, 2010.
(3) European Commission, Taking stock of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2014) 130 final, Brussels, 
2014 (p. 12).
(4) Set in current prices.
(5) Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 June 2015 on the European Fund for Strategic Investments, 
the European Investment Advisory Hub and the European Investment Project Portal and amending Regulations (EU) No 1291/2013 and 
(EU) No 1316/2013 — the European Fund for Strategic Investments.
(6) European Commission, Closing the loop — An EU action plan for the Circular Economy, COM(2015) 614 final, Brussels, 2015.
(7) European Commission, Roadmap to a resource Efficient Europe, COM (2011) 571 final, Brussels, 2015 (p. 4).
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Open to the World (8), digital technologies are 
fundamentally transforming the way science 
operates and businesses innovate — ‘new 
knowledge is now created through global 
collaborations involving thousands of people 
from across the world and from all walks of life’. 
The ability of the EU to continue transferring 
knowledge into commercial and social gains 
would depend on how it adapts to this changing 
reality. In recognition of this, the European 
Commissioner for research, Carlos Moedas, has 
set three goals for EU research and innovation 
policy, which aim to make science and innovation 
more open, collaborative and global. The 
European Commission is already taking actions 
in this direction by developing a European 
Science Cloud, increasing access to the scientific 
data generated by Horizon 2020 projects and 
undertaking new international research  
co-operation agreements with Ukraine, Tunisia, 
China and South American countries, to name a 
few examples.
The analysis in this chapter focuses on the 
headline indicator ‘gross domestic expenditure 
on R&D’, which monitors the strategy’s research 
and development target. Fundamental enabling 
factors that drive innovation are also discussed. 
These are the first links in the innovation chain 
and include R&D investment in EU Member 
States and its distribution across regions and the 
various public and private societal actors. The 
role of education, in particular tertiary education 
in science and technology, in providing the 
necessary human capital for the knowledge-
based society is also highlighted. In addition, 
the economy’s capacity for R&D and innovation 
in terms of a skilled workforce is examined. This 
is followed by a look at the EU’s performance 
concerning innovative business frontrunners 
and the technological output at the end of the 
innovation chain in terms of commercialisation 
and internationalisation. These indicators 
complement the ‘R&D intensity’ headline indicator, 
which is an input measure, with measures 
referring to the output and outcome dimensions 
of innovation.
The importance of R&D and innovation for 
fulfilling the ambitions of the Europe 2020 strategy 
is evident in the close interlinkages between 
them and the strategy’s other objectives. The R&D 
target is closely related to the strategy’s tertiary 
educational attainment and employment targets 
(see the chapters on ‘Employment’, page 25, and 
‘Education’, page 107). 
Public investment in R&D generates the 
knowledge base and talent that higher education 
and innovative companies need. Higher public 
investment in R&D also leverages private 
investment in research and innovation, providing 
new jobs in business and academia and ultimately 
increasing demand for scientists and researchers 
on the labour market. R&D investment spurs 
innovation, which contributes to industrial 
competitiveness and job creation.
The Europe 2020 target on R&D is also linked to 
the strategy’s climate change and energy targets 
(see the chapter on ‘Climate change and energy’, 
page 81). In particular, the transition to a green and 
low-carbon economy and adaptation to climate 
change will require significant innovation, from 
small incremental changes to major technological 
breakthroughs. 
(8) European Commission, Open Innovation, Open Science, Open to the World, Brussels, 2016 (p. 8).
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Gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a 
percentage of GDP in the EU stagnated at 
2.03 % between 2013 and 2015, halting 
what had been a period of slow but rising 
growth since 2008. Up until that point, 
R&D intensity had been relatively stable 
at around 1.8 % between 2002 and 2007. 
As a result, the gap between the current 
performance and the 3 % target has yet to 
be closed. 
The business sector remains the main 
source of finance for R&D activities in the 
EU and it has recorded the highest increase 
since 2002. Although the higher education 
and government sectors have lower 
R&D shares and have been growing at a 
slower pace, they have 
been more resilient to 
economic fluctuations.
R&D expenditure is 
highest in northern 
and western European 
countries, which are also 
characterised by predominantly business-
financed R&D.
The regions with the highest R&D intensity 
in the EU are found in Germany, the United 
Kingdom, the Nordic countries, Austria, 
France and Belgium. The Province Brabant 
Wallon in Belgium has by far the highest 
R&D intensity in the EU — 11.4 %.
2.2 Investment in research and development 
in the EU
EUROPE 2020
H E A D L I N E
I N D I C AT O R
2020 target
3 
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Figure 2.1: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, EU-28, 2002–2015 (1)
(% of GDP)
Europe 2020 headline indicator 
(1) Data for 2002 are estimates, 2015 data are provisional.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: t2020_20)
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(9) Research and experimental development (R&D) comprises creative work undertaken on a systematic basis to increase the stock of 
knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications’  
(Frascati Manual: Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys on Research and Experimental Development, 6th edition, p. 63).
more or less stable at around 1.77 % of GDP. 
Overall, R&D intensity emerged stronger from 
the economic crisis as a result of depressed GDP 
growth and increased public funding for R&D 
expenditure in many Member States.
At the global level, the EU’s R&D intensity is still 
lagging behind other advanced economies, such 
as the United States, Japan and South Korea, 
with only the best performing Member States 
surpassing the United States (see Figure 2.2). The 
EU’s relative position in the global R&D landscape 
has also weakened because of a rapid rise of R&D 
expenditure in China. In 2014, China overtook the 
EU by spending 2.05 % of its GDP on R&D.
The headline indicator gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D, also referred to as R&D 
intensity, shows the proportion of gross domestic 
product (GDP) dedicated to research and 
development (9). 
After a period of somewhat continuous growth 
between 2007 and 2014, R&D expenditure in the 
EU reached 2.04 % of GDP in 2014, up from 1.77 % 
in 2007. However, progress has been slow and the 
most recent figures point to a stagnation, which 
has moved the EU further away from its 3 % target. 
The slow increase since 2007 contrasts with the 
prolonged stagnation experienced between 2002 
and 2007, when EU R&D expenditure remained 
Figure 2.2: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, by country, 2008 and 2015 
(% of GDP)
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
2008 2015 Europe 2020 target
EU
-2
8 
(1
)
Sw
ed
en
 (1
)(
2 )
A
us
tr
ia
 (2
)(
3 )
D
en
m
ar
k 
(1
)
Fi
nl
an
d
G
er
m
an
y 
(3
)
Be
lg
iu
m
 (1
)
Fr
an
ce
 (1
)(
4 )
Sl
ov
en
ia
 (1
)(
5 )
N
et
he
rla
nd
s 
(1
)(
5 )
(6
)
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
ub
lic
 (1
)(
12
)
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
 (3
)(
2 )
(1
3 )
Ir
el
an
d 
(7
)(
14
)
Es
to
ni
a 
(1
)
H
un
ga
ry
It
al
y 
(1
)
Lu
xe
m
b
ou
rg
 (1
)(
6 )
(1
5 )
Po
rt
ug
al
 (1
)(
16
)
Sp
ai
n
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Li
th
ua
ni
a 
(1
)
Po
la
nd
Bu
lg
ar
ia
 (1
)
G
re
ec
e 
(1
)(
2 )
C
ro
at
ia
M
al
ta
 (1
)
La
tv
ia
 (1
)
Ro
m
an
ia
 (5
)
C
yp
ru
s 
(1
)
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
 (8
)
Ic
el
an
d 
(5
)(
9 )
N
or
w
ay
 (1
)
Tu
rk
ey
 (7
)
Se
rb
ia
 (7
)(
10
)
M
on
te
ne
gr
o 
(7
)
So
ut
h 
Ko
re
a 
(7
)
Ja
p
an
 (7
)(
9 )
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 (1
1 )
C
hi
na
 (1
7 )
Ru
ss
ia
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(5) Break in time series in 2011. 
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(8) 2012 data (instead of 2015). 
(9) Break in time series in 2013. 
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(17) There is a break in series between 2009 and the previous years. 
Source: UNESCO.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: t2020_20)
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2.2.1 R&D spending has risen in three 
quarters of Member States since 2008
Across the EU, R&D intensity ranged from 0.46 % to 
3.26 % in 2015 (see Figure 2.2). Northern Member 
States Finland and Sweden did not only share a 
pattern of high expenditure, they also had the most 
ambitious national targets. In 2015, Denmark slightly 
exceeded its R&D target of 3 %, while Slovakia, 
Cyprus and Germany came very close to meeting 
their targets of 1.2 %, 0.5 % and 3 %, respectively. 
Lower R&D intensity levels, below 1 %, were mostly 
recorded in eastern and southern Member States. 
Patterns in R&D investment, in particular business 
R&D spending, between countries generally mirror 
the industrial structure of economies, differences 
in the knowledge intensity of sectors and their 
research capabilities (10). 
R&D intensity increased in most Member States 
between 2008 and 2015. This was mainly due to 
a slowdown in GDP growth, along with a rise in 
nominal government spending on R&D in many 
EU countries. Nevertheless, countries with very 
high levels of R&D intensity (Sweden and Finland), 
moderate levels (Luxembourg and Portugal) 
and very low levels (Croatia and Romania) alike 
suffered negative trends in R&D expenditure in 
that period. It is to be noted that Finland was a 
leader in R&D intensity in 2008, but its spending 
contracted to below 3.00 % of GDP in 2015. The 
negative trends experienced in both Finland and 
Sweden could be partly attributed to difficulties in 
their information and communication technology 
(ICT) sectors (11). Growth in R&D expenditure 
between 2008 and 2015 was most pronounced 
in some central and eastern European economies 
that generally have low levels of spending, such as 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic. 
2.2.2 Business enterprise is the largest 
R&D performing sector
R&D activities are carried out by four main 
institutional sectors, namely business 
enterprise, government, higher education 
and the private non-profit sector (see Box 2.1). 
Figure 2.3 shows how R&D expenditure was 
distributed between these four sectors in 
2015. The business enterprise sector, which 
accounted for 64.0 % of total R&D expenditure 
in the EU (EUR 191.2 billion), was the largest 
R&D performing sector. Next was the higher 
education sector, which spent almost three times 
less on R&D activities than the business sector 
(EUR 69.4 billion).
(10) Reinstaller, A., Unterlass, F., 2012, Comparing business R&D across countries over time: a decomposition exercise using data for the EU27, 
Applied Economics Letter 19, 1143–1148.
(11) European Commission, Science, Research and Innovation Performance of the EU, Brussels 2016 (p. 43).
Figure 2.3: R&D expenditure, by sectors of performance, EU-28, 2015 (1)
(%)
Business enterprise sector 
Higher education sector 
Government sector 
Private non-profit sector
0.8 %
12.0 %
23.2 %
64.0 %
(1) Provisional data.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: rd_e_gerdtot)
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Although the share of the government sector 
in total R&D expenditure was more modest at 
12.0 % (EUR 35.7 billion), its role remains important, 
especially for the long-term stability of R&D 
expenditure. This includes performing ‘far from 
the market’ research (13) and research that is of 
social or environmental importance (for example, 
health, quality of life, environment and defence). 
It also includes establishing the basis for R&D 
activities and compensating for reduced business 
R&D expenditure during economic downturns 
to help avoid a decline in the build-up of capital 
stocks and harm to long-term productivity 
growth (14). The smallest sector performing R&D 
was the private non-profit sector (EUR 2.5 billion), 
making its share almost negligible at less than 1 %.
All R&D sectors in the EU experienced increases 
in their R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
between 2002 and 2015, except for the private 
non-profit sector (see Figure 2.4). Business R&D 
intensity grew the most, by 0.15 percentage 
points. Apart from stalling in 2007 and 2010, its 
R&D intensity has been rising slowly since 2005. 
The higher education sector’s R&D intensity rose 
at just half the pace over the same period, while 
R&D performed in the government sector grew 
marginally by only 0.01 percentage points. 
As Table 2.1 shows, annual changes in total R&D 
expenditure are mainly influenced by R&D trends 
in the business sector. This is not surprising as 
the private sector is the largest in terms of R&D 
performance. Business R&D expenditure typically 
follows the cyclical patterns of GDP growth. Indeed, 
the sharpest drop in total business R&D spending 
coincided with the slump in GDP growth in 2009, 
whereas its peaks in 2006 and 2011 occurred 
during or after economic upturns. Apart from 
brief interruptions in 2009 and 2013, business R&D 
(12) For some countries, the private non-profit sector is considered together with the government sector.
(13) The market does not provide sufficient incentives for this type of research due to the non-appropriable, public good, intangible character 
of knowledge and the risky nature of research. For more information see: OECD.STI policy profiles. Public research policy: https://www.
oecd.org/sti/outlook/e-outlook/stipolicyprofiles/competencestoinnovate/publicresearchpolicy.htm 
(14) OECD, Public investment in R&D in reaction to economic crises — A longitudinal study for OECD countries, 2016.
Box 2.1: The four R&D sectors
Four main institutional sectors carry out R&D: 
business enterprise, government, higher 
education and private non-profit. 
The business enterprise sector comprises all 
firms, organisations and institutions whose 
primary activity is the production of goods 
or services (other than higher education) for 
sale to the general public at an economically 
significant price. It also includes the private non-
profit institutions that mainly serve them (while 
excluding those serving households). 
The government sector includes all 
departments, offices and other bodies that 
furnish, but normally do not sell to the 
community; those common services other than 
higher education, that cannot otherwise be 
conveniently and economically provided, as 
well as those that administer the state and the 
economic and social policy of the community. It 
also includes non-profit institutions controlled 
and mainly financed by government (excluding 
the higher education sector). Public enterprises 
are included in the business enterprise sector. 
The higher education sector encompasses all 
universities, colleges of technology and other 
institutions of post-secondary education, 
whatever their source of finance or legal 
status. It also includes all research institutes, 
experimental stations and clinics operating 
under the direct control of or administered by or 
associated with higher education institutions. 
The private non-profit sector includes non-
market, private non-profit institutions serving 
households (the general public) and private 
individuals or households (12).
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(15) European Commission, Science, Research and Innovation Performance of the EU, Brussels 2016 (p. 143).
(16) Id., p. 28.
Figure 2.4: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, by sectors of performance, EU-28, 2004–2015 
(% of GDP)
Business enterprise sector (1)
Higher education sector (1) 
Government sector (1) 
Private non-profit sector (2)0.0
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(1) Data for 2015 are provisional. 
(2) Data are estimates and/or provisional (whole time series).
Source: Eurostat (online data code: rd_e_gerdtot)
spending has increased annually at a relatively high 
rate. In contrast, public sector R&D expenditure 
(higher education and government) has been 
less cyclical and has grown more slowly. However, 
there have been exceptions. The education sector 
outpaced business in terms of R&D spending 
growth over the period 2007 to 2010 and the 
government sector’s R&D expenditure grew 
faster from 2008 to 2009 and more recently in 
2015. Overall, for all sectors annual growth in R&D 
expenditure has still not recovered to the levels 
seen before 2009.  
In many Member States, direct government R&D 
funding has been complemented by indirect 
support for business R&D in the form of tax 
incentives. Such incentives have played either an 
important or a dominant role in addition to direct 
funding for business R&D in half of the Member 
States. These countries also increased their use of 
R&D tax incentives during the crisis years (15). 
Another important source of R&D finance has come 
from European funds, in particular through the 
EU Research Framework Programme and the EU 
Structural Funds. According to recent estimates, 20 % 
of the increase in public R&D expenditure between 
2007 and 2012 could be attributed to ‘funding from 
abroad’, mainly from the EU budget (16), which was 
an important addition to the 69 % increase that 
Table 2.1: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, by sector of performance, EU-28, 2006–2015 (1)
(% change over previous year) (2)
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
All sectors 4.8 3.4 4.4 – 0.4 1.9 4.0 1.5 0.5 2.6 1.8 
Business enterprise sector 5.7 3.7 3.8 – 2.9 2.1 6.2 2.1 0.5 3.1 2.0 
Government sector 1.4 0.7 4.3 2.2 – 0.5 0.7 – 0.2 0.3 0.5 2.5 
Higher education sector 3.7 4.3 6.3 4.4 2.6 0.8 0.7 1.0 2.0 1.1 
Private non-profit sector 16.2 0.0 2.3 2.3 6.7 – 10.4 – 2.3 – 9.5 5.3 0.0 
(1) Data for ‘Private non-profit sector’ are estimates (whole time series).
(2) Calculation based on million purchasing power standards (PPS) at 2005 prices.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: rd_e_gerdtot)
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(17) European Commission, Science, Research and Innovation Performance of the EU, Brussels 2016 (p. 145).
(18) Id., p. 160.
came from national public spending. Although 
most funds from EU research programmes flow to 
large, research-intensive Member States that joined 
the EU before 2004, they have made substantial 
contributions to public funding in several small 
Member States with low R&D capacity that joined 
more recently (17). There has also been an important 
shift in the use of Structural Funds, with a growing 
share being channelled into R&D spending (18).
To illustrate country differences in gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D by sector of performance, 
Figure 2.5 presents business sector R&D 
expenditure as a share of GDP on the horizontal 
axis and public sector (higher education and 
government) R&D expenditure as a share of GDP 
on the vertical axis. The business sector is the 
largest R&D sector of performance in the most 
research-intensive countries. In the least research-
intensive countries, such as the Baltic countries 
Figure 2.5: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, by sectors of performance, by country, 2015
(% of GDP)
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and some southern and eastern Member States, 
the public sector — higher education and 
government — tends to account for the most R&D 
expenditure. There are, however, exceptions to this 
pattern in the east (Hungary, Bulgaria and Croatia) 
and the south (Italy and Spain). In general, low 
business sector R&D intensity in Member States 
indicates that the broader innovation system and 
framework conditions for this type of investment 
are still insufficiently attractive (19). Although 
the public R&D system drives the generation 
of knowledge and talent needed by innovative 
enterprises, it is only through business investment 
that the full impacts of R&D can be realised. 
Business R&D integrates and transforms available 
knowledge into commercially viable technologies 
and innovation such as greener products, 
processes and services that enable higher labour 
productivity, industrial competitiveness, resource 
efficiency and reduced environmental impacts.
2.2.3 R&D intensity concentrated in regions 
in Germany, the United Kingdom, Nordic 
countries, Austria, France and Belgium 
When looking at the regional distribution of 
R&D intensity, it can be seen that most of 
the EU’s research activity is concentrated in 
30 NUTS 2 regions (see Map 1). These regions, 
located mostly in Germany (10 regions), the 
United Kingdom (five regions), Sweden and 
Austria (four regions each), Finland (three regions), 
Belgium (two regions), Denmark and France 
(one region each), reported R&D intensity above 
3.00 %. Some research-intensive ‘clusters’ are 
also apparent, in particular: a band of research-
intensive regions running from Finland, through 
southern Sweden into Denmark; another band 
from the United Kingdom, through Belgium into 
southern Germany; and a final band going from 
Slovenia, through Austria into southern France and 
northern Spain. This geographical concentration 
of R&D activities is a common phenomenon. 
R&D clusters often develop around academic 
institutions or specific high-technology industrial 
activities and knowledge-based services, where 
they could benefit from a favourable environment 
and knowledge sharing. Due to clusters many 
regions attract new start-ups and highly qualified 
personnel and develop a competitive advantage 
in specialised activities. 
Three regions in the EU appear to have particularly 
high R&D intensities. In 2013, Germany’s Stuttgart 
and Braunschweig regions spent 6 % and 7.3 % 
of their GDP on R&D, respectively. Even more 
ambitious was Belgian’s Brabant Wallon province 
where R&D spending peaked at 11.4 % of GDP — 
almost six times higher than the EU average. 
However, this figure can partly be explained by 
the high number of commuters that travel from 
Brabant Wallon to the Brussels regions, increasing 
the GDP of Brussels and lowering the GDP of 
Brabant Wallon. 
At the other end of the scale, the 38 regions with 
R&D intensity below 0.5 % of GDP mainly belong 
to southern or central Member States: Romania 
(seven regions), Poland (six regions), Bulgaria and 
Greece (five regions each), Portugal, Spain and the 
United Kingdom (three regions each), Belgium, 
France, Croatia, Italy, the Czech Republic and 
Finland (one each).
Capital regions recorded the highest levels of R&D 
intensity in 12 multi-regional Member States. In 
addition, in 20 countries, the capital regions’ R&D 
intensity exceeded the national average but was 
not necessarily the highest in the country. Only 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece went against 
this trend, with capital regions’ R&D intensity 
below the national average. Regional disparities in 
R&D intensity within countries were largest in the 
United Kingdom, Belgium and Spain and smallest 
in Slovenia, Hungary, Croatia and the Netherlands. 
Changes in R&D intensity over time are presented 
in Map 2. Of the 269 regions for which data 
are available, 62 experienced a decline in R&D 
intensity between 2007 and 2014. This decline was 
below one percentage point in all regions except 
for four regions in the United Kingdom, namely 
Essex, Lancashire, Cheshire and Kent. In the 
remaining regions, the increase in R&D intensity 
ranged between 0.01 percentage points and 
4.63 percentage points (Belgian Brabant Wallon). 
(19) European Commission, Innovation Union Competitiveness Report 2013, Brussels 2013 (p. 38).
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Map 2.1: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, by NUTS 2 regions, 2014 (1)
(% of GDP)
Administrative Boundaries: © EuroGeographics © UN-FAO © Turkstat
Data for BE, DE, IE, EL, FR, AT, FI and SE refer to 2013 instead of 2014
Data for IT and UK are estimates
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, by NUTS 2 regions, 2014
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Map 2.2: Change in gross domestic expenditure on R&D, by NUTS 2 regions, 2007–2014 (1)
(percentage points difference between 2013 and 2007, % of GDP)
Administrative Boundaries: © EuroGeographics © UN-FAO © Turkstat
Change in gross domestic expenditure on R&D, by NUTS 2 regions, 2007–2014
(percentage points difference between 2014 and 2007, % of GDP)
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(20) Skill mismatches occur when the distribution of skills in the labour force does not match with the qualifications required by the labour 
market. For trends in skill mismatches in the EU see: ILO. 2014. Skills mismatch in Europe, Statistics Brief, Geneva, 2014.
(21) See http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/publications-and-resources/data-visualisations/job-opportunities?locale=EN&dataSource=SFMJ
&plot=crossCountry&question=01.+JobOpportunities&onlyEU=0
(22) European Institute of Innovation and Technology, Catalysing innovation in the knowledge triangle: practices from the EIT knowledge and 
innovation communities, 2012 (p. 8).
Box 2.2: The knowledge triangle: 
education facilitates research 
and innovation
Education is the ultimate way of building 
up human capital and is strongly linked 
to research and innovation. These three 
concepts, which are central drivers of a 
knowledge-based society, form the so-called 
knowledge triangle (22). This concept brings 
together education; academic research and 
knowledge production; and innovation, and 
highlights the mutual benefits to be gained 
from strong links between the three. To 
realise a cohesive European Research Area 
(ERA), education, research and innovation 
need to be strongly interlinked.
The EU increased its output 
of tertiary graduates in 
science and technology by 
32 % between 2008 and 2015. 
Despite this progress women 
are still underrepresented in 
this field of study across all 
Member States.
Although employment in knowledge-
intensive activities has increased in almost 
all Member States since 2008, the United 
States and Japan still outperform the EU in 
this respect. Countries with large financial 
and ICT sectors relative to their GDP report 
the highest employment in knowledge-
intensive activities in the EU.
Since 2002, the share of R&D personnel 
in the labour force has been slowly but 
continuously increasing, reaching 1.2 % of 
total employment in 2015. The business 
sector employs more than half of this 
workforce.
2.3 Building the knowledge base for research 
and innovation
Knowledge and skills are crucial for gaining new 
scientific and technological expertise and for 
building an economy’s capacity to absorb and use 
this knowledge (see Box 2.2). R&D expenditure is 
a vital enabling factor for human capital because 
it supports knowledge generation and skills 
development. Highly skilled human resources 
in turn are necessary for the EU’s research and 
innovation capacity and competitiveness. 
However, current skill mismatches (20) pose a 
challenge for the supply of a highly qualified 
workforce at a time of increasing and rapidly 
shifting technological needs and an ageing 
population. According to projections from 
the European Centre for the Development of 
Vocational Training (Cedefop), around 16 million 
more highly qualified people will be needed 
in the EU by 2025 (21). To meet this demand 
and avoid a potential skills gap, the EU would 
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need a high number of tertiary graduates (also 
see the chapters on ‘Employment’, page 25, 
and ‘Education’, page 107).
2.3.1 Number of science and technology 
graduates in the EU is increasing, but 
women remain underrepresented
A well-functioning research and innovation 
system is important to promote excellence in 
education and skills development and ensure a 
sufficient supply of (post)graduates in science, 
technology, engineering and mathematics. 
Increasing the number of science graduates 
and jobs in knowledge-intensive activities 
would help to create a solid base for the EU 
knowledge economy and contribute to Europe 
2020’s objectives by fostering the EU’s innovation 
capacity, economic strength and employment.
(23) European Commission, Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative Innovation Union, SEC (2010) 1161, Brussels, 2011 (p. 11 and 36).
Despite some challenges regarding science 
education — in particular disparities in basic 
science literacy and quality of science education, 
as well as gender imbalances across countries and 
regions — the EU has a good basic education 
system (23). And the number of EU students that 
graduate from tertiary education in science 
and technology has been growing. 
Figure 2.6 shows how this trend has developed 
in recent years. Between 2008 and 2015 the share 
of tertiary graduates in science and technology 
grew by 32 %, from 14.5 graduates per 1 000 
people aged 20 to 29 to 19.1 graduates per 1 000 
in the same age group. However, these figures 
need to be interpreted with caution because the 
growth in the number of science and technology 
graduates might be somewhat overstated by 
the Bologna effect. This occurs when tertiary 
Figure 2.6: Tertiary graduates in science and technology, by country, 2008 and 2015 (1)
(Graduates per 1 000 population aged 20 to 29 years)
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(1)  2008 data based on ISCED97; 2014 data based on ISCED 2011. 
Full title of the 2014 indicator ‘graduates in tertiary education, in 
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(⁵) 2011 data instead of 2008. 
(⁶) No data for 2015.
Source: Eurostat (online data codes: tps00188 and educ_uoe_grad04)
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Despite growth in the share of female tertiary 
graduates in science over the past few years, 
women are still under-represented in the science 
and technology fields in all Member States, 
especially those with the highest output of 
graduates in these fields (see Figure 2.6). This might 
be explained by the fact women still engage in 
different fields of study than men. For instance, men 
are more than two times more likely than women 
to choose a degree in engineering, manufacturing 
and construction, while women are twice as likely 
to pursue an education degree (26). It is generally 
accepted that, among other factors, differences in 
the educational pathways have some impact on 
gender segregation in employment. Occupational 
segregation, understood as under- or over-
representation of a given group in occupations 
or sectors (for example, the female-dominated 
primary education and care sector and male-
dominated technical occupations), may contribute 
to wage inequalities and threatens to exacerbate 
labour and skill shortages. The share of women 
in science and technology fields declines further 
at the postgraduate level and even more so after 
they transition to the workplace: in 2012 women 
accounted for 47 % of PhD graduates (ISCED 6: post-
graduate programmes above master’s level (27)) 
but made up only 33 % of researchers and 21 % of 
top-level researchers (grade A) (28).
2.3.2 More than one third of the EU labour 
force is employed in knowledge-intensive 
activities
Pursuit of innovation is not an end in itself. It 
can have far-reaching impacts because it drives 
productivity, supports long-term growth and 
generates high-quality jobs. Innovation can also 
shift a country’s economic structure towards 
more knowledge-intensive activities with higher 
added value (29). This structural change has 
graduates who complete a bachelor’s and then 
a master’s degree are counted twice. As a result, 
the trend in terms of the absolute number of 
graduates has not been as positive.
At the Member State level the trend varies 
considerably (see Figure 2.6). In 2015, the number 
of science and technology graduates ranged 
from about 31.5 per 1 000 inhabitants in Ireland 
to 8.3 per 1 000 inhabitants in Cyprus and 2.5 
per 1 000 inhabitants in Luxembourg (2011 data). 
The very low ratio of graduates in science and 
technology in Luxembourg and Cyprus might 
be the result of a high proportion of students 
pursuing their studies abroad. Foreign graduates 
tend to push up the ratio in the country where 
they studied and pull it down in their home 
country. In all Member States, except Finland, 
Portugal, Romania and Luxembourg, the rates of 
tertiary graduates in science and technology have 
increased since 2008. Between 2008 and 2015, the 
tertiary graduate rate in Malta more than doubled, 
while the rate grew twice in Hungary and almost 
doubled in Cyprus and Spain.
Empowering women in tertiary education and 
enhancing their employment opportunities in 
the R&D sector is also an essential part of the EU’s 
research and innovation policy. Ensuring gender 
equality and integrating the gender dimension in 
research and innovation is one of the European 
Commission’s main five priorities set out in the 2012 
Communication ‘A Reinforced European Research 
Area Partnership for Excellence and Growth’ (24) and 
a key element of the Horizon 2020 programme. 
Improving gender equality in science education 
can promote research, innovation and ultimately 
long-term growth by increasing the number of 
scientists and engineers. It can also help to reduce 
occupational segmentation in the labour force and 
improve gender equity in the labour market (25). 
(24) European Commission, A Reinforced European Research Area Partnership for Excellence and Growth, COM(2012) 392 final, Brussels, 2012.
(25) OECD, Report on the Gender Initiative: Gender Equality in Education, Employment and Entrepreneurship, Meeting of the OECD Council at 
Ministerial Level Paris, 25–26 May 2011 (p. 25).
(26) European Commission, She Figures 2015 (p. 5).
(27) ISCED 1997 classifications used.
(28) See footnote 26, p. 5–6.
(29) Knowledge-intensive activities are defined based on the level of tertiary educated people within sectors. An activity is classified as 
knowledge-intensive if employed tertiary educated persons (according to ISCED97, levels 5–6) represent more than 33 % of total 
employment in that activity.
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important implications for employment as it helps 
accommodate and stimulate the development of a 
highly skilled labour force. Therefore, the indicator 
on employment in knowledge-intensive activities as 
a percentage of total employment shows how the 
supply of highly skilled labour feeds into a country’s 
economic structure.
Employment in knowledge-intensive activities 
accounts for more than one third of total 
employment in the EU. Between 2008 and 2015 this 
share increased slightly, from 34.2 % to 36.0 %. 
As Figure 2.7 shows, countries in eastern and 
southern Europe, except for Cyprus and Malta, 
recorded employment shares in knowledge-
intensive activities below the EU average. 
Luxembourg led the ranking, with more than half 
of workers employed in fields requiring a high 
level of knowledge and education. This may be 
explained by the importance of financial services 
to the economy. A further five countries, most of 
them in northern Europe and with large financial or 
ICT sectors relative to their GDP, also recorded rates 
above 40 %.
Between 2008 and 2015 the employment share 
in knowledge-intensive activities increased in all 
Member States, except for Luxembourg and Italy, 
which experienced a 3.1 and 0.2 percentage point 
reduction, respectively. The highest increases of 
more than five percentage points were in Estonia 
as well as in some small southern Member States 
(Croatia, Portugal and Malta). 
These findings should take into consideration that 
a growing share of employment in knowledge-
intensive activities might not necessarily indicate 
a country is moving towards a more knowledge-
based economy. It could also be the result of 
employment in non-knowledge-intensive sectors 
decreasing more than employment in knowledge-
intensive activities. In fact, this seems to be the 
case for countries such as Greece, Spain, Italy and 
Figure 2.7: Employment in knowledge-intensive activities, by country, 2008 and 2015 (1) 
(% of total employment)
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(1) Break in time series for EU-28 and all countries except for Turkey 
and The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
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Source: Eurostat (online data code: htec_kia_emp2)
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the Netherlands, which experienced reductions 
in both total employment and in employment in 
knowledge-intensive activities in absolute values 
between 2008 and 2015 (30). On the other hand, 
increased employment in sectors not considered 
knowledge-intensive would lead to lower values for 
the analysed indicator, even if this employment is 
the result of significant investment in innovation in 
these sectors (31).
In 2015, 44.2 % of women employed in the EU 
were working in knowledge-intensive activities. In 
contrast, the share was only 29.1 % for men (32). While 
half of all men employed in knowledge-intensive 
activities were working in the business sector, this 
was the case for only 30 % of women. 
Improvement in the EU’s scientific tertiary education 
output has been complemented, to a varying 
extent, by national measures intended to attract a 
highly qualified workforce and human resources, 
including women, to science and research (33). At 
the EU level, R&D personnel — researchers and 
other staff employed directly in R&D — accounted 
for 1.3 % of the labour force in 2015 (34). The business 
enterprise sector was the biggest employer of 
R&D personnel, providing jobs for more than half 
of this workforce. The higher education sector 
was the second most important employer of R&D 
professionals.
Similar to the evolution of R&D intensity, the share 
of R&D personnel in the labour force increased 
marginally between 2002 and 2015 (0.26 percentage 
points). This trend was mainly driven by the business 
enterprise sector, where the share of R&D personnel 
grew by 0.17 percentage points. The higher 
education and the government sectors showed 
much smaller increases of 0.08 and 0.02 percentage 
points, respectively. The private non-profit sector 
maintained its almost negligible share of 0.01 % 
between 2002 and 2014.
(30) Source: Eurostat (online data codes: lfsi_emp_a and htec_kia_emp2).
(31) Janger, J., Schubert, T., Andries, P., Rammer, C. and Hoskens, M., The EU 2020 innovation indicator: A step forward in measuring innovation 
outputs and outcomes?, Research Policy 46 (2017) 30–42.
(32) Source: Eurostat (online data code: htec_kia_emp2).
(33) European Commission, European Research Area, Facts and Figures for 2014, Luxembourg, 2014 (p. 22).
(34) 2015 data is provisional. Source: Eurostat (online data code: rd_p_perslf).
Figure 2.8: R&D personnel, by sectors of performance, EU-28, 2015
(%)
Business enterprise sector (1) 
Higher education sector (1) 
Government sector (1) 
Private non-profit sector (2)
0.8 %
13.2 %
31.6 %
54.4 %
(1) Provisional data. 
(2) 2014 data instead of 2015; 2014 data are estimates.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: rd_p_persocc)
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A dynamic business environment is essential for 
the promotion and diffusion of innovation. The 
challenge is to make use of R&D by fostering 
entrepreneurship and creativity to trigger 
innovation and economic competitiveness. 
Therefore, measures targeting knowledge diffusion 
and absorption of ideas and innovations, for 
example, through the creation of technology 
markets and licensing schemes, are just as 
important as investment in knowledge generation 
(see Box 2.4, page 77). The higher the uptake and 
use of ideas from R&D, the more likely innovative 
players are to invest in future knowledge 
generation through increased private R&D 
expenditure. Innovators also help to create a more 
dynamic innovation system. In many cases they 
contribute to the structural and technological 
changes needed to adapt to new circumstances 
and challenges. An example is the depletion of 
fossil fuels and the resulting transition towards 
more renewable energy sources.
Progress in achieving knowledge diffusion and 
absorption can be measured through data on 
the number of innovative companies, patent 
applications and exports of high-tech products, 
among others. Other attempts to measure 
innovation include composite indices such as the 
European Innovation Scoreboard and the Eco-
Innovation Index. 
The European Innovation Scoreboard is a policy 
instrument used by the European Commission to 
compare Member States’ research and innovation 
performance. Based on a composite indicator, 
known as the summary innovation index, it forms 
a comprehensive benchmarking and monitoring 
system of research and innovation trends in 
Europe (35). 
Eco-innovation is any innovation that reduces 
the use of natural resources and decreases the 
release of harmful substances across a product’s 
whole life cycle, bringing both economic and 
(35) The European Innovation Scoreboard analyses the innovation system of EU Member States through a set of 25 indicators broken 
down into eight dimensions looking at human resources, research systems, finance and support, firm investments, linkages and 
entrepreneurship, intellectual assets, innovators and economic effects. In the resulting summary innovation index, Member States 
are classified into four groups, based on their average innovation performances: ‘innovation leaders’ have an innovation performance 
well above the EU average, ‘innovation followers’ group comprises countries whose performance is above or close to the EU average, 
‘moderate innovators’ have a performance below that of the EU average, and ‘modest innovators’ whose performance is well below the 
EU average (see European Commission, Innovation Union Scoreboard 2016, 2016 Brussels).
Almost half of the EU’s 
enterprises reported some 
kind of innovation activity 
in 2014, which was similar 
to the levels observed 
in 2012. Member States 
with relatively a high 
GDP per capita, in particular Germany and 
Luxembourg, had the highest number of 
innovative enterprises. 
A third of the EU’s innovative enterprises 
were engaged in some form of co-operation 
with other enterprises or institutions during 
the period 2012–2014. The United Kingdom 
led the ranking, with more than 60 % of 
its innovative enterprises reporting co-
operation activities.
Since 2008, the number of patent 
applications to the European Patent 
Office has stabilised at about 57 000. This 
contrasts with the upward trend in patent 
filings before the economic downturn. 
High-tech exports to outside the EU 
doubled between 2007 and 2015. This 
growth was mainly driven by increases in 
the aerospace and pharmacy sectors.
2.4 Introducing innovative ideas to the 
market: the role of businesses 
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Figure 2.9: Enterprises by type of innovation, EU-28, 2014
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(36) Eco-innovation Observatory, Introducing eco-innovation: from incremental changes to systemic transformations, 2011.
(37) Eco-Innovation Scoreboard (Eco-IS) on the DG Environment website: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecoap/scoreboard_en  
(38) The Eco-IS shows how well individual countries perform in different dimensions of eco-innovation compared with the EU average. It 
is based on 16 indicators grouped in to five thematic areas: eco-innovation inputs, eco-innovation activities, eco-innovation outputs, 
resource efficiency and socio-economic outcomes. In the index, Member States are ranked in relation to the EU average of 100.
(39) The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) is a survey of innovation activities of enterprises in Member States. The survey collects 
information about product and process innovation as well as organisational and marketing innovation and other key variables. Most 
questions cover new or significantly improved goods or services or the implementation of new or significantly improved processes, 
logistics or distribution methods. It produces a broad set of indicators on innovation activities, innovation expenditure, public funding, 
sources of information for innovation, innovation co-operation, organisational and marketing innovation and on strategies and obstacles 
for reaching the enterprises’ goals. For further information, see the Statistics Explained article on innovation statistics available on the 
Eurostat website: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Innovation_statistics 
(40) Eurostat (online data code: inn_cis9_type).
environmental benefits. Environmental benefits 
include improved resource productivity, in 
particular better material and energy efficiency, 
lower greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and 
reduced waste generation, which is beneficial for 
companies and end users. All types of innovation 
can become eco-innovation as long as they bring 
environmental benefits. Eco-innovation can, 
therefore, introduce to the market a new good 
or service, process, organisational change or 
marketing method. It can also have implications 
at the wider economic and societal level (for 
example, new urban design or new transportation 
systems) (36). 
The Eco-Innovation Scoreboard (37) is a policy tool 
that helps measure eco-innovation performance 
and assess whether the EU and its Member 
States are moving towards smart and sustainable 
growth, as requested by the Europe 2020 
strategy (38). 
2.4.1 Almost half of EU enterprises carry 
out innovation activities
Almost half (49.1 %) of EU enterprises reported 
innovation activity between 2012 and 2014. The 
share has remained relatively stable since the 
previous biennial Community Innovation Survey 
(CIS) in 2012 (48.9 %) (39) (see Figure 2.9). The share 
of innovative enterprises is broadly linked with 
GDP per capita levels. By far, the highest share 
of innovative enterprises was observed in 
Germany (67.0 %), but other countries with high 
GDP per capita and productivity levels such as 
France, and the Benelux and northern European 
countries also seemed to provide a favourable 
environment for innovative business activities 
(55 % or more innovative enterprises) (40). These 
countries also share a high proportion of medium-
high and high-tech manufacturing companies 
or a high proportion of knowledge-intensive 
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services (for example, ICT and finance). The share 
of innovative enterprises therefore seems to be 
also linked to economic structures. Similar to R&D 
intensity, a west-east divide could be observed, 
with businesses in eastern European countries 
with below EU-average income per capita 
recording the lowest innovation activity. 
Innovative companies can be distinguished by 
the type of innovation they pursue. Figure 2.9 
shows how different business strategies lead 
to different innovation types such as product, 
process, organisational or marketing innovation 
(see Box 2.3). More than a quarter (27.3 %) of 
EU enterprises reported an organisational 
innovation that involved implementing a new 
method in the enterprise’s business practices, 
workplace organisation or external relations. 
Product innovation related to the launch of new 
or significantly improved goods or services was 
the second most common innovation activity 
reported by enterprises (23.9 %).
Complex innovations with the highest potential 
for boosting productivity and growth often 
depend on the ability to draw on diverse sources 
of information and knowledge, or to collaborate 
on the development of an innovation. Innovation 
co-operation, which measures among other 
things the flow of knowledge between public 
research institutions and enterprises and between 
enterprises and other enterprises, provides an 
important indication of enterprises’ innovation 
activity. 
A third (33.1 %) of EU enterprises that conducted 
product and process innovation activities 
were also engaged in innovation co-operation 
arrangements during 2012 to 2014 (see 
Figure 2.10). The United Kingdom stands out in 
this context with 61.4 % of innovative enterprises 
involved in co-operation activities — double 
the EU average. At the other end of the scale, 
enterprises in some of the southern European 
countries were less likely to participate in 
(41) The Community Innovation Survey 2014, The harmonised survey questionnaire, 23 July 2014.
(42) OECD and Eurostat, Oslo Manual. Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data. Third Edition, Paris, 2005 (p. 1 onwards).
(43) European Commission, Commission staff working document — A rationale for action accompanying the Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative 
Innovation Union, SEC (2010) 1161 final, Brussels, 2010 (p.  6).
Box 2.3: Types of innovation
Innovation is a broad concept that 
encompasses the capacity of a company, 
economy or society to adapt to changing 
environments and circumstances. As 
outlined in the Community Innovation 
Survey 2014 (41) and the Oslo Manual (42) it 
comprises a variety of aspects:
• Product innovation: introduction of 
new or significantly improved goods or 
services.
• Process innovation: significant changes 
in production and delivery methods.
• Organisational innovation: changes 
in the way business or manufacturing 
practices are organised.
• Marketing innovation: the introduction 
of new marketing methods (concept or 
strategy).
Other innovation types, elaborated in a 
Commission Staff Working Document (43), 
include:
• User-driven innovation: innovation that 
draws heavily on knowledge inputs from 
customers and markets.
• Open innovation: changes in the way 
companies and other organisations 
access and exploit knowledge to 
innovate.
• Social innovation: innovations in the 
way society organises itself, especially 
the different ways that the public sector 
serves the needs of society.
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collaborative knowledge creation. Interestingly, 
the EU leader in innovative enterprises — 
Germany — showed a comparatively low share of 
enterprises engaged in collaboration. In contrast, 
some Baltic and eastern European countries with 
a relatively low share of innovative enterprises 
displayed above average innovation co-operation. 
2.4.2 Stagnation in the number of EU 
patent applications since 2008
The more cutting-edge knowledge is produced, 
the more likely it is to spill over into new products 
and private R&D activities. In this regard, patents 
provide a valuable measure of the exploitation 
of research results and of the inventiveness of 
countries, regions and enterprises. Patenting has 
a strategic role in supporting the Europe 2020 
strategy. Introducing innovative ideas to the 
market through patenting helps improve the 
EU’s competitiveness and productivity, which 
underlie economic growth and employment, and 
brings long-term benefits to the economy at large 
through the wide diffusion of knowledge. 
In 2012, the total number of patent 
applications to the European Patent Office 
(EPO) was 10 % higher compared to the level 
a decade earlier. Patent applications had been 
steadily increasing until 2008, but have since 
stabilised at around 57 000. The largest decrease 
in patent filings coincided with the slowdown 
in economic growth in 2008 and later in 2012. 
This might be explained by the fact that many 
industries reduce their R&D budgets and 
expenditure on the application and maintenance 
of intellectual property rights during an economic 
downturn (44).
The most prolific technology fields in terms 
of EU patents are performing operations and 
transporting, electricity and human necessities 
(see Figure 2.11). These three sectors accounted 
for half of all EU patent applications in 2012 (54 %). 
Trends for total patent filings in the individual 
sectors tended to follow the overall trend. The 
sectors experiencing the most growth in the 
number of patent applications between 2002 
and 2012 were mechanical engineering, lighting, 
(44) Benoliel, D. and Gishboliner, M., The Effect of Economic Crises on Patenting Activity Across Countries, 14 Chicago — Kent Journal of 
Intellectual Property 316, 2015 (p. 323).
Figure 2.10: Innovative enterprises engaged in any type of co-operation, by country, 2014
(% of product and/or process innovative enterprises)
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(45) Harhoff, D., Hall, B.H., von Graevenitz, G., Hoisl, K., Wagner, S., Gambardella, A. and Giuri, P., The strategic use of patents and its implications for 
enterprise and competition policies, Final Report to DG Enterprise, July 8, 2007 (p. 7).
(46) Gambardella, A., Giuri, P. and Mariani, M., Study on evaluating the knowledge economy: what are patents actually worth? The value of patents 
for today’s economy and society, Project ETD/2004/IM/E3/77 for DG Internal Market, 2006 (p.  28, 31).
(47) Janger, J., et al, The EU 2020 innovation indicator: A step forward in measuring innovation outputs and outcomes?, Research Policy 46, 2017 
(p. 30–42).
(48) See footnote 46.
Figure 2.11: Patent applications to the European Patent Office (EPO) by priority year by 
international patent classification (IPC) sections and classes, EU-28, 2002–2012
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Box 2.4: Relationships between R&D, innovation and patents
Patents are legal instruments that encourage 
companies to innovate by conferring some 
exclusive rights to inventors or assignees 
in return for the disclosure of an invention. 
According to literature (45), a company’s 
propensity to file patents is influenced by three 
factors: R&D efforts, strategic considerations 
and the competitive environment. One of the 
trade-offs for filing a patent application is that it 
excludes other parties from using the invention, 
unless permitted by the patent holder, and 
therefore limits its diffusion into society (46).
Since the 1990s, a trend of increased propensity 
to patent without a corresponding growth in 
R&D expenditure has been experienced in the 
United States and in the EU. A large variety 
of factors could have contributed to this 
trend including time-lags, knowledge spill-
overs, different accounting of R&D costs (for 
example, innovation activity not recorded as 
R&D spending), higher number of applications 
filed on the international level, lower quality 
of patents and novelty of inventions, easier 
granting of patents in the US system and others. 
At company level, the increase in patents might 
also reflect economic requirements such as the 
need for asset creation by small companies. 
Next to patent filing, the extent to which 
patents are actually used for economic and 
societal purposes remains of major importance. 
Patent counts might not truly reflect innovation 
output as patent technologies are not always 
brought into use and a considerable share of 
innovation outputs are not patentable at all (47). 
Licensing has largely been used to alleviate 
the risk that innovations are not used and 
that they are patented for reasons other than 
increasing productivity and further innovation 
(for example, guaranteeing protection 
from rivals) (48).
2 R&D and innovation
  Smarter, greener, more inclusive?78
heating, weapons and blasting (28 %) and fixed 
constructions (36 %).
2.4.3 High-tech exports to non-EU 
countries have doubled since 2007
Beyond turning research results into tangible 
applications, innovative businesses compete 
globally to sell their high-tech products on the 
world market. The volume of high-tech trade 
provides an indication of EU enterprises’ ability 
to commercialise their R&D and innovation 
outputs globally. It also reflects the specialisation 
of countries in producing medium and high-
tech products that result from innovation and 
contributes to an economy’s balance of trade 
and international competitiveness. The creation, 
exploitation and commercialisation of high-tech 
products is associated with high value added 
for the economy and knowledge-intensive and 
remunerative jobs. Therefore, high-tech trade also 
contributes to the Europe 2020 strategy’s priorities 
for smart and inclusive growth.  
Between 2007 and 2015 the value of high-tech 
exports to outside the EU grew by more than 
50 % in nominal terms, from EUR 199 billion to 
EUR 304 billion. This was a result of continuous 
growth, which was interrupted only briefly 
during the economic downturn in 2009. The 
main drivers behind the development of EU’s 
high-tech exports since 2007 were the pharmacy 
and aerospace sectors, which increased by 
145 % and 114 %, respectively. In particular, the 
EUR 45 billion increase in exports of aerospace 
high-tech accounted for almost half of the 
growth in total exports to countries outside 
the EU. Within high-tech exports, aerospace 
was also the product group with the highest 
level of exports (EUR 84 billion), followed by 
pharmacy (EUR 60 billion) and electronics and 
telecommunications (EUR 59 billion). In terms of 
destination, the United States and China were the 
main importers of EU high-tech products in 2015, 
with shares of 26 % and 10 %, respectively (49).
(49) Eurostat, Statistics Explained, Production and international trade in high-tech products, Data extracted in December 2016.
Figure 2.12: High-tech exports by high-tech group of products, EU-28, 2007–2015
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The Europe 2020 strategy tries to overcome the 
economic crisis and its impacts by addressing 
the structural weaknesses of the EU economy. It 
also attempts to create the conditions for smarter 
growth through more effective investments in 
education, research and innovation. 
However, R&D intensity — the headline indicator 
for the strategy’s smart growth priority — is 
expected to remain below the 3 % objective 
that the EU has set for itself for 2020. In 2015, 
R&D expenditure as share of GDP was at 2.03 % 
and had shown only limited progress over time, 
despite increases in public and private R&D 
expenditure since 2007. Estimates show that to 
meet the 2020 target, EU R&D intensity would 
need to grow three times as fast as it did between 
2007 and 2014 — 6.7 % versus 1.9 % annually (50) (51). 
According to these projections, if the 2007 to 2014 
trend continues, investment in R&D is forecasted 
to rise to only 2.28 % by 2020 (52). The more recent 
stagnation in R&D expenditure in 2014 and 2015 
means that the likelihood of reaching the target 
is even lower than described in the projection. 
Progressing more rapidly towards the 3 % target 
would require a faster structural shift to more 
knowledge-based economic activities. 
R&D intensity could reach 2.6 % if Member States 
meet their national targets. However, progress 
towards these has been uneven. In 2015, Denmark 
had already met its national targets, while Slovakia, 
Cyprus and Germany came very close, with a 
gap of 0.02, 0.04 and 0.13 percentage points, 
respectively, to be closed by 2020. However, most 
Member States still need to significantly accelerate 
their R&D intensity growth to be able to meet 
their respective national targets (53). In terms of 
building up the necessary human capital, it has 
been estimated that the EU will need to train 
and employ at least one million new researchers 
compared with 2008 levels if it is to reach its 3 % 
R&D target (54).
Although factors influencing R&D investment 
tend to be very context-specific, the European 
Semester Country Reports, published by the 
European Commission as part of the Europe 2020 
policy cycle, identify some persistent challenges 
in the European research and innovation system 
that impede progress towards the Europe 2020 
priorities. According to the European Semester 
Thematic Factsheet — Research and Innovation 
2016 (55), these bottlenecks could be grouped in 
three main categories: low quality of the public 
research and innovation system in some Member 
States, mainly a result of their lower public R&D 
investment; weak knowledge flows and science-
business linkages; and insufficiently attractive 
framework conditions for R&D investment and 
entrepreneurial activity. 
A number of EU policy actions and instruments 
have been put in place to address these 
challenges. The European Commission’s ‘Open 
Innovation, Open Science, Open to the World’ (56) 
initiative brings together some of the most recent 
of these and places emphasis on making science 
and innovation more open, collaborative and 
global. The Commission has established three 
pillars of action for its Open Innovation Policy, 
namely reforming the regulatory environment, 
boosting private investment and maximising 
impacts. Some specific actions under the first 
pillar include: the establishment of the Scientific 
Advice Mechanism for providing the Commission 
policy-making activities with independent 
scientific advice; the ‘Innovation Deals’, which 
make it possible for innovators to question 
EU rules posing obstacles to innovation; the 
(50) The authors note that one should bear in mind that the growth rate in R&D intensity over the 2007–2014 period was boosted by a 
depressed GDP.
(51) European Commission, Science, Research and Innovation Performance of the EU, Brussels 2016 (p. 30).
(52) Ibid.
(53) Id., p. 36.
(54) European Commission, Researchers’ report — Final report 2014, Brussels, 2014 (p. 54).
(55) European Commission, European Semester Thematic Factsheet — Research and Innovation 2016 (pp. 1–8).
(56) European Commission, Open Innovation, Open Science, Open to the World, Brussels, 2016.
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Horizon 2020 Policy Support Facility, which 
provides Member States Horizon 2020 associated 
countries with practical support in the design, 
implementation and evaluation of research and 
innovation policy reforms. Under the second 
pillar the Commission has planned some of the 
following policy measures: setting up a European 
Venture Capital Fund of Funds, which would 
support businesses as they start up and grow, 
and maximising the use of the European Fund 
for Strategic Investments for mobilising private 
funding for strategic investments and for risk 
finance for small businesses. Under the third pillar, 
the Commission foresees further implementation 
of the Seal of Excellence, which identifies 
promising Horizon 2020 project proposals and 
recommends them for further funding from 
alternative sources; establishment of a European 
Innovation Council, which would help converting 
knowledge and science into market-creating 
products and services and a second wave of 
Horizon 2020 simplification (57). 
European initiatives in the area of Open Science 
include the establishment of Open Science Policy 
Platform, the creation of European Open Science 
Cloud, the advancement of open access and data 
policies, the removal of legal barriers to the use of 
text and data mining techniques for research and 
innovation and the fostering of research integrity, 
to name a few examples (58).
The European Commission has also put to 
use all available instruments to maximise the 
impact of international co-operation on research 
and innovation, for example Horizon 2020, 
the Strategic Forum for International Science, 
policy dialogues on science and technology 
co-operation with key international partners and 
external policies (59).
(57) European Commission, Open Innovation, Open Science, Open to the World, Brussels, 2016 (p. 17–30).
(58) Id., p. 33–55.
(59) Id., p. 64–79.
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By changing weather patterns, redrawing 
coastlines and degrading natural ecosystems, 
unchecked climate change threatens to erode 
the foundations on which modern society is 
built. To avoid dangerous levels of warming, 
the international community, including the EU, 
committed to the objective of limiting the mean 
global temperature rise to well below 2 °C above 
pre-industrial levels and to drive efforts to limit the 
increase even further to 1.5°C. This agreement (1) 
was signed at the UNFCCC 21st Conference of 
the Parties (COP 21) in 2015 in Paris. A target of 
2 °C was already agreed upon in 2009 at COP 15 
in Copenhagen (2). As a means of implementing 
the international obligations in the EU, the Europe 
2020 strategy aims to turn the EU into a so-called 
‘low-carbon’ economy based on renewable 
energy sources and energy efficiency.
To contribute to this global goal, the EU has 
pledged to continually reduce the amount of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) it emits. The Europe 
2020 strategy reinforced this commitment, aiming 
to turn the EU into a so-called ‘low-carbon’ 
economy and reduce GHG emissions by 80–90 % 
by 2050 compared with 1990. Among all GHGs, 
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO
2
) are the most 
prevalent, accounting for about 81 % of the EU’s 
GHG emissions in 2014 (without land use, land 
use change and forestry (LULUCF) (5). Other GHGs 
include nitrous oxide, methane and fluorinated 
gases. The aggregate of GHGs is often measured 
in CO
2
 equivalents to make the data comparable. 
In addition to mitigating climate change, climate 
and energy policies have further environmental 
and health benefits, by helping to reduce air 
pollution and the health risks it poses. This lowers 
health costs and increases well-being, particularly 
in cities. 
The transition towards a low-carbon economy is 
not only a strategy to prevent catastrophic climate 
change. Climate and energy policies contribute to 
the core objective of the Europe 2020 strategy (6) 
3.1 Climate change and energy —  
why do they matter?
Europe 2020 strategy targets on climate change and energy 
The Europe 2020 strategy sets three 
objectives for climate and energy policy, to 
be reached by 2020 (3): 
• Reducing GHG emissions by at least 20 % 
compared with 1990 levels; 
• Increasing the share of renewable energy 
in gross final energy consumption to 
20 %; and 
• Moving towards a 20 % increase in energy 
efficiency. 
These targets are also known as the ‘20-20-
20’ targets. The Europe 2020 strategy’s three 
climate and energy targets are interrelated 
and mutually support one another. The EU 
is currently debating the climate and energy 
targets for 2030 (see Box 3.2, page 88). 
With the Clean Energy for All Europeans (4) 
legislative package of November 2016, 
the European Commission has tabled a 
comprehensive set of legislative proposals 
and measures to further develop climate and 
energy policy after 2020.
(1) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement, Paris, United Nations, 2015.
(2) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen Accord, Copenhagen, United Nations, 2009.
(3) European Commission, Taking stock of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2014) 130 final, Brussels, 
2014.
(4) European Commission, Clean energy for all Europeans, COM(2016) 860 final.
(5) EEA, Annual European Union greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2014 and inventory report 2016, Technical report No 15/2016, Copenhagen 2016.
(6) European Commission, Europe 2020 — A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 final, Brussels, 2010.
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(7) European Commission, Climate Action: Benefits of climate action, 2016 (accessed 1 June 201). 
(8) European Commission, A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy, COM(2015) 80 final, 
Brussels, 2015. 
(9) European Commission, Clean Energy for all Europeans, COM(2016) 860 final, Brussels, 2016.
of enabling sustainable growth. A push for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency — two 
key levers for reducing emissions — can spur 
innovation and create jobs. Therefore, the EU’s 
‘20-20-20’ targets are also interlinked with other 
Europe 2020 goals, in particular those for research 
and development (R&D) and employment. 
The EU can become a lead market in fields with 
high global demand. Creating demand for ever-
better green products while boosting innovation 
and export strength in the growing global market 
will be key to mastering new technologies such as 
smart grids, energy storage and electric vehicles. 
At the same time, more efficient energy use will 
improve the competitiveness of EU businesses by 
lowering production costs. 
Furthermore, more renewables and improved 
energy efficiency can reduce energy dependence 
and save the EU between EUR 175 and 320 billion 
in energy import costs per year over the next 40 
years (7). As recognised in the flagship initiative 
Innovation Union, a push for technological and 
policy innovation will be crucial for accomplishing 
this transformation. 
The EU’s Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy 
Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change 
Policy (8), introduced in 2015, complements 
existing climate change and energy governance 
policies for the period up to 2020 and will guide 
the development of policies for the following 
decade up to 2030. It aims to ensure secure, 
affordable and climate-friendly energy supply by 
focusing on five related and mutually supportive 
dimensions: 1) energy supply security of the EU; 2) 
the EU-internal energy market; 3) energy efficiency 
improvements; 4) GHG emission reduction; and 
5) research and innovation. To implement these 
goals, the European Commission presented the 
Clean Energy for all Europeans package (9) in 
November 2016. The package encompasses a set 
of legislative proposals and facilitating measures 
which are now being discussed in the European 
Council and in the European Parliament.
The analysis in this chapter is based on the 
three headline indicators chosen to monitor 
the climate and energy targets: ‘GHG emissions’, 
‘share of renewable energy in gross final energy 
consumption’ and ‘primary and final energy 
consumption’. 
Contextual indicators are used to present a 
broader picture, looking into the drivers behind 
changes in the headline indicators. Changes in 
EU GHG emissions are analysed in relation to 
underlying sectoral trends. Based on this analysis 
EU trends are compared with information on the 
global trend in GHG emissions and its impact on 
global mean temperature and the climate system. 
The analysis then turns to the two most important 
measures for cutting EU emissions, namely energy 
supplied from renewable sources and energy 
efficiency. For both fields, progress at the EU and 
Member State levels is assessed with a special 
focus on the wider socioeconomic effects of the 
emerging green economy. 
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(10) See: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm
(11) Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020.
(12) See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4411192/4411431/Europe_2020_Targets.pdf
(13) Based on Eurostat data on greenhouse gas emissions, base year 1990 (accessed 6 July 2016). 
In 2015, EU greenhouse 
gas emissions, 
including emissions 
from international 
aviation and indirect CO
2
 
emissions, were down by 
22.1 % compared with 1990 levels. The EU 
is thus expected to exceed its Europe 2020 
target of reducing GHG emissions by 20 % 
by 2020. 
All sectors, except fuel combustion in 
transport and international aviation, 
contributed to the reductions between 
1990 and 2015. In 2015 transport emissions 
have risen for the second consecutive 
year — coinciding with a return of stronger 
economic growth.
3.2 The EU is on track to achieving its GHG 
emission reduction target for 2020
Reducing greenhouse gas emissions is a central 
objective of the Europe 2020 strategy. As a result, 
the EU as a whole aims to reduce these emissions 
by 20 % compared with 1990 levels (including 
international aviation and indirect CO
2
 emissions). 
The main policy instruments to achieve this target 
are the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) (10) 
and the Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) (11).  
The EU ETS sets a single EU-wide cap for more 
than 11 000 power stations and industrial plants, 
as well as the emissions from flights within the 
European Economic Area (EEA). It allows these 
economic actors to trade emission allowances 
among themselves. The cap shrinks each year to 
reach an emissions reduction of 21 % compared 
with 2005 by 2020. 
The Effort Sharing Decision sets binding annual 
GHG emissions targets for Member States for 
sectors not included in the EU ETS. Member 
States’ targets for the non-EU ETS sectors (such 
as transport, buildings, agriculture and waste) 
vary between a 20 % reduction to a 20 % increase 
in emissions by 2020, reflecting differences in 
starting points and wealth (12). Less wealthy 
economies are allowed to increase their emissions 
to accommodate higher economic growth. 
Their targets still limit emissions compared with 
business-as-usual scenarios; hence all Member 
States are committed to making reductions. By 
2020, the national targets will collectively deliver 
a reduction of around 10 % in total EU emissions 
from the non-EU ETS sectors compared with 
2005 levels. 
Together, the EU ETS and the Effort Sharing 
Decision will reduce overall emissions to around 
14 % below 2005 levels by 2020 (13). This will equal 
a 20 % cut below 1990 levels. In addition to these 
overarching instruments, the EU has set an array 
of policy tools to address emissions from certain 
sectors and activities. Box 3.1 lists the most 
important tools.
By 2015, the EU as a whole had cut man-made 
GHG emissions by 22.1 % compared with their 
1990 levels (see Figure 3.1). A large portion of this 
reduction occurred during the 1990s. Between 
1990 and 1994 a large drop of 6.8 % occurred, 
mostly due to structural changes (such as a 
shift from heavy manufacturing industries to 
more service-based economies), modernisation 
in industries and a change from coal to gas. 
Emissions began to rise again in 1995, but this 
trend reversed in 1997. Between 1998 and 2007 
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Box 3.1: Key policy instruments to reduce GHG emissions 
The EU has adopted a number of instruments to 
complement the EU Emissions Trading System 
(EU ETS) and the Effort Sharing Decision (ESD). 
The most relevant, given the energy sector’s 
importance as a major source of emissions, are 
those underlying the renewable energy and 
energy efficiency targets. 
The Renewable Energy Directive (14) (RED) 
sets a framework for promoting energy from 
renewable sources. It establishes mandatory 
national targets, detailed planning and 
regular monitoring requirements, and rules on 
simplifying administrative procedures. Within 
this framework, Member States have leeway 
to develop their own support schemes for 
renewable technologies. 
The Energy Efficiency Directive (15) (EED) creates 
an overarching framework for improving 
efficiency in Member States to ensure the 
EU’s energy efficiency target is met. It is 
complemented by sector-specific instruments 
such as the Energy Performance of Buildings 
Directive (16), which sets insulation standards for 
newly built buildings, the Ecodesign Directive (17) 
defining performance standards for energy-using 
products and the Energy Taxation Directive (18), 
which sets minimum rates for energy products. 
To increase energy efficiency in the transport 
sector, the EU has set mandatory emissions 
reduction targets for new passenger cars (19). 
Fleets must emit no more than an average of 95 
grams of CO
2
 per kilometre by 2020. Similarly, the 
Vans Regulation (20) limits CO
2
 emissions from 
new vans to a fleet average of 147 grams of CO
2
 
per kilometre by 2020.
(14) Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and the European Council on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC.
(15) European Commission, Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency, 
amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC. European Commission, Brussels, 
2012, Art. 3.
(16) Directive 2002/91/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2002 on the energy performance of buildings.
(17) Directive 2009/125 of 21 October 2009 establishing a framework for the setting of eco design requirements for energy-related products.
(18) Directive 2003/96 of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity.
(19) Regulation 443/2009 of 23 April 2009 setting emission performance standards for new passenger cars as part of the Community’s 
integrated approach to reduce CO
2
 emissions from light-duty vehicles.
(20) Regulation (EU) No 510/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011 setting emission performance standards for 
new light commercial vehicles as part of the Union’s integrated approach to reduce CO
2
 emissions from light-duty vehicles.
(21) Climate change — driving forces, Statistics Explained, Eurostat Website (retrieved June 2017).
(22) EEA, Analysis of key trends and drivers in greenhouse gas emissions in the EU between 1990 and 2015, EEA Report No. 8/2017, Copenhagen 2016.
(23) Based on Eurostat data on real GDP growth rate — volume (accessed 12 June 2017).
emissions stabilised at around 92–94 % of 1990 
levels. This was mainly the result of a decrease 
in the consumption of fossil fuels. However, 
significant cuts were also made in the waste 
sector through the reduction of landfilling and in 
agriculture due to a decline in livestock numbers 
and nitrogenous fertiliser use (21). 
By far the sharpest single-year decline in GHG 
emissions since the early 1990s occurred between 
2008 and 2009 (– 7.2 %). During this time the 
economic crisis reduced industrial production, 
transport volumes and energy demand. The 
following years only saw slow recovery in many 
parts of Europe. The decline of CO
2
 emissions 
observed between 2009 and 2012 can mainly be 
attributed to three factors: improvement in the 
energy intensity of the EU economy, development 
of renewable energy sources and the economic 
slowdown (22). 
From 2013 to 2014, GHG emissions fell by 3.1 %, 
while GDP grew 1.7 % (23). The largest share 
of emission reductions during this year were 
achieved in the energy sector, with more 
than 80 % of cuts occurring because of lower 
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EUROPE 2020
H E A D L I N E
I N D I C AT O R
(1) Total emissions, including international aviation and indirect CO
2
, but excluding emissions from land use, land use 
change, and forestry (LULUCF).
Source: European Environment Agency, Eurostat (online data code: t2020_30)
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Figure 3.1: Greenhouse gas emissions, EU-28, 1990–2015 (1)
(Index 1990 = 100) 
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Figure 3.2: Greenhouse gas emissions per capita, by country, 2005 and 2015 (1)
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(1) Total emissions, including international aviation and indirect CO
2
, 
but excluding emissions from land use, land use change, and 
forestry (LULUCF).
(²) 2014 data (instead of 2015).
Source: European Environment Agency, Eurostat (online data code: t2020_rd300)
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Figure 3.3: Greenhouse gas emissions and projections, 1990–2050 (1)
(Million tonnes of CO
2
 equivalent) 
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(1) Total EU GHG emissions include those from international aviation; exclude those from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). 
Source: European Environment Agency
Box 3.2: The 2030 climate and energy framework
The 2030 climate and energy framework was 
adopted by EU leaders in October 2014 and 
builds on the 2020 climate and energy package. 
The strategy sets three key targets for the year 
2030:
• At least a 40 % reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions (from 1990 levels);
• At least a 27 % share for renewable energy;
• At least a 27 % improvement in energy 
efficiency (increased to a target of at least 
30 % improvement in the Commission’s 
proposal for a recast energy efficiency 
directive).
The 2030 framework is also in line with the long-
term perspective of the Roadmap for moving to 
a competitive low carbon economy in 2050 (24), 
which sets out the pathway towards the EU’s 
objective of reducing emissions by 80–95 % by 
2050 compared with 1990 levels (25). 
In the European Council Conclusions of October 
2014 (26), the European Council stressed that the 
indicative target at the EU level set for improving 
energy efficiency by at least 27 % will be reviewed 
by 2020, having in mind an EU level of 30 %. In 
the Clean Energy for All Europeans (27) legislative 
package of November 2016, the European 
Commission proposed a binding EU energy 
efficiency target of 30 % by 2030.
(24)  European Commission, A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050, Brussels, 2011.
(25)  European Commission, Europe 2020 — A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 final, Brussels, 2010.
(26)  European Council (23 and 24 October 2014) — Conclusions, EUCO 169/14.
(27)  European Commission, Clean energy for all Europeans, COM(2016) 860 final.
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emissions from electricity generation in thermal 
power stations (28). However, between 2014 and 
2015, GHG emissions started to rise again, by 0.5 %, 
and real GDP continued to grow, by 2.2 % (29). This 
increase in emissions was the result of growth 
in road transport, both passenger and freight. 
Furthermore, colder temperatures in Europe in 
2015 led to rising emissions in the residential and 
commercial sectors (30).
Dividing emission figures by the total population 
provides a way of comparing countries’ GHG 
emissions on a more equal footing. Figure 3.2 
shows Member States’ overall per capita 
GHG emissions for the years 2005 and 2015. 
Luxembourg emitted the most GHG per capita 
in the EU in 2015. This can partly be attributed 
to a considerable number of commuters from 
neighbouring countries fuelling their cars on 
Luxembourgish territory, as well as road freight 
transit and fuel tourism (31). Luxembourg was 
followed by Estonia, Ireland and the Netherlands. 
In contrast, per capita emissions were lowest in 
some eastern and southern European countries as 
well as in Sweden. 
Between 2005 and 2015, Luxembourg showed the 
highest reduction in per capita emissions. Ireland, 
(28) EEA, Annual European Union greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2014 and inventory report 2016, EEA Report No 15/2016, Copenhagen 2016.
(29) Based on Eurostat data on real GDP growth rate — volume (accessed 12 June 2017).
(30) EEA, Annual European Union greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2015 and inventory report 2017, EEA Report No 6/2017, Copenhagen 2017. 
(31) Eurostat, Using official statistics to calculate greenhouse gas emissions, Luxembourg 2010 (p. 28).
(32) European Council (23 and 23 October 2014) — Conclusions , Brussels 2014. 
Denmark, Greece, Belgium, Finland and Cyprus also 
showed large falls. However, emissions rose in some 
of the eastern Member States over the same time 
frame.
Looking towards 2020, projected GHG emissions 
based on Member States’ existing policy measures 
shows the EU is on track to surpass its 2020 target 
(see Figure 3.3). However, it can also be seen that 
existing and already planned measures are not 
enough to put the EU on track to meet its target for 
the next decade to reduce GHG emissions by 40 % 
by 2030 (32). Thus, further efforts will be needed. This 
is why the EU is introducing new mitigation policies 
for the period after 2020, with in particular a reform 
of the EU ETS and the Effort Sharing Regulation. 
These proposals should be adopted by the end 
of 2017.
3.2.1 All sectors except transport have 
lowered emissions since 1990
Figure 3.4 shows how each sector has contributed 
to the EU’s total GHG emissions. All sectors, except 
fuel combustion in transport and international 
aviation, contributed to the overall GHG emission 
reductions from 1990 to 2015. 
Figure 3.4: Greenhouse gas emissions by sector, EU-28, 1990, 2000, 2005 and 2015
(Million tonnes of CO
2
 equivalent)
1 680 1 509 1 445 1 242
836
679 537
483
782
918 931
906
517
452
390
374
548
464
426
437
241
231
170
139
852
769
782
639
69
116
132
142
0
1 000
2 000
3 000
4 000
5 000
6 000
1990 2000 2010 2015
Fuel combustion in energy industries
Fuel combustion in manufacturing 
industries and construction
Fuel combustion in transport
Industrial processes and product use
Agriculture
Waste management
Other sectors (including indirect CO2)
International aviation
Source: European Environment Agency, Eurostat (online data code: tsdcc210)
3 Climate change and energy
  Smarter, greener, more inclusive?90
In absolute terms, energy industries made the 
biggest emission reductions with 438 million 
tonnes of CO
2
 equivalent over the period (26.1 %). 
Nevertheless, it is still the sector responsible 
for the largest share of total emissions (27.9 % 
in 2015). The second largest reduction of 353 
million tonnes of CO
2
 equivalent was achieved in 
the manufacturing industries and construction 
(42.2 %). 
By contrast, transport emissions were 15.9 % 
higher in 2015 than in 1990. Fuel combustion 
in transport accounted for 20.4 % of total EU 
emissions in 2015, making it the second largest 
source after the energy industries. However, 
transport emissions were even higher in 2007, 
where they peaked at 988 million tonnes of 
CO
2
 equivalent and then fell by 10.6 % by 2013, 
reaching their lowest point in 16 years. Ex-post 
evaluation of climate policies showed that the 
recent emission reductions in the transport sector 
were explained by the increasing share of biofuels 
as well as increased car efficiency (33). However, 
in 2015 transport emissions rose for the second 
consecutive year and are now 2.5 % above 2013 
levels — coinciding with a return of stronger 
economic growth. Improving energy efficiency 
and increasing the share of alternative fuels 
therefore remain crucial to permanently reducing 
the transport sector’s GHG emissions. 
Emissions from international aviation more than 
doubled between 1990 and 2015, increasing from 
69 to 142 million tonnes of CO
2
 equivalent.    
3.2.2 Continuous positive developments 
in non-ETS emissions since 2005
Figure 3.5 shows Member States’ non-ETS 
emissions between 2005 and 2015, as well as their 
2020 non-ETS targets. Sixteen countries reduced 
their emissions and have already reached their 
national targets. Emissions increased in three 
countries, but of these only Malta overshot its 
target. Ten Member States remain above their 
national reduction targets, although all of them 
except one had reduced their emissions up 
to 2015. Malta was the furthest from its target, 
followed by Ireland, Belgium and Luxembourg.
(33) EEA, Why did GHG emissions decrease in the EU between 1990 and 2012?, 2014.
Figure 3.5: Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors, by country, 2015 (¹)
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The overall positive trend for non-ETS emissions in 
the EU can be linked mainly to the building sector 
as a result of energy efficiency improvements 
and a less carbon-intensive fuel mix for space 
heating (34). However, mild winter temperatures 
are also partly responsible for the fall in energy 
demand. The reductions in transport emissions 
since 2007 also contributed to the decrease. 
3.2.3 Global CO
2
 emissions and mean 
temperature continue to rise
Despite reductions in the EU, global CO
2
 emissions 
from fuel combustion rose by 57.9 % between 
1990 and 2014, as shown in Figure 3.6. Most of 
the increase took place in emerging economies. 
Emissions growth, both in relative and absolute 
(34) EEA, Annual European Union greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2015 and inventory report 2017, Technical report No 19/2015, Copenhagen 2017.
Figure 3.6: Global CO
2
 emissions from fuel combustion, 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2014
(Million tonnes of CO
2
 equivalent)
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Figure 3.7: Total greenhouse gas emissions per capita, by country, 1990 and 2013
(tonnes of CO₂ equivalent per capita)
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(35) IEA, CO
2
 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, 2016.
(36) EEA, SOER 2015 — The European environment: Increasingly severe consequences of climate change (GMT 9), 2015.
(37) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement, Paris, United Nations, 2015.
terms, was strongest in China. Between 1990 and 
2014, China’s annual CO
2
 emissions more than 
tripled and the country overtook the United 
States to become the world’s biggest emitter. At 
the same time, China’s per capita emissions from 
fuel combustion reached 6.66 tonnes of CO
2
, 
outpacing the EU level of 6.22 tonnes (35). 
Although less important in absolute terms, 
emissions in the rest of Asia and the rest of the 
world also grew significantly in relative terms 
between 1990 and 2014 (214.8 % and 90.8 % 
respectively). As a result of these trends, the EU’s 
share of global CO
2
 emissions has been shrinking, 
from almost a fifth in 1990 to 9.8 % in 2014. 
In 2013, GHG emissions per capita remain at very 
different levels across the globe (see Figure 3.7). 
On average, an Australian emits 11 times as much 
as an Indian citizen. Even within the group of 
industrialised countries, emission levels per person 
vary widely. The US level is, for example, more 
than twice as high as the EU average. However, 
between 1990 and 2013 a trend towards greater 
convergence can be observed. While per-capita 
emissions have decreased in the EU (– 15 %), the 
US (– 15 %) and Australia (– 11 %), emission levels 
per person have increased in poorer countries, 
with the biggest rises taking place in China 
(+ 211 %) and South Korea (+ 98 %). Over the 
same time frame, the global average per-capita 
emissions increased by 11.2 %, reaching 6.3 tonnes 
of CO
2
-equivalent in 2013.
Rising emissions have dramatically increased 
CO
2
 levels in the atmosphere. Although there is 
a time lag between CO
2
 being emitted and the 
corresponding increase in average global surface 
temperature, recordings already show a clear 
upward trend (see Figure 3.8). Between 2001 and 
2010, the global surface temperature was around 
0.89 °C higher than during the first decade of the 
20th century. The year 2015 was the warmest year 
since records began in 1850. Current projections 
estimate that global mean temperatures could 
rise by as much as 2.6 °C to 4.8 °C compared with 
the reference period (1986–2005) by the late 21st 
century (2081–2100) if CO
2
 emissions remain at 
current levels (36). 
Despite the EU’s shrinking share of global CO
2
 
emissions, recent findings on the potentially 
catastrophic impacts of climate change confirm 
the ongoing importance of its climate and energy 
goals. EU emission cuts alone cannot halt climate 
change, but the GHG reduction objectives for 
2030 and 2050 are considered a fair contribution 
to the global mitigation efforts, consistent with 
the internationally agreed objective (37) of keeping 
the temperature increase below 2 °C compared to 
Figure 3.8: Global annual mean temperature deviations, 1850–2015 
(Temperature deviation in °C, compared with 1850–1899 average)
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(38) European Commission, Impact Assessment accompanying the Communication A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 
2020 up to 2030, SWD(2014)15.
(39) EEA, Climate change, impacts and vulnerability in Europe 2016, EEA Report No 1/2017, Copenhagen 2017.
(40) EEA, Economic losses from climate related extremes (accessed on 7 July 2017).
(41) See footnote 39.
Box 3.3: The consequences of climate change 
In Europe and globally, temperature rises have 
already led to observable changes in natural 
systems and society. For example, the warming 
of lakes and rivers has led to more frequent 
algal blooms and forced species to move 
northwards (39). Damage costs from natural 
disasters have increased and are likely to rise 
substantially in the future (40).
A European Environment Agency (EEA) 
assessment shows that climate change will not 
affect European regions equally. For example, 
it is likely to increase existing vulnerabilities 
such as exposure to flood risk in coastal areas or 
drought in the Mediterranean region. Coastal 
erosion and flooding due to sea-level rise, as 
well as more extreme weather events such as 
storms and heat waves, are the biggest threats 
to people and infrastructure. In southern 
Europe, problems of water availability and 
more frequent droughts threaten to lower crop 
productivity even with a temperature rise of 
1–2 °C, putting the region’s agricultural sector 
at risk (41). 
By hitting marginalised regions and poor people 
the hardest, climate change could deepen 
socioeconomic imbalances in Europe. 
3.3 More renewable energy means fewer  
GHG emissions
Renewable energy is on the rise in the EU: 
in 2015 it provided 16.7 % of gross final 
energy consumption, up from 8.5 % in 2004. 
Member States’ renewable energy shares 
ranged from 53.9 % in Sweden to 5.0 % in 
Luxembourg and Malta. Electricity from solar 
or wind projects is increasingly competitive 
with fossil fuel-based power generation. 
Solid, liquid and gaseous biofuels still 
provide the biggest share of total renewable 
energy in the EU. It is the largest renewable 
energy source used in transport and for 
heating and cooling. 
For transport, 
renewable energy 
provided 6.7 % of 
all energy used in 
2015, up from 1.4 % 
in 2004.
In the electricity 
sector, hydropower 
remains the dominant renewable energy 
technology. However, thanks to cost 
reductions and effective support schemes, 
the share of wind and solar energy has 
increased particularly quickly. 
pre-industrial levels (38). Moreover, if the EU can show 
that a low-carbon economy is feasible, and can 
even increase innovation and employment, it will 
serve as a role model to other regions. Continuous 
investment in advanced low-carbon technologies 
can also help the EU uphold technological 
leadership and secure export markets. A successful 
clean energy transition, discussed in the next 
section, will create the condition for sustainable 
jobs, growth and investment. 
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(42) EEA, Renewable energy in Europe 2017: recent growth and knock-on effects, EEA Report No 3/2017, Copenhagen 2017.
(43) Ecofys, Renewable energy progress and biofuels sustainability, Utrecht 2014.
(44) McCrone, Angus et al, Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2017, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, commissioned by 
UN Environment’s Economy Division in co-operation with Frankfurt School-UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate & Sustainable Energy 
Finance and produced in collaboration with Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Frankfurt am Main 2017.
(45) See footnote 42.
(46) Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and the European Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, 2009.
3.3.1 Renewable energy keeps growing 
steadily 
The Europe 2020 strategy’s second climate 
change and energy target is to increase the 
share of renewable energy in gross final 
energy consumption to 20 % by 2020. Gross 
final energy consumption comprises the energy 
supplied to the final consumers for all energy 
uses and the consumption of electricity and heat 
by the energy branch for electricity and heat 
production, including losses of electricity and heat 
in distribution and transmission.
Between 2004 and 2015, the share of renewable 
energy almost doubled, reaching 16.7 % of gross 
final energy consumption in 2015 (see Figure 3.9). 
The two main drivers of this increase were 
the implementation of support schemes for 
renewable energy technology and falling costs 
of renewable energy systems (42). (However, it 
must also be kept in mind that updated and 
more accurate statistical information, as a result 
of revisions based on specialised surveys, have 
also contributed to this increase, in particular 
data revisions in the area of solid biomass 
(wood) consumption in households). Over the 
past decade, there has been a steady growth in 
installed capacity for renewable electricity and 
heat generation, driven by policies such as feed-
in tariffs, grants, tax credits and, more recently, 
tenders. At the same time, an introduction of 
obligatory quotas has stimulated the use of 
renewable transport fuels (43). In the electricity 
sector, an upscaling of global production volumes 
as well as technological advances have allowed 
producers to substantially cut energy costs. 
New photovoltaic power stations built in 2016 
produce electricity for a third of the costs required 
in 2009 and are approaching the cost level of 
onshore wind. The offshore wind industry has also 
achieved dramatic cost cuts, roughly halving costs 
per kilowatt-hour between 2011 and 2016 (44). 
Electricity from wind turbines and large solar 
installations is becoming increasingly competitive 
with new fossil fuel plants. 
These price falls led some Member States to 
restrict support for new renewable energy 
projects, which reduced profitability and created 
uncertainty for investors (45). In combination with 
lower costs per unit, this lowered total investment 
Box 3.4: Implementing the EU 2020 renewable energy target in the  
Member States 
The EU’s renewable energy target has been 
broken down into national targets that reflect 
differences in resource base and wealth. 
To ensure the renewable energy targets are 
met, the Renewable Energy Directive adopted 
in 2009 (46) allows Member States to put in place 
support schemes and requires them to remove 
administrative barriers to the authorisation, 
certification and licensing of renewable 
energy plants. 
All Member States created national renewable 
energy action plans (NREAPs) in 2010. These 
outline how they plan to achieve their target 
and include interim targets and trajectories per 
sector and technology. Progress on these plans 
is reported to the European Commission every 
two years. In addition, Member States report on 
their national renewable energy policies in the 
National Reform Programme under the Europe 
2020 strategy.
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Figure 3.9: Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption, EU-28, 2004–2015
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Figure 3.10: Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption, by country, 2004 and 
2015
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in renewable energy plants. Renewable 
energy investment in Europe (including the 
Commonwealth of Independent States) peaked 
at EUR 88.9 billion in 2011, when both Italy and 
Germany experienced a boom in photovoltaic 
installations, and declined by over 40 % in the 
following four years. In 2016, the decline was 
halted and investment rebounded by 3 % 
compared to 2015, reaching EUR 55.2 billion (47). 
In 2015, the share of renewable energy in 
gross final energy consumption in Member 
States ranged from 53.9 % in Sweden to 5.0 % 
in Luxembourg and Malta (see Figure 3.10). 
Differences between Member States stem 
from variations in natural resources, such as the 
potential for building hydropower plants and the 
availability of biomass, but also from the success 
of national climate and energy policies. All EU 
countries increased their renewable energy share 
between 2004 and 2015. Fourteen have more than 
doubled their share, albeit from a low base. Ten 
have already met their 2020 targets. 
Compared with other world regions, the EU’s 
renewable energy share is relatively high. The 
continent of Africa, where the use of traditional 
biomass is still widely used, procured almost half 
of its total primary energy supply from renewable 
sources in 2014, however, most emerging and 
industrialised countries have lower shares. For 
example, China covered 11.4 % of its primary 
energy supply through renewable sources in 
2014 (48), followed by Mexico with 8.5 %, the 
United States (7.1 %), Australia (6.6 %) and Japan 
(5.3 %). In the Middle East, the share was as low 
as 0.4 %. An exception was Canada, which had 
a renewable share of 18.0 % in 2014 due to its 
abundant hydropower resources (49). 
3.3.2 Biofuels dominate renewable energy 
but wind and solar are expanding fast
Renewable energy can be generated from a 
range of sources, including hydro, wind, solar and 
geothermal power. Bioenergy remains by far the 
EU’s most important renewable energy source 
because it contributes to all energy use sectors 
(electricity generation, transport and heating and 
(47) McCrone, Angus et al, Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2017, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, commissioned 
by UN Environment’s Economy Division in co-operation with Frankfurt School-UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate & Sustainable 
Energy Finance and produced in collaboration with Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Frankfurt am Main 2017, p. 14. US dollar values were 
converted to euros based on Eurostat exchange rate data (online data code: ert_bil_eur_a).
(48) Note that the headline indicator for consumption of renewables in the EU is calculated as a share of gross final energy (16.7 % in 2015), 
while the shares shown here for non-EU countries are expressed as a percentage of primary energy supply. The figures are thus not 
directly comparable to the shares shown in Figure 3.9 and 3.10. 
(49) IEA Headline Global Energy Data, 2016 edition.
Figure 3.11: Gross inland consumption of renewable energy, by source, EU-28, 2004 and 2015 
(%)
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Source: Eurostat (online data code: nrg_107a)
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cooling). In 2015, solid biofuels, renewable waste, 
biogas and liquid biofuels provided 64.4 % of 
the total gross inland consumption of renewable 
energy (see Figure 3.11). At the same time, wind 
and solar energy are growing the fastest. In 
2015, the EU generated 26.0 million tonnes of oil 
equivalent (Mtoe) from wind energy — a more 
than five-fold increase compared with 2004. In 
the same year, solar energy contributed 13.1 Mtoe, 
more than 18 times as much as in 2004. 
3.3.3 Shares of renewable energy in 
different sectors
Renewable energies contribute both to electricity 
and energy consumption for heating and cooling 
as well as to the transport sector.
After rapid expansion over the past decade, 
renewables contributed 28.8 % of total gross final 
electricity consumption in 2015, compared with 
14.3 % in 2004 (50). Hydropower remained the 
largest source, but declined in relative weight as 
wind, solar and biogas experienced rapid growth 
(see Figure 3.12). 
Moreover, renewable energy provided 18.6 % of 
Europe’s final energy consumption for heating 
and cooling in 2015, up from 10.2 % in 2004 (51). 
Solid biofuels delivered the largest share of total 
renewable consumption, followed by minor 
contributions from biogas, solar thermal and 
ambient heat captured by heat pumps. 
Between 2011 and 2015, the share of renewables in 
transport energy use increased from 4.0 % to 6.7 %. 
Figure 3.13 shows this share has increased almost 
continuously since 2004, with a break in 2011 
when the accounting methodology changed. 
The Renewable Energy Directive (52) (Directive 
2009/28/EC) sets sustainability criteria for the 
production of liquid biofuels, which make up the 
largest share of renewables in transport (53). Since 
2011, only those biofuels certified as sustainable 
according to the Directive are counted towards 
(50) Eurostat, Shares 2015 — Short assessment of renewable energy sources (last update: 27 March 2017).
(51) Ibid.
(52) Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and the European Council of 23 April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, 2009.
(53) See footnote 50.
Figure 3.12: Share of renewable energy sources in total final electricity consumption, EU-28, 
2004–2015 (1)
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(1)  According to the requirement set in Annex II of Directive 
2009/28/EC, hydro and wind generation is normalised to smooth 
out variability in weather over a 15-year period for hydro and a 
five-year period for wind. Pumping is excluded because it is a 
storage technology not an energy source. Solar includes solar 
photovoltaics and solar thermal generation. All other renewables 
includes electricity generation from gaseous and liquid biofuels, 
renewable municipal waste, geothermal, and tide, wave and 
ocean.
Source: Eurostat (SHARES 2015)
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A 2015 amendment to the Fuel Quality Directive 
and the Renewable Energy Directive (54) puts 
greater emphasis on production of advanced 
biofuels (biofuels stemming from the residual 
non-food parts of crops, as well as crops that 
are not used for food purposes). Furthermore, it 
limits the contribution of liquid biofuels produced 
from crops grown on agricultural land towards 
the 2020 renewable energy transport target to 
7 %. Alternative biofuels, mainly based on used 
cooking oil, contributed 23 % to all compliant 
biofuels used in the EU in 2015, up from 1 % 
in 2009 (55).  
the share of renewables in transport and are 
therefore included in the indicator. Some Member 
States transposed the sustainability standards into 
national law earlier than others. This change in the 
accounting methodology explains the drop in the 
share of renewables in transport from 2010 to 2011. 
Consumption of liquid biofuels in transport has 
been growing steadily, but also slowly. In 2015, 
the overall share of renewable energy in transport 
was at 6.7 % in the EU. In the same year, Member 
States’ shares ranged between 0.4 % and 24 %. 
However, despite a slight increase in the EU’s 
overall share of renewable energy in transport 
of 0.2 % between 2014 and 2015, the share fell or 
remained stable in 12 Member States. 
(54) Directive (EU) 2015/1513 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 amending Directive 98/70/EC relating to the 
quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources.
(55) European Commission, Renewable energy progress report, (COM(2017) 57 final), Brussels, 2017.
Figure 3.13: Share of renewable energy in fuel consumption of transport, EU-28, 2004–2015 (¹)
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(¹)  Break in series in 2011; since 2011 only sustainable biofuels that comply with Directive 2009/28/EC have been included in the data. The 
data presented above are calculated using multipliers for renewable electricity used in the transport sector and advanced biofuels.
Source: Eurostat (SHARES 2015)
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Delivering the same service or product by using 
less energy is one of the most cost-effective ways 
of reducing GHG emissions and enhancing energy 
security. Building renovations as well as efficiency 
improvements in the transport sector offer the 
biggest potential for further reductions (56). 
The target is to move towards a 20 % increase in 
energy efficiency. In absolute terms this means 
that by 2020 EU energy consumption should 
not exceed 1 483 Mtoe of primary energy or 
1 086 Mtoe of final energy (57)(58). 
Primary energy consumption (PEC) includes all 
gross inland energy consumption except energy 
carriers employed for non-energy purposes, 
for example, petroleum or gas not used for 
combustion but for producing plastics. By 
contrast, final energy consumption only comprises 
the energy supplied to the final consumer’s door 
for all energy uses, excluding energy used by the 
energy sector. The difference between primary 
and final energy consumption is equivalent 
to the energy losses occurring during energy 
transformation (particularly electricity generation), 
transmission and distribution. 
3.4 The EU needs to further pursue energy 
efficiency improvements
(56) European Commission, 2016 assessment of the progress made by Member States in 2014 towards the national energy efficiency targets 
for 2020 and towards the implementation of the Energy Efficiency Directive 2012/27/EU as required by Article 24 (3) of the Energy 
Efficiency Directive 2012/27/EU, (COM (2017) 56 final), Brussels, 2017.
(57) European Commission, Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency, amending 
Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC.
(58) Council Directive 2013/12/EU of 13 May 2013 adapting Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on Energy 
Efficiency, by reason of the accession of the Republic of Croatia.
The EU has made 
substantial progress 
towards its energy 
efficiency objective. 
The 2020 target for final 
energy consumption has 
already been achieved. With respect to 
primary energy consumption, the EU must 
achieve a further reduction of 3.1 % over the 
five years between 2015 to 2020 to achieve 
the target of improving energy efficiency by 
20 %. In 2015, the EU consumed 10.7 % less 
primary energy than in 2005.  
Although energy efficiency policies have 
helped drive reductions in primary energy 
consumption, some of the reductions can 
be attributed to lower economic output and 
warmer than average years, such as 2013 
and 2014.
All but two Member States reduced primary 
energy consumption compared to 2005 by 
values ranging from 3.3 % to 27.3 %. 
Between 2005 and 2015, agriculture and 
forestry, as well as industry, have reduced 
final energy consumption by over a quarter, 
while consumption in the residential sector 
has remained stable. By contrast, energy 
consumption in the services and transport 
sectors has risen by 35.2 % and 26.3 %, 
respectively. 
The EU still relies heavily on energy imports 
from non-EU countries, which provided 
54.1 % of all energy consumed in 2015. The 
main supplier of energy to the EU in 2015 
was Russia. It supplied 37.3 % of total gas 
imports, 32.9 % of imports of petroleum 
products and 29.1 % of solid fuel imports.
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3.4.1 Energy consumption in the EU has 
been decreasing, with a reversed trend in 
recent years
As shown in Figure 3.14, PEC in the EU was on an 
intermittent but overall rising trend until 2006 
when it peaked at 1 722 Mtoe. However, by 2009, 
following the economic crisis, it had fallen sharply 
by 124 Mtoe. It rebounded temporarily in 2010, 
but continued on its downward path over the 
next four years, reaching 1 508 Mtoe in 2014. The 
downward trend was interrupted in 2015, when 
PEC increased by 1.4 % compared to the previous 
year. In 2015, the EU consumed 2.5 % less primary 
energy than it did in 1990 and 10.7 % less than 
in 2005. To achieve the target for 2020, the EU 
needs to reduce its primary energy consumption 
by another 3.1 % in the five years between 2015 
and 2020.  
Much of the decrease between 2008 and 2009 
may be attributed to reduced economic activity as 
a result of the financial and economic crisis, rather 
than to a structural shift in energy consumption 
patterns. In 2010, an especially cold winter caused 
a sharp increase in heating demand. The most 
recent reductions from 2011 onwards can again 
be partly attributed to reduced economic output 
expressed by a 0.5 % contraction of real GDP in 
2012. However, primary energy consumption 
continued to fall thereafter, despite a real GDP 
growth of 1.7 % in 2014 (59). Warmer years in 
2013 and 2014, and improvements in energy 
efficiency due to new policies, are considered to 
have contributed to this decrease (60). The slight 
increase in 2015 reflects a return to more average 
heating demand compared to the exceptionally 
warm 2014 (61). 
Figure 3.14: Primary energy consumption and final energy consumption, EU-28, 1990–2015
(Million tonnes of oil equivalent)
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Source: Eurostat (online data codes: t2020_33 and t2020_34)
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(59) Based on Eurostat data on real GDP growth rate — volume (accessed 7 July 2017).
(60) EEA, Trends and Projections in Europe 2016 — Tracking progress towards Europe’s climate and energy targets, European Environment Agency, 
Copenhagen, 2016. 
(61) European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: 2016 assessment of the progress made by 
Member States in 2014 towards the national energy efficiency targets for 2020 and towards the implementation of the Energy Efficiency Directive 
2012/27/EU as required by Article 24 (3) of the Energy Efficiency Directive 2012/27/EU, COM(2017) 56 final, Brussels 2017.
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The analysis underlines the need to further pursue 
energy-efficiency measures. Continuous effort can 
ensure PEC will continue to decrease even when 
economic growth accelerates.
The trend in final energy consumption has 
closely followed the trend in primary energy 
consumption, reaching 1 082 Mtoe in 2015. This 
means that the energy efficiency target for final 
energy consumption has already been reached.
According to the Energy Efficiency Directive 
(EED) (62), the EU efficiency target is measured 
as a 20 % saving compared with a hypothetical 
projection for EU primary energy consumption 
(PEC). Starting with the 2005 base year, this 
business-as-usual projection (carried out in 
2007) estimated a primary energy consumption 
of 1 853 Mtoe in 2020. It assumed continuous 
economic growth and no additional energy-
efficiency policies above and beyond those in 
place in 2005. The envisaged 20 % saving amounts 
to an absolute saving of 370 Mtoe, resulting in a 
target PEC value of no more than 1  483 Mtoe for 
2020 (63). Compared with the actual PEC in 2005, 
this is equivalent to a reduction of 13.4 %.
Globally, only one major economy has reduced 
PEC by more than the EU: Japan consumed 16 % 
less primary energy in 2015 than it did in 2005. The 
United States reduced its PEC by 5.9 % over the 
same time frame, whereas energy demand rose in 
all other big industrialised countries and regions. 
The highest increase of 68 % between 2005 and 
2014 was observed in China, followed by the 
Middle East (53.9 %), South Korea (31.3 %) (64) and 
Africa (28.8 %) (65). An increase in PEC can, however, 
occur despite energy efficiency improvements. In 
emerging economies in particular, high economic 
growth and population drive up demand for 
energy.
3.4.2 Changes in energy consumption at 
Member State and sector level
Figure 3.15 shows the change in PEC from 2005 
to 2015 in all Member States. Looking at the 2015 
data, 26 Member States reduced primary energy 
(62) European Commission, Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency, 
amending Directives 2009/125 and 2010/30 and repealing Directives 2004/8 and 2006/32, European Commission, Brussels, 2012, Art. 3.
(63) Council Directive 2013/12/EU adapting Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on energy efficiency, by reason 
of the accession of the Republic of Croatia (accessed 20 April 2016).
(64) Refers to provisional 2015 data.
(65) International Energy Agency, Statistics, Headline Energy Data, 2016 edition.
Figure 3.15: Change in primary energy consumption, by country, 2015
(Index 2005 = 100)
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(66)  Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency, amending Directives 
2009/125 and 2010/30 and repealing Directives 2004/8 and 2006/32, Brussels, 2012, Art. 3.
(67)  EEA, Trends and Projections in Europe 2016 — Tracking progress towards Europe’s climate and energy targets, Copenhagen, 2016. 
Box 3.5: National energy efficiency targets 
The revised Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) 
adopted in 2012 (66) requires Member States to set 
indicative national energy efficiency targets for 
2020. These can be based on different indicators 
(primary or final energy consumption, or primary 
or final energy savings, or energy intensity). To 
make these targets comparable, the Directive 
also requires each Member State to ‘translate’ 
its target into levels of primary and final energy 
consumption in 2020. In addition, Member States 
need to explain how this has been calculated. 
Taken collectively, the national indicative targets 
result in a 3 % higher PEC than the absolute 2020 
target set at EU level, which means Member 
States overall are not aiming for sufficient energy 
use reductions (67). 
Figure 3.16: Final energy consumption, by sector, EU-28, 1990 and 2015
(% in total FEC) 
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Source: Eurostat (online data code: tsdpc320)
Figure 3.17: Final energy consumption, by sector, EU-28, 1990–2015
(Index 1990=100)
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consumption compared to 2005 by values ranging 
from 3.3 % to 27.3 %. PEC increased in Poland and 
Estonia by 2.7 % and 14.3 %, respectively (see also 
Box 3.5 on national targets).
Between 1990 and 2015, economic sectors 
showed different final energy consumption trends 
(see Figure 3.16 and Figure 3.17). Agriculture 
and forestry, as well as industry, reduced their 
final energy consumption by 26.6 % and 25.8 %, 
respectively, while the residential sector’s 
consumption remained stable with a reduction of 
just 0.3 %. By contrast, energy consumption in the 
services and transport sectors grew by 35.2 % and 
26.3 % respectively over the same time period. 
While these changes reflect sector-specific levels 
of energy-efficiency improvement, they also 
relate to structural changes in the EU economy, 
particularly a shift away from an energy-intensive 
industry to a service-based economy. In the case 
of transport, a large share of efficiency gains 
have been outweighed by rising volumes of 
transport over the past few decades. In 2015, the 
majority of final energy was used in transport 
with a 33.2 % share, followed by industry and the 
residential sector with shares of 25.3 % each. The 
services sector was responsible for 13.6 % and 
agriculture and forestry for 2.2 % of final energy 
consumption. 
Despite recent reductions in energy 
consumption, substantial potential for cost-
efficient improvements in energy efficiency 
remains untapped. There is, for example, 
particular scope for savings in transport, building 
refurbishment, industrial processes and along the 
energy supply chain. 
3.4.3 EU’s dependency on energy 
imports has been increasing, despite 
renewable energy and energy efficiency 
improvements 
Energy-efficiency improvements can strengthen 
the EU’s competitiveness and lower its 
dependence on fossil fuel imports. The EU’s 
energy dependence — the share of total energy 
needs met by imports from non-EU countries —
has increased significantly over the past decade, 
reaching 54.1 % in 2015 (see Figure 3.18). Shrinking 
domestic production of fossil fuels is mostly 
responsible for this increase. By contrast, most 
renewable energy can be sourced domestically. 
The imported share of solid fuels such as hard 
coal has more than doubled between 1990 and 
2015, while the share of imports in total gas 
consumption has increased by 25 percentage 
points. The increasing demand for fossil fuel 
imports is driven by a decline in domestic oil, 
Figure 3.18: Energy dependence, EU-28, 1990–2015 (¹)
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gas and coal production (68). Over the observed 
period, the fall in EU mining and drilling has 
overcompensated the increase in domestic 
renewable energy production. 
Dependence on imported energy exposes the 
European economy to significant costs and the 
risk of supply shortages, for example, due to 
geopolitical conflicts. The expansion of renewable 
energy sources and the improvement of energy 
efficiency reduce these risks and contribute to the 
Europe 2020 strategy’s employment objective (see 
the chapter on Employment, page 25) by creating 
jobs and value added within EU borders. 
Figure 3.19 shows where the EU imports energy 
from. The main supplier in 2015 was Russia. 
It supplied 37.3 % of gas, 32.9 % of petroleum 
products and 29.1 % of solid fuels imports from 
non-EU suppliers. The second largest source of 
natural gas is other non-EU European countries, 
mainly Norway, with 33.0 %. Also 11.8 % of oil 
imports come from this region. The second largest 
source supplying oil to the EU after Russia is Africa, 
with 19 %, followed by the Middle East with 16.9 %. 
Regarding solid fuels, Central and South America is 
the second largest source after Russia with 24.3 %, 
followed by North America with 17.3 %.    
(68) European Commission, In-depth study of European Energy Security, Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the European 
energy security strategy, SWD(2014) 330 final/3, Brussels 2014.
Figure 3.19: Where the EU imports its energy carriers from, 2015
(thousand tonnes and million cubic metres)
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According to the 2016 Climate action progress 
report (69), the EU is expected to exceed its 2020 
GHG emission target. Also at the Member State 
level, regarding their achievement of individual 
non-ETS targets (manifested in the Effort-Sharing 
Decision), 24 countries are on track to meet their 
GHG targets (except Austria, Belgium, Ireland and 
Luxembourg) (70). However, projections show that 
further efforts will be necessary to put the EU on 
track to meeting the 2030 target. 
With respect to renewable energy, the EU is 
currently on track to meet its 2020 target (71). 
However, the European Commission’s 2017 
Renewable energy progress report (72) emphasises 
that continuous effort is required to keep up 
investment and to further remove administrative 
barriers. The EEA also emphasises that in view of 
the EU’s decarbonisation objectives for 2050, the 
built up of renewable energy capacity needs to 
speed up (73). 
The 2020 target for energy efficiency is within 
reach. To achieve it, the EU needs to reduce PEC 
by an extra 3.1 % in the five years between 2015 
and 2020. Nevertheless, continuous efforts are 
needed to ensure primary energy consumption 
returns to a downward path after a slight rebound 
in 2015 and remains on it while the economy 
continues to grow. The 2016 Energy efficiency 
progress report (74) concludes there is still potential 
for further energy efficiency improvements, 
particularly in the buildings and transport sectors.   
(69) European Commission, Implementing the Paris Agreement — Progress of the EU towards the at least 40% target, SWD(2015) 349 final.
(70) EEA, Trends and Projections in Europe 2016 — Tracking progress towards Europe’s climate and energy targets, European Environment Agency, 
Copenhagen, 2016.
(71) Ibid.
(72) European Commission, Renewable energy progress report, COM (2017) 57 final, Brussels, 2015.
(73) See footnote 69.
(74) European Commission, 2016 assessment of the progress made by Member States in 2014 towards the national energy efficiency targets for 
2020 and towards the implementation of the Energy Efficiency Directive 2012/27/EU as required by Article 24 (3) of the Energy Efficiency Directive 
2012/27/EU, (COM (2017) 56 final), Brussels, 2017.
3.5 Outlook towards 2020
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Education and training lie at the heart of the 
Europe 2020 strategy and are seen as key drivers 
for growth and jobs. The recent economic crisis 
along with an ageing population, through their 
impact on economies, labour markets and 
society, are two important challenges that are 
changing the context in which education systems 
operate (1). At the same time, education and 
training help boost productivity, innovation and 
competitiveness. 
Upper secondary education is now considered the 
minimum desirable educational attainment level 
for EU citizens. Young people who leave education 
and training prematurely lack crucial skills and 
run the risk of facing serious, persistent problems 
in the labour market and experiencing poverty 
and social exclusion. Early leavers from education 
and training who do enter the labour market are 
more likely to be in precarious, low-paid jobs and 
to draw on welfare and other social programmes. 
They are also less likely to be ‘active citizens’ or 
engage in adult learning. 
In addition, tertiary education, with its links 
to research and innovation, provides highly 
skilled human capital (see the chapter on ‘R&D 
and innovation’, page 55). A lack of these skills 
presents a severe obstacle to economic growth 
and employment in an era of rapid technological 
progress, intense global competition and labour 
market demand for ever-increasing levels of skill. 
The Europe 2020 strategy, through its ‘smart 
growth’ priority, aims to tackle early school leaving 
and to raise tertiary education levels. 
The analysis in this chapter builds on the 
headline indicators chosen to monitor the 
strategy’s education targets: ‘early leavers from 
education and training’ and ‘tertiary educational 
attainment’. Contextual indicators are used to 
provide a broader picture and insight into drivers 
4.1 Education and training — why do  
they matter?
Europe 2020 strategy target on 
education 
The Europe 2020 strategy sets the 
target of ‘reducing the share of early 
leavers of education and training to 
less than 10  % and increasing the 
share of the population aged 30 to 34 
having completed tertiary or equivalent 
education to at least 40  % by 2020’ (2).
(1) For further information on the impact of demographic ageing on the labour force, see the chapter on ‘Employment’, page 25.
(2) European Commission, Taking stock of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2014) 130 final, Brussels, 2014.
(3) Council conclusions of 12 May 2009 on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training (‘ET 2020’)  
(2009/C 119/02), Official Journal of the European Union.
behind changes in the headline indicators. 
Some are also used to monitor progress towards 
additional benchmarks set under the EU’s 
Strategic Framework for Education and Training 
2020 (ET 2020) (3). These indicators include early 
childhood education, basic reading, maths and 
science skills and adult participation in learning. 
The benchmarks are listed in Box 4.1.
The analysis in this chapter starts with early 
school leaving and its impacts, followed by the 
typical educational pathway, starting with early 
childhood education, followed by the acquisition 
of basic skills and foreign languages, leading 
to tertiary education and adult participation in 
learning. It then switches to the ‘outcome’ side, 
looking at educational attainment in general and 
its impacts on the labour market. The chapter 
finally investigates the input in the form of public 
expenditure on education.
The EU’s education targets are interlinked with 
the other Europe 2020 goals as higher educational 
attainment improves employability, which in turn 
reduces poverty. The tertiary education target 
is furthermore interrelated with the research 
and development (R&D) and innovation target 
because investment in the R&D sector is likely to 
raise the demand for highly skilled workers.
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Box 4.1: ET 2020 — the EU’s Strategic Framework for Education and  
Training 2020 
The two Europe 2020 education targets also 
feature as EU benchmarks under the Strategic 
Framework for Education and Training 2020 (ET 
2020) (4). ET 2020 aims to foster European  
co-operation in education and training, providing 
common strategic objectives for the EU and its 
Member States for the period up to 2020. ET 2020 
covers the areas of adult participation in learning 
and mobility; quality and efficiency of education 
and training; equity, social cohesion and active 
citizenship; and creativity, innovation and 
entrepreneurship at all levels of education and 
training. To support the achievement of these 
objectives ET 2020 sets EU-wide benchmarks. 
In addition to the two Europe 2020 targets for 
education, there are another five benchmarks: 
• At least 95 % of children between the age of 
four years and the age for starting compulsory 
primary education should participate in early 
childhood education. 
• The share of low-achieving 15 year olds in 
reading, mathematics and science should be 
less than 15 %. 
• The share of graduates (20 to 34 year olds) 
having left education and training in the past 
one to three years who are employed and not 
in any further education and  training should 
be at least 82 %. 
• An average of at least 15 % of adults should 
participate in learning.
• An EU average of at least 20 % of higher 
education graduates and of at least 6 % of 
18 to 34 year olds with an initial vocational 
qualification should have spent some time 
studying or training abroad (5).
(4) Council conclusions of 12 May 2009 on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training (‘ET 2020’) (2009/C 
119/02), Official Journal of the European Union.
(5) For further information, see: http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/
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The EU defines upper secondary education as the 
minimum desirable educational attainment level 
for EU citizens. The skills and competences gained 
in upper secondary education are considered 
essential for successful labour market entry and 
as the foundation for adult learning. Therefore, 
the headline indicator ‘early leavers from 
education and training’ measures the share of 
the population aged 18 to 24 with at most lower 
secondary education and who were not involved 
in further education or training during the four 
weeks preceding the survey. Figure 4.1 shows that 
the share of early leavers has fallen continuously 
from 17.0 % in 2002 to 10.7 % in 2016. This trend 
mirrors reductions in almost all Member States for 
both men and women. 
Overall, in the EU men tend to leave education 
and training earlier than women. This gap, which 
was 3 percentage points in 2016, has narrowed 
by 1.5 percentage points since 2004. However, 
for the first time since 2010 the gap has widened 
compared to the previous year. The rate for 
women is already below the headline target, with 
only 9.2 % leaving early in 2016.  
At the country level, gender differences in 2016 
were particularly strong in Spain, Latvia, Malta 
and Cyprus. Bulgaria and Romania were the only 
Member States where men were more likely 
to stay longer in education and training than 
women.
4.2.1 Substantial decreases in early 
leaving in southern European countries 
Reflecting different national circumstances, the 
overall EU target for early leavers from education 
and training has been transposed into national 
targets by all Member States except the United 
Early leaving from 
education and 
training has been 
falling continuously 
in the EU since 2002, 
for both men and 
women. The fall from 
17.0 % in 2002 to 10.7 % in 2016 represents 
steady progress towards the Europe 2020 
target of 10 %. 
15 countries have already reached their 
national targets for the rate of early leavers 
from education and training. Southern 
European countries made particularly 
strong progress between 2008 and 2016.  
Across the EU, rates of early leaving from 
education and training are generally 
higher for people who study away from the 
country in which they were born.
Educational attainment strongly influences 
labour market participation. In 2016, 
about 58 % of 18 to 24 year old early 
leavers from education and training were 
either unemployed or inactive. Of the 
total population of 18 to 24 year olds, 
15.2 % were neither in employment nor in 
any further education or training (NEET), 
putting them at risk of being excluded from 
the labour market. 
Participation in early childhood education 
and care (ECEC) has grown more or less 
continuously in the EU since 2002. In 2015, 
94.8 % of children between the age of 
four and the starting age of compulsory 
education participated in ECEC. This is 
very close to the ET 2020 benchmark of a 
participation rate of at least 95 %. 
In 2015, about one fifth of 15 year olds 
showed insufficient abilities in reading, 
maths and science. This is a step backward 
compared to 2012. As a result, the EU as 
a whole is seriously lagging behind in all 
three domains when it comes to progress 
towards the ET 2020 benchmark of less than 
15 % low achievers.
A
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4.2 Early school leaving is still decreasing
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Figure 4.1: Early leavers from education and training, EU-28, 2002–2016 (1)
(% of the population aged 18–24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further 
education or training)
Europe 2020 headline indicator 
(1) Breaks in time series in 2003, 2006 and 2014.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: t2020_40)
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Kingdom. National targets range from 4 % for 
Croatia to 16 % for Italy (see Figure 4.2). In 2016, 
15 countries had already achieved their targets: 
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Latvia, the Netherlands and Slovenia. 
Rates of early leaving vary widely across Member 
States. In 2016, the lowest proportion of early 
leavers was observed in Luxembourg and some 
eastern European countries (Croatia, Lithuania, 
Poland and Slovenia), with rates of less than 6 %. 
The share was highest in Malta, Romania and 
Spain, with 18.5 % or more. 
At the same time southern European countries 
experienced strong falls in early leaving between 
2008 and 2016, especially Portugal (from 34.9 % to 
14 %), Spain (from 31.7 % to 19 %) and Greece (from 
14.4 % to 6.2 %). Overall, 17 Member States were 
already below the overall EU target of 10 % in 2016. 
Of the candidate countries, Turkey had the highest 
share of early leavers, at more than three times the 
EU average. 
Country of birth strongly influences the rate of 
early leaving across the EU (see Figure 4.3). People 
who study away from the country in which they 
were born are more likely to struggle to complete 
their education. Socioeconomic status underlies 
much of this difficulty, but issues associated 
specifically with immigration such as language 
barriers and settling into a new environment are 
also at play, according to the Migration Policy 
Institute (6). 
1.2.2 Early school leaving leads to severe 
problems in the labour market 
In general, low educational attainment — at most 
lower secondary education — influences other 
socioeconomic factors. The most important of 
(6) Nouwen, Ward, Noel Clycq and Daniela Ulicna, Reducing the risk that youth with a migrant background in Europe will leave school early, 
Brussels, Migration Policy Institute Europe and SIRIUS Policy Network on the education of children and youngsters with a migrant 
background, 2015.
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these are employment, unemployment and the 
risk of poverty or social exclusion. Some of these 
relationships are also analysed in detail in other 
chapters (see the chapters on ‘Employment’, 
page 25, and ‘Poverty and social exclusion’, 
page 129). 
Early leavers from education and training and 
low-educated young people face particularly 
severe problems in the labour market. As shown 
in Figure 4.4, about 58 % of 18 to 24 year olds, with 
at most lower secondary education and who are 
not in further education or training, were either 
unemployed or inactive in 2016. The situation for 
early leavers has worsened over time: between 
2008 and 2016, the share of 18 to 24 year old early 
leavers who were not employed but who wanted 
to work grew from 30 % to 37 %. For a further 
analysis on youth unemployment, see the chapter 
on ‘Employment’, page 25. 
The indicator monitoring young people neither 
in employment nor in education and training 
(NEET) covers people aged 18 to 24 years. 
Low educational attainment is one of the key 
determinants of young people entering the NEET 
category. Other factors include having a disability 
or coming from a migrant background. 
In 2016, 15.2 % of 18 to 24 year olds were neither 
in employment nor in education, exposing 
themselves to the risk of labour market exclusion 
and dependence on social security. This was an 
improvement since 2012 when the NEET rate 
peaked at 17.2 %, but was still higher than the 2008 
low of 14.0 %. 
Changes in the EU NEET rate have been mainly 
caused by changes in the unemployment rate of 
18 to 24 year olds (see Figure 4.5). In comparison, 
the share of inactive youths has remained stable 
at, or just below, 8 %. The NEET rate was slightly 
higher for women (15.7 %) than for men (14.7 %). 
However, while women in the NEET category 
tended to be economically inactive, men were 
mostly unemployed.
Figure 4.2: Early leavers from education and training, by country, 2008 and 2016 (¹)
(% of the population aged 18–24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further 
education or training)
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(¹) All countries: break in time series in 2014 (switch from ISCED 1997 
to ISCED 2011), data are comparable for all countries except EE. 
(²) Target: less than 10 %. 
(³) 2016 data with low reliability. 
(⁴) Target: less than 9 %. 
(⁵) Break in time series in 2015. 
(⁶) Break in time series in 2016. 
(⁷) target: less than 7%. 
(⁸) No target in National Reform Programme.
Source: Eurostat (online data code : t2020_40)
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Figure 4.3: Early leavers from education and training by broad group of country of birth, by 
country, 2016 
(% of the population aged 18–24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further 
education or training)
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Source: Eurostat (online data code: edat_lfse_02)
Figure 4.4: Early leavers from education and training, by labour status, EU-28, 2008 and 2016 (1)
(% of the population aged 18 to 24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further 
education or training)
Employed
Not employed, would 
like to work (seeking 
employment or not) 
Not employed, do 
not want to work
54 %
30 %
16 %
2008
42 %
37 %
21 %
2016
(¹) Break in time series in 2014 (switch from ISCED 1997 to ISCED 2011).
Source: Eurostat (online data code: edat_lfse_14)
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4.2.3 Participation in early childhood 
education and care has reached the ET 
2020 benchmark 
Early childhood education and care (ECEC) can 
bring wide-ranging social and economic benefits 
for individuals and for society as a whole. Quality 
ECEC provides an essential foundation for effective 
adult learning and future educational achievements. 
It also lays the foundations for later success in life 
in terms of well-being, employability and social 
integration. To realise these benefits, the EU aims 
to ensure that all young children can access and 
benefit from high-quality education and care (7). 
Participation in ECEC is crucial for preparing 
children for formal education, especially those 
from disadvantaged backgrounds. The aim is to 
reduce the incidence of early school leaving and 
thereby address one of the Europe 2020 headline 
targets on education. Investment in pre-primary 
education also offers higher medium- and long-
term returns and is more likely to help children 
from low socioeconomic status than investment 
at later educational stages. 
ET 2020 (8) recognises ECEC’s potential for 
addressing social inclusion and economic 
challenges. It has set a benchmark to ensure that at 
least 95 % of children aged between four and the 
starting age of compulsory education participate 
in ECEC. As Figure 4.6 shows, participation has 
been rising more or less continuously in the EU 
since 2002, reaching 94.8 % in 2015 and therefore 
very close to the benchmark of 95 %. There are 
some variations on the country level. Half of the 
Member States had already exceeded the ET 2020 
benchmark in 2015, implying almost universal 
pre-school attendance. France, Malta and the 
United Kingdom had already achieved a 100 % 
pre-school attendance, while in Belgium and 
Denmark participation rates were 98 % and above. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the lowest 
pre-school attendances were observed in Croatia 
(73.8 %) and Slovakia (78.4 %). When it comes to 
gender differences, very little variation in early 
childhood education can be seen across the EU.
4.2.4 Acquisition of skills such as reading, 
maths and science has taken a step 
backwards
All educational systems aim to equip people with 
a wide range of skills and competences. These 
encompass not only basic skills such as reading 
(7) European Commission, Key Data on Early Childhood Education and Care in Europe, 2014. 
(8) Council conclusions of 12 May 2009 on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training (‘ET 2020’) (2009/C 
119/02), Official Journal of the European Union.
Figure 4.5: Young people not in employment and not in any education and training, EU-28, 
2002–2016 (¹)
(% of population aged 18 to 24)
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(¹) Breaks in time series in 2003 and 2006.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: edat_lfse_20)
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and mathematics, but also others like science and 
foreign languages. 
Basic skills, whether reading simple texts or 
performing easy calculations, provide the 
foundations for learning, gaining specialised skills 
and personal development. These skills are also 
essential for people to fully participate in and 
contribute to society. The ET 2020 framework 
acknowledges the increasing importance of 
individual skills in the era of the knowledge-based 
economy. Therefore, one of the targets enshrined 
in the ET 2020 is to reduce the share of 15 year 
olds achieving low proficiency levels in reading, 
mathematics and science to less than 15 % 
by 2020. 
In 2015, about one fifth of 15-year-old EU 
citizens showed insufficient abilities in reading, 
mathematics and science as measured by the 
OECD’s PISA study (9). Test results were best for 
reading, with a 19.7 % share of low achievers, 
followed by science with 20.6 % and maths 
with 22.2 %. Figure 4.7 shows how the overall 
performance in reading, maths and science varied 
significantly across countries. It also indicates that 
performance is highly correlated across all three 
areas of basic skills. Member States that show 
certain levels of basic skills in one of the areas tend 
to show a similar value in the other areas.
The share of pupils failing to acquire competences 
in the key subjects surpassed 36 % in Bulgaria, 
Cyprus and Romania. However, only two countries 
(Estonia and Finland) reached the ET 2020 
benchmark and had a share of low achievers, 
with levels below 15 %. In general, there is no 
clear geographical pattern, with a number of 
eastern Member States performing better than 
the EU average while some northern and western 
Member States show lower rates. 
Compared with international competitors, the 
EU’s overall share of low achievers in reading and 
science was similar to that of the United States 
while in maths US pupils performed significantly 
worse (29.4 %). However, it was higher than for 
Japan and South Korea, where the shares of 
low-achieving pupils were below 13 % and 16 % 
respectively. 
According to the European Commission’s PISA 
2015 (10) report, the EU as a whole is seriously 
lagging behind the 2020 target to have less than 
15 % of low achievers in each of the three basic 
skill areas. The report also shows that progress 
(9) PISA is an international study that was launched by the OECD in 1997. It aims to evaluate education systems worldwide every three years 
by assessing 15-year-olds’ competencies in the key subjects: reading, mathematics and science. For further details see http://www.oecd.
org/pisa/
(10) European Commission, PISA 2015: EU performance and initial conclusions regarding education policies in Europe, 2016 (p. 3).
Figure 4.6: Participation in early childhood education, EU-28, 2002–2015 (¹)
(% of the age group between 4 years old and the starting age of compulsory education)
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(¹) Break in time series in 2013 (switch from ISCED 1997 to ISCED 2011); 2015 data are estimates; ET 2020 benchmark for the EU: at least 95 %.
Source: Eurostat (online data codes: tps00179 and educ_uoe_enra10)
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has taken a step backwards, with the rate of low 
achievers increasing since the PISA 2012 results by 4 
percentage points in science, 1.9 percentage points 
in reading and 0.1 percentage points in maths. 
In general, gender differences are not as large as 
they used to be. The gender gap in the share of 
low achievers in maths (girls: 23.2 %, boys: 21.2 %) 
and science (girls: 20.4 %, boys: 20.7 %) continues 
to be small. The gap between boys and girls for 
reading (girls: 15.9 %, boys: 23.5 %) has narrowed 
significantly. In addition to basic skills in reading, 
maths and science, the ability of citizens to 
communicate in at least two languages besides 
their mother tongue has been identified as a key 
priority in the ET 2020 framework. The European 
Commission has proposed monitoring student 
proficiency in the first foreign language and the 
uptake of a second foreign language at lower 
secondary level. Member States must ensure 
the quantity and quality of foreign language 
education is scrutinised and that teaching and 
learning are geared towards practical, real-life 
application (11). Foreign language skills should be 
taken into account in the effort to equip young 
people with the competences needed to meet 
labour market demands. 
Schools teach foreign languages in all Member 
States, making language learning a central 
element in every child’s school experience across 
Europe. On average, 16.3 % of pupils across the 
EU in primary education (ISCED level 1) were not 
engaged in foreign language learning at this level 
in 2014 (12). This number was higher in 2013, with 
18.3 %. Looking at students in lower secondary 
education (ISCED level 2), the share learning no 
foreign language dropped to 1.4 % across the EU. 
On the other hand, students learning one foreign 
language reached nearly 40 % and students 
learning two or more foreign languages reached 
almost 59 % in 2015.
(11) The Member States play an important role in the development of national assessments of language learning. See in particular the May 
2014 Council Conclusions on Multilingualism and the development of language competence.
(12) Data source: Eurostat (online data code: educ_uoe_lang02)
Figure 4.7: Low achievers in reading, maths and science, by country, 2015 
(Share of 15-year-old pupils who are below proficiency level 2 on the PISA scales for reading, maths 
and science)
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Between 2002 and 
2016, the share of 
30 to 34 year olds 
having completed 
tertiary education 
grew continuously 
from 23.6 % to 39.1 %. 
Growth was considerably faster for women, 
who in 2016 were already clearly above the 
Europe 2020 target at 43.9 %. In contrast, 
among 30 to 34 year old men the share was 
34.4 % in 2016. 
The share of adults participating in learning 
does not seem to be increasing fast enough 
to meet the ET 2020 benchmark of raising 
participation to at least 15 % by 2020. Over 
the last four years, the share stagnated 
between 10.7 % (2013, 2015) and 10.8 % 
(2014, 2016).
(13) Educational attainment is defined according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Tertiary educational 
attainment refers to ISCED 2011 level 5–8 (for data as from 2014) and to ISCED 1997 level 5–6 (for data up to 2013). 
4.3 Increasing attainment at tertiary level
4.3.1 The share of tertiary graduates 
keeps on growing 
The second Europe 2020 education target — 
raising the share of the population aged 30 to 
34 that have completed tertiary or equivalent 
education to at least 40 % — is monitored with 
the headline indicator on tertiary educational 
attainment of the same age group (13). 
Figure 4.8 shows a steady and considerable 
growth in the share of 30 to 34 year olds who 
have successfully completed a university degree 
or other tertiary-level education since 2002. 
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Figure 4.8: Tertiary educational attainment, EU-28, 2002–2016 (1)
(% of the population aged 30–34 with completed tertiary education)
Europe 2020 headline indicator 
(1) Break in time series in 2014 (switch from ISCED 1997 to ISCED 2011); Europe 2020 target: at least 40%.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: t2020_41)
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The share of 39.1 % in 2016 implied a growth of 
15.5 percentage points since 2002. 
4.3.2 Tertiary education attainment rate is 
considerably higher for women   
Figure 4.9 shows a significantly widening gender 
gap among graduates from tertiary education 
across the EU. While in 2002 the share of tertiary 
graduates was similar for both sexes, the share 
of female graduates has since grown at almost 
twice the rate. In 2016, women outnumbered men 
significantly in almost all Member States. In fact, 
the gender gap was more than 10 percentage 
points in 21 countries, with Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovenia showing the highest gaps of over 20 
percentage points. Germany was the most ‘equal’ 
country with a gender gap of only 0.4 percentage 
points in favour of men.
4.3.3 All Member States made significant 
progress in raising tertiary educational 
attainment
The increase in tertiary educational attainment levels 
across the EU is mirrored across all Member States. 
This to some extent reflects countries’ investment in 
higher education to meet demand for a more skilled 
labour force. Another factor is the shift to shorter 
degree programmes following implementation of 
Bologna (14) process reforms in some countries. 
National targets for tertiary education range from 
26 % for Italy to 66 % for Luxembourg. Germany’s 
target is slightly different from the overall EU 
target because it includes post-secondary, non-
tertiary attainment (ISCED level 4). For France, the 
target definition refers to the 17 to 33 year age 
group while for Finland the target excludes former 
tertiary vocational education and training (VET). 
Figure 4.10 shows that in 2016, 13 countries had 
already achieved their national targets. Belgium, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania were close at less 
than two percentage points from their national 
targets while Luxembourg and Slovakia were the 
most distant, at 11.4 and 8.5 percentage points, 
respectively, below their targets. 
In 2016, levels of tertiary educational attainment 
varied by a factor of about 2.3 across Europe. 
Northern and central Europe had the highest 
percentage of tertiary graduates, with 18 countries 
exceeding the overall EU target of 40 %. The 
Figure 4.9: Tertiary educational attainment, by sex, EU-28, 2002–2016 (1)
(% of the population aged 30–34 with completed tertiary education)
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(1) Break in time series in 2014 (switch from ISCED 1997 to ISCED 2011).
Source: Eurostat (online data code: t2020_41)
(14) The Bologna process put in motion a series of reforms to make European higher education more compatible, comparable, competitive 
and attractive for students. Its main objectives were: the introduction of a three-cycle degree system (bachelor, master and doctorate); 
quality assurance; and recognition of qualifications and periods of study (source:  Education and training statistics introduced (accessed 
25 April 2016)).
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(15) The data in Figure 4.11 refers to the age group 25–34, because the OECD database does not include the age group 30–34 that is used for 
the Europe 2020 target. 
Figure 4.10: Tertiary educational attainment, by country, 2008 and 2016
(% of the population aged 30–34 with completed tertiary education)
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(¹) All countries: break in time series in 2014 (switch from ISCED 1997 
to ISCED 2011, data are comparable for all countries except AT. 
(²) Break in time series in 2015. 
(³) Target: 45–50 %. 
(⁴) No target in National Reform Programme. 
(⁵) Data and target refer to ISCED 2011 levels 4–8. 
(⁶) Target: more than 40 %. 
(⁷) Break in time series in 2016. 
(⁸) Target: excluding former tertiary Vocational Education and 
Training (VET). 
(⁹) Target refers to 17–33 year-olds. 
(¹⁰) Target: 34–36 %. 
(¹¹) Target: 26–27 %.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: t2020_41)
lowest levels could be observed in Italy and 
Romania, which were both around 26 %. 
At the same time, some eastern European 
countries experienced the strongest increases 
over the period 2008 to 2016. Changes were most 
pronounced in Latvia, Greece and the Czech 
Republic where the shares almost doubled. 
Looking at non-EU Europe, the EFTA countries 
Norway, Switzerland and Iceland were at the level 
of the best performing Member States in 2016. 
However, the candidate countries The former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey 
showed tertiary educational attainment levels 
similar to southern and eastern Member States. 
Across other major world economies (15), the 
tertiary attainment rates vary greatly, but all 
countries showed clear increases between 2005 
and 2015 (see Figure 4.11). South Korea experienced 
the biggest rise, with 18 percentage points.
4.3.4 Country-specific participation in 
adult learning varies greatly 
In addition to tertiary educational attainment, 
adult participation in learning is also crucial for 
providing Europe with a highly qualified labour 
force. Adult education and training covers the 
longest time span in the process of learning 
throughout a person’s life. After an initial phase of 
education and training, continuous, adult learning 
is crucial for improving and developing skills, 
adapting to technical developments, advancing 
careers or returning to the labour market (also 
see the chapter on ‘Employment’, page 25). In 
recognition of this, adult participation in learning 
plays a crucial role in the Europe 2020 flagship 
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Figure 4.11: Tertiary educational attainment rate, age group 25–34, by country, 2005 and 2015
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initiative ‘An Agenda for new skills and jobs’ 
and played an important role in the concluded 
initiative ‘Youth on the move’. In addition, the 
European Council in 2011 adopted a resolution on 
a renewed European agenda for adult learning (16). 
The EU’s ET 2020 framework also includes a 
benchmark that aims to raise the share of adults 
participating in learning to at least 15 %. This 
benchmark refers to people aged 25 to 64 who 
stated they received education or training in the 
four weeks preceding the survey. 
After growing between 2003 and 2005, the share 
of EU adults participating in learning fell slightly 
to 9.2 % in 2012 (see Figure 4.12). It increased to 
10.7 % in the following year, but this rise was 
mainly influenced by a methodological change to 
the French Labour Force Survey (17). In the last four 
years, the share stagnated between 10.7 % (2013, 
2015) and 10.8 % (2014, 2016). 
In most Member States, adult participation 
in learning stagnated or changed marginally 
between 2013 and 2016. Estonia showed the 
largest difference, where the rate increased by 
3.1 percentage points. The United Kingdom 
experienced the largest fall of 2.2 percentage 
points. Overall, there are clear regional differences. 
The Scandinavian countries Sweden (29.6 %),  
Denmark (27.7 %) and Finland (26.4%) stand out 
with the highest rates, followed by western 
Member States such as France, the Netherlands 
(both 18.8 %) and Luxembourg (16.8 %). At the 
other end of the scale, Romania and Bulgaria had 
low shares of 1.2 % and 2.2 %. In general, adult 
learning seems to be a less common form of 
educational attainment in eastern and southern 
European countries.
Women are more likely to participate in adult 
learning than men. In 2016, the share of adult 
(16) Council Resolution on a renewed European agenda for adult learning (2011/C 372/01), Official Journal of the European Union.
(17) INSEE, the French Statistical Office, has carried out an extensive revision of the questionnaire of the Labour Force Survey. The new 
questionnaire was used from 1 January 2013 onwards. It impacts significantly the level of various French LFS-indicators. 
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unemployment rates among migrants in some 
countries, resulting in a greater participation in 
labour market integration programmes (see the 
chapter on ‘Employment’, page 25). 
There is a clear gradient of adult participation in 
learning and a person’s educational attainment. 
In 2016, adults with at most lower secondary 
education were less engaged in learning (4.2 %) 
than those with upper secondary (8.8 %) or tertiary 
education (18.6 %). 
In relation to labour status, employed people in 
general show a slightly higher participation rate. 
Some 11.6 % of employed 25 to 64 year olds took 
part in adult learning in 2016. Among unemployed 
people, the rate was slightly lower than the total 
participation rate, at 9.6 %. 
women engaged in learning was nearly 
2 percentage points higher than that of men 
(11.7 % compared with 9.8 %). Women recorded 
higher participation rates in all Member States 
except for Germany and Croatia, where a slightly 
higher share of adult men were engaged in 
learning. Greece and Romania showed no 
perceivable difference in gender participation 
rates. Interestingly, the two countries with the 
highest shares in general had the largest gender 
differences: Sweden with 14.0 percentage points 
and Denmark with 9.9 percentage points. 
Overall, the rates are higher for adults participating 
in learning in another Member State than the one 
they were born in (11.7 % in 2016). This may reflect 
participation in targeted learning activities such as 
language courses. It may also be linked to higher 
Figure 4.12: Adult participation in learning, EU-28, 2002–2016 (1)
(% of population aged 25 to 64) (2)
Total
Women
Men
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
7.1
10.8
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
(1) Breaks in time series in 2003, 2006 and 2013. ET 2020 benchmark 
for the EU: at least 15 %. 
(2)  Adult participation in learning refers to people aged 25 to 64 
who stated they received education or training in the four weeks 
preceding the survey (numerator). The denominator consists 
of the total population of the same age group, excluding those 
who did not answer to the question ‘participation in education 
and training’.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: tsdsc440)
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Educational attainment is the visible output of 
education systems. Achievement levels can have 
major implications for many issues affecting a 
person’s life. This is reflected in adult participation 
in learning as well as in other aspects presented 
in the chapters on ‘Employment’, page 25, and 
‘Poverty and social exclusion’, page 129. 
Figure 4.13 shows the educational attainment level 
of different population groups. The age group 25 
to 54 shows higher educational levels than the 
55 to 74 age group, which reflects the growing 
demand for a more highly skilled workforce in 
most parts of Europe over the past few decades. 
A more skilled workforce is expected to emerge 
as older generations leave the workforce and are 
replaced by younger, more highly educated ones. 
If labour markets do not provide adequate jobs this 
may result in higher levels of over-qualification and 
youth unemployment. For workers aged 55 and 
older, lower educational attainment levels, especially 
among women, highlight the importance of adult 
learning to increase their employability and to help 
meet the Europe 2020 strategy’s employment target 
(see the chapter on ‘Employment’, page 25). 
Across all age groups, migrants born outside 
the EU (extra-EU migrants) have a much higher 
prevalence of low educational levels (ISCED 0–2) 
than people living in their country of birth or 
coming from another EU country (intra-EU 
migrants). The reverse pattern can be observed 
for the medium education levels (ISCED 3–4). This 
rate is significantly lower for people from outside 
the EU, especially in the age group 25 to 54. 
Interestingly, the tertiary education rate for extra-
EU migrants is similar to or higher than the rate 
for natives, while the tertiary education rate for 
intra-EU migrants is higher than for the native 
population.   
4.4 Educational levels of the population 
Educational attainment 
is the visible output of 
education systems. In general, 
younger people show higher 
educational levels than the 
older age group. And across 
all age groups, migrants 
born outside the EU (extra-
EU migrants) have a much higher 
prevalence of low educational levels 
(ISCED 0–2) than people living in their 
country of birth or coming from another 
EU country (intra-EU migrants).
Figure 4.13: Population by educational level, by age group and broad group of country of birth, 
EU-28, 2016 
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The EU’s ET 2020 framework (18) acknowledges 
the important role of education and training in 
raising employability. As a consequence, the EU 
aims to ensure that at least 82 % of recent EU 
graduates (20 to 34 year olds) should have found 
employment no more than three years after 
leaving education and training (see Box 4.2). 
Figure 4.14 shows how severely the economic 
crisis has affected recent graduates. Between 
2008 and 2013, employment rates among 20 to 
34 year olds who had left education and training 
in the past one to three years, and were not in 
further education or training in the four weeks 
preceding the survey, fell by 6.6 percentage 
points. In comparison, the decline in the overall 
(18) Council conclusions of 12 May 2009 on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training (‘ET 2020’) (2009/C 
119/02), Official Journal of the European Union.
(19) European Commission, Towards a job-rich recovery, COM(2012) 173 final, Strasbourg, 2012 (p. 10).
4.5 Employment rate of recent graduates 
Education and training plays 
an important role in improving 
employability. The employment 
rate of recent graduates (20 to 34 
year olds having left education and 
training in the past one to three 
years) has dropped considerably due to the 
economic and financial crisis. It fell from 
82.0 % in 2008 to 75.4 % in 2013. However, 
it has increased clearly since 2013, reaching 
78.2 % in 2016. 
Box 4.2: Policies tackling the transition from education to employment 
The EU employment package ‘Towards a job-
rich recovery’ (19), under its objective of restoring 
the dynamics of labour markets, calls for 
‘security in employment transitions’, such as in 
the transition of young people from education 
to work. It states: ‘There is evidence to show that 
apprenticeships and quality traineeships can be 
a good means of gaining entry into the world of 
work, but there are also recurring examples of 
traineeships being misused.’ 
The employment package also reaffirms the 
European Commission’s commitment to tackling 
the dramatic levels of youth unemployment 
by supporting the transition to work ‘through 
youth guarantees, activation measures targeting 
young people, the quality of traineeships and 
youth mobility’. 
employment rate for 20 to 64 year olds was ‘only’ 
1.9 percentage points over the same period. 
However, 2013 seems to mark a turnaround in 
this trend, with the share of employed recent 
graduates increasing in the three following years, 
reaching 78.2 % in 2016. 
The data in Figure 4.14 refer to graduates 
who left education and training with at least 
upper-secondary qualifications (ISCED levels 
3–8). Breaking the data down by educational 
attainment reveals the fall in the employment rate 
had been slightly stronger for the lower educated 
cohort (– 4.4 percentage points from 2008 to 
2016) than for those with a tertiary education 
(– 4.1 percentage points from 2008 to 2016). 
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Public expenditure on education as a 
percentage of GDP is often considered an 
indicator of a government’s commitment to 
developing skills and competences. Generally, the 
public sector funds education either by directly 
bearing the current and capital expenses of 
educational institutions or by supporting students 
and their families with scholarships and public 
loans as well as by transferring public subsidies 
for educational activities to private firms or non-
profit organisations. Both types of transactions 
together are reported as total public expenditure 
on education. 
Figure 4.15 shows the total public expenditure on 
education as a share of GDP in 2014. Data for all 
four education levels are available for 25 Member 
States. Nonetheless, all 26 Member States for 
which data are at least partly available have been 
included in the following analysis (20). 
The highest share of public expenditure on 
education can be observed in Denmark (8.3 % 
of GDP), followed by Sweden (7.7 %) and 
Finland (7.2 %). The lowest proportions were 
reported by Romania (2.8 %), the Czech Republic 
(3.8 %) and Luxembourg (4.0 %). 
Across the EU, public expenditure was highest for 
primary and lower secondary education (levels 1 
and 2). As a share of GDP, this ratio ranged from 
1.1 % in Romania to 3.3 % in Cyprus and Denmark. 
By contrast, in nearly all countries, the smallest 
share of public expenditure on education went to 
(20) No data are available for Croatia and Greece.
Figure 4.14: Employment rate of recent graduates, EU-28, 2006–2016 (1)
(Share of graduates (20–34 year olds) having left education and training in the past 1–3 years who 
are employed and not in any further education or training)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
78.9
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(1)  Data refer to graduates having left education and training with at least upper secondary qualifications (ISCED 3–8); break in time series in 
2014 (switch from ISCED 1997 to ISCED 2011). ET 2020 benchmark for the EU: at least 82 %.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: edat_lfse_24)
4.6 Investment in future generations:  
the case of public expenditure on education
In 2014, public expenditure 
on education as a 
percentage of GDP in the 
EU was highest for primary 
and lower secondary 
education (levels 1 and 2) 
and lowest — for early childhood and 
education.
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early childhood education (21). This ratio ranged 
from 0.1 % in Ireland to 1.8 % in Sweden. In 
general, in eight of the 25 Member States, public 
expenditure on this level of education was less 
than 0.5 % of GDP. 
For the two remaining categories (upper 
secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary 
education (levels 3 and 4) and tertiary education 
(levels 5 to 8), the differences were not as high as 
for the two lower categories. For upper secondary 
education (including also post-secondary non-
tertiary levels), the range of public expenditure 
was equivalent to 0.7 % of GDP in Lithuania and 
Romania to 1.9 % of GDP in Belgium. 
The proportion of financial resources devoted to 
the tertiary level varied between the 26 Member 
States for which data are available, ranging from 
0.5 % in Luxembourg to 2.3 % in Denmark. 
Figure 4.15: Total public expenditure on education by education level, by country, 2014
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(21)  The analysis takes in consideration all ISCED0 levels (i.e. early childhood education development — ISCED01 and pre-primary education 
— ISCED02). Data on early childhood education development are not obligatory by the EU Regulation, therefore not provided by all 
countries.
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improving the employability of young people 
and reducing early leaving from education and 
training, by offering an interesting alternative to 
general education. 
Additionally, the Europe 2020 strategy puts 
particular effort into making sure that higher 
education courses develop the skills relevant 
to the world of work, both for meeting future 
labour demand and for ensuring the long-term 
attractiveness of higher education. Moreover, the 
European Council’s Resolution (23) on a renewed 
European agenda for adult learning addresses the 
challenge of raising participation rates of adults in 
learning activities. 
Knowledge of current student cohorts and 
demographic projections allow educational 
trends to be estimated up to 2020 (see Box 4.3). 
This can help identify priority issues that may 
need particular political attention on the path to 
meeting the Europe 2020 targets. 
The flagship initiative ‘An Agenda for new skills 
and jobs’ addresses the challenge of early leaving 
from education and training. In 2011, the European 
Council published recommendations on policies 
to reduce early leaving from education and 
training (22), giving guidance to Member States on 
the implementation of strategies and measures 
tackling this problem. Vocational Education and 
Training (VET) systems are seen as important for 
4.7 Outlook towards 2020
Box 4.3: Projections up to 2020 in relation to the Europe 2020 education 
targets 
Based on the most recent data for early school 
leaving and tertiary education, the European 
Commission has published projections of the 
likelihood that Europe 2020’s education targets 
will be met by 2020: 
• The EU average early school leaving rate in 
2010 was 13.9 % and would need to be below 
10 % by 2020, ten years later. It follows from 
a basic calculation that the minimum annual 
progress required for the EU as a whole during 
this period is – 3.3 %, whereas the observed 
annual progress for the EU between 2010 and 
2016 has been – 3.8 %. This means that overall 
the EU is on track to meeting the headline 
target if current progress is sustained.
• The EU average tertiary attainment rate in 
2010 was 33.8 % and it would need to reach 
40 % ten years later. The resulting minimum 
annual progress required for the EU as a 
whole is 1.8 %, while the observed annual 
change between 2010 and 2016 has been 
considerably higher (2.5 %). This means the EU 
is well on track to reach its 40 % target by 2020 
if recent progress can be sustained.
Of the 12.0 million 30 to 34 year olds with a 
tertiary education qualification, 7.2 million are 
women. This highlights a significant gender 
difference in relation to obtaining a high-level 
education. Moreover, this difference has been 
increasing, up by 0.3  percentage points from 
2011. In fact, women, taken as a separate group, 
achieved the 40 % benchmark in 2012, eight years 
ahead of the 2020 target date. 
(22) Council recommendations of 28 June 2011 on policies to reduce early school leaving (2011/C 191/01), Official Journal of the European 
Union.
(23) Council Resolution on a renewed European agenda for adult learning (2011/C 372/01).
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Poverty and social exclusion harm individual lives 
and limit the opportunities for people to achieve 
their full potential by affecting their health and 
well-being and lowering educational outcomes. 
This, in turn, reduces opportunities to lead a 
successful life and further increases the risk of 
poverty. Without effective education, health, 
social, tax benefit and employment systems, the 
risk of poverty is passed on from one generation 
to the next. This causes poverty to persist and 
hence creates more inequality, which can lead 
to long-term loss of economic productivity from 
whole groups of society (1) and hamper inclusive 
and sustainable economic growth.
To prevent this downward spiral, the European 
Commission has made ‘inclusive growth’ one of 
the three priorities of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
It has set a target to lift at least 20 million people 
out of the risk of poverty or social exclusion by 
2020. To underpin this objective, the European 
Commission has launched two flagship initiatives 
under the ‘inclusive growth’ priority: the ‘Agenda 
for new skills and jobs’ and the ‘European platform 
against poverty and social exclusion’. Furthermore, 
between 2010 and 2014 a package of policy 
initiatives ‘Youth on the move’ was instated to 
enhance the performance of education systems 
and help young people find work. Also, Member 
States have made a commitment through 
the ‘Youth guarantee’ programme to enhance 
employment and further training opportunities 
for young people across the EU. 
By setting a poverty target, the EU has put 
social concerns on equal footing with economic 
objectives. Achieving the target to reduce 
the number of people at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion will depend on the successful 
implementation of other priorities of the Europe 
2020 strategy, such as providing better 
opportunities for employment and education 
(see the chapters on ‘Employment’, page 25, and 
‘Education’, page 107).
This chapter analyses the EU’s progress in reducing 
poverty, which is monitored through the headline 
indicator ‘people at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion’. As poverty is a multidimensional issue, 
the full picture is captured by three sub-indicators 
that constitute the headline indicator: monetary 
poverty, severe material deprivation and 
very low work household intensity. The aim of 
including other components of social exclusion 
alongside relative monetary poverty is to highlight 
that other factors in addition to low income 
also lead to severe and chronic disadvantages 
and that these are all closely intertwined. This 
chapter also includes breakdowns of the headline 
indicator by sex, age, labour status, household 
type, educational level, parents’ educational level, 
country of birth and degree of urbanisation of 
residential municipality to reveal a broader picture 
and to show the drivers behind the changes 
observed. 
5.1 Poverty and social exclusion —  
why do they matter?
Europe 2020 strategy target 
on the risk of poverty or social 
exclusion
The Europe 2020 strategy has set the 
target of ‘lifting at least 20 million 
people out of the risk of poverty or 
social exclusion’ by 2020 compared to 
the year 2008 (2).
(1) European Commission, Social trends and dynamics of poverty, ESDE conference, Brussels, 2013.
(2) Due to the structure of the survey on which most of the key social data is based (EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions), a large 
part of the main social indicators available in 2010, when the Europe 2020 strategy was adopted, referred to 2008 as the most recent 
year of data available. This is why 2008 data for the EU-27 are used as the baseline year for monitoring progress towards the Europe 2020 
strategy’s poverty target. Since 115.9 million people were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU-27 in 2008, the target value to be 
reached is 95.9 million by 2020.
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5.2.1 The rate of poverty or social exclusion 
in the EU has returned to around the 2008 
level, yet progress remains limited
In 2015, almost 119 million people, or 23.7 % of the 
EU population, were at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion. This means roughly one in four people 
in the EU experienced at least one of the following 
three forms of poverty or social exclusion: 
monetary poverty, severe material deprivation, or 
very low work household intensity. 
The development of risk of poverty or social 
exclusion (see Box 5.1) in the EU over the past 
decade has been marked by two turning points: 
in 2009, when the number of people at risk started 
to rise because of the delayed social effects of the 
economic crisis and in 2012, when this upward 
The number of people living in poverty 
or social exclusion has fallen since the 
economy started recovering in 2013. 
Nevertheless, almost every fourth person in 
the EU still experiences at least one of the 
three forms of poverty or social exclusion, 
showing there is some way to go to meet 
the Europe 2020 strategy target. 
Monetary poverty is the most widespread 
form of poverty, affecting 17.3 % of 
EU residents in 2015. Severe material 
deprivation and very low work intensity 
follow, affecting 8.1 % of the EU population 
and 10.6 % of EU residents aged 0 to 59, 
respectively. 
Developments in the headline indicator 
were mainly driven by a reduction in the 
number of people living in severe material 
deprivation. While monetary poverty has 
been moderately but steadily increasing 
and very low work intensity has not 
changed drastically since 2010, material 
deprivation has followed the same path as 
the headline indicator.
The share of the population at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion increased in 16 
Member States between 2008 and 2015. 
While three countries using this measure for 
their national poverty targets had already 
reached their goals in 
2015, others have yet 
to do so.
In most EU countries, the 
share of people affected 
by monetary poverty increased between 
2008 and 2015. On average, monetary 
poverty is lower in the EU at 17.3 % than in 
many other advanced economies. In most 
non-European OECD countries, this value 
was roughly between 20 % and 25 %.
The degree to which monetary poverty was 
reduced by providing social transfers in 
Member States varied between 19.9 and 3.9 
percentage points. Overall, social transfers 
decreased monetary poverty in the EU by 
8.7 percentage points in 2015.
Across the EU, severe material deprivation 
affected 8.1 % of the population in 2015. 
Although the overall EU share of people 
living in households with very low work 
intensity has remained relatively stable 
at 10.6 % since 2010, the country-specific 
levels and developments have differed 
widely. Moreover, being in work does not 
necessarily protect against poverty: in 2015, 
7.7 % of the EU’s working population was 
at risk of poverty even though they were 
working full time. 
5.2 How do poverty and social exclusion  
affect Europe? 
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(3) For trends since 2009, see European Commission Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Poverty developments in the EU 
after the crisis: a look at main drivers, Economic Brief, Issue 31, May 2014.
(4) Dolls et al, Automatic stabilization and discretionary fiscal policy in the financial crisis, IZA Journal of Labor Policy, 2012, 1:4.
(5) European Commission, European Economic Forecast Autumn 2016, Institutional Paper 038, 2016.
(6) European Commission, Employment and Social Developments in Europe, Annual Review, 2016.
trend reversed (3). By 2015, the number of people 
at risk had fallen almost to the 2008 level, reaching 
117.6 million people for the EU-27 and 118.8 million 
people for the EU-28 (see Figure 5.1).
Following the onset of the economic crisis 
automatic stabilisers as well as other discretionary 
measures implemented by EU governments 
were used to cushion the recession’s negative 
social effects. While discretionary measures, such 
as increased spending by the government and 
tax breaks, constitute policy responses to crises, 
automatic stabilisers, such as unemployment 
programmes and progressive taxes that increase 
the tax-base during economic expansion, are 
elements of fiscal policy that reduce tax burdens 
and increase public spending without immediate 
government actions (4). 
Since 2013, the EU has experienced a moderate 
economic recovery. This was mainly spurred 
by low energy prices, elevating households’ 
purchasing power, and the depreciation of 
the euro, which helped European exports. 
Gradual improvements in labour markets also 
accompanied the economic recovery (as shown 
in the European Commission’s Economic Forecast 
Autumn 2016 (5)). For more information see also 
the chapter on ‘Employment’, page 25, and 
the European Commission’s Annual Review on 
Employment and Social Developments (6).
2020 target
20 
million people 
to be lifted out 
of the risk of 
poverty or social 
exclusion by 
2020 compared 
with 2008 (2)
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Figure 5.1: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, EU-27 and EU-28, 2005–2015
(million persons)
Europe 2020 headline indicator 
(¹) Data for 2005, 2006 are estimates
(²) The overall EU target (referring to the EU-27 — the 27 EU countries before the accession of Croatia) is to lift at least 20 million people 
out of the risk of poverty or social exclusion by 2020. Due to the structure of the survey on which most of the key social data is 
based (EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions), a large part of the main social indicators available in 2010, when the Europe 
2020 strategy was adopted, referred to 2008 as the most recent year of data available. For this reason progress towards the Europe 
2020 strategy’s poverty target is monitored using 2008 as the baseline year.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: t2020_50)
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(7) European Commission (Directorate-General for Economic, Social Affairs and Inclusion), Employment and Social Developments in Europe 
2011, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2012 (p. 144).
Box 5.1: What is social exclusion?
In its 2011 edition of Employment and 
Social Developments in Europe (7), the 
European Commission defines social 
exclusion as ‘a process whereby certain 
individuals are pushed to the edge of 
society and prevented from participating 
fully by virtue of their poverty, or lack 
of basic competencies and life-long 
learning opportunities, or as a result 
of discrimination. This distances them 
from job, income and education and 
training opportunities as well as social 
and community networks and activities. 
They have little access to power and 
decision-making bodies and thus often 
feel powerless and unable to take control 
over the decisions affecting their day-to-
day lives’.
Measuring poverty and social exclusion requires 
a multidimensional approach. While household 
income has a big impact on living standards, 
other aspects, such as access to labour markets 
and material deprivation, also prevent full 
participation in society. To address this, a broad 
‘at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate’ indicator 
was proposed by the European Commission 
and adopted by the European Council to serve 
the purposes of the Europe 2020 strategy. This 
indicator is an aggregate of three sub-indicators: 
monetary poverty, severe material deprivation 
and very low work intensity (the latter is limited to 
people aged 0 to 59). 
Because these three dimensions of poverty tend 
to overlap, they cannot simply be added up to 
give the total number of people at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion. Some people are affected by 
two or even all three types of poverty, therefore 
taking the sum of each would lead to cases 
being double-counted. This becomes clear when 
Figure 5.2: Aggregation of sub-indicators of ‘people at risk of poverty or social exclusion’, EU-28, 
2015
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Source: Eurostat (online data codes: t2020_51, t2020_52, t2020_53 and ilc_pees01)
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looking at the current number of people at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion (see Figure 5.2). 
Therefore people are counted only once in the 
headline indicator, even if they fall into more than 
one category.
As Figure 5.2 shows, monetary poverty was the 
most widespread form of poverty in 2015, with  
86.6 million people (17.3 % of the EU population) 
living at risk of poverty after social transfers. 
This was more than twice as many as those 
with severe material deprivation (40.3 million 
people or 8.1 % of EU citizens) and very low work 
intensity (8) (39.6 million people or 10.6 % of the 
EU population aged 0 to 59). 
Almost 39 million people, or nearly one third 
(32.5 %) of all people at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion, were affected by more than one 
dimension of poverty over the same period. 
Another 9.2 million people, or one in twelve of 
those at risk of poverty or social exclusion (7.7 %), 
were affected by all three forms (9).
As shown in Figure 5.3, the three forms of 
poverty followed different trends between 2005 
and 2015. While monetary poverty has been 
increasing gradually since 2005, the other two 
sub-indicators have not followed such a steady 
path. The number of people aged 0 to 59 living 
in households with very low work intensity 
declined between 2006 and 2008, but has since 
returned to the previous levels. Meanwhile, the 
number of severely materially deprived people 
has shown the largest swings compared to both 
2005 and 2012, following a similar pattern to the 
headline indicator with significant reductions 
in recent years (see Figure 5.1). This suggests 
that the reduction in material deprivation was 
the main driver behind the improvement in the 
headline indicator since the start of the economic 
recovery. As will be described later in the chapter, 
the decline in the amount of materially deprived 
people was mainly driven by improvements in a 
handful of countries. 
One possible reason for the divergence between 
monetary poverty and the two other forms of 
poverty is the different nature of the indicators. 
While monetary poverty is measured in relative 
terms, material deprivation and low work intensity 
(8) The dimension ‘very low work intensity’ is only measured among those aged 0 to 59. Therefore people older than 59 are considered at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion only if the criteria of one of the two dimensions ‘monetary poverty’ or ‘severe material deprivation’ are 
met. 
(9) The year of reference differs for the three sub-indicators. The risk of poverty after social transfers and whether or not someone lives in a 
household with very low work intensity are based on data from the previous year. The extent to which an individual is severely materially 
deprived is determined based on information from the year of the survey. 
Figure 5.3: Sub-indicators of ‘people at risk of poverty or social exclusion’, EU-27 and EU-28, 
2005–2015 (¹) 
(million people)
Severely materially deprived 
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Severely materially deprived 
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(¹) EU-27 data for 2005 and 2006 are estimates; EU-27 data for 2009 for ‘severe material deprivation’ are estimates.
Source: Eurostat (online data codes: t2020_51, t2020_52 and t2020_53)
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are absolute measures (see Box 5.2). The relativity 
of monetary poverty means the at-risk rate may 
remain stable or even increase even though 
the average or median equivalised disposable 
income (10) increases. This is because the monetary 
poverty threshold is set at a specific percentage of 
the median disposable income. That means that if 
the median income increases, but the inequality 
of the income distribution remains unchanged or 
even increases, the number of people below the 
poverty line does not decrease. Absolute poverty 
measures reflecting a person’s ability to afford 
basic goods, however, are likely to decrease during 
economic revivals when people are generally 
more financially better off.
5.2.2 The number of people at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion has increased 
in most Member States
Although on average 23.7 % of the EU population 
were affected by poverty or social exclusion in 
2015, the levels of individual countries varied 
widely. The country with the lowest share of poor 
or socially excluded people among its population 
was the Czech Republic (14.0 %), followed by 
Sweden (16.0 %), the Netherlands (16.4 %) and 
Finland (16.8 %). At the other extreme were some 
southern and eastern European countries, in 
particular Bulgaria (41.3 %), Romania (37.4 %) and 
Greece (35.7 %), where more than a third of the 
population was affected by poverty or social 
exclusion.
To meet the overall EU target on risk of poverty 
and social exclusion, Member States have set their 
own national targets in their National Reform 
Programmes. As noted in the European Council 
conclusions from 17 June 2010 (12), Member 
States are free to set their own targets based 
on the most appropriate indicators for their 
circumstances and priorities. In most countries 
the target is expressed as an absolute number 
of people to be lifted out of the risk of poverty 
or social exclusion compared with 2008 (13). This 
corresponds to the base year also used for the 
overall EU target.
In 16 Member States, the number of people at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion has risen since 2008, 
pushing them further away from their national 
targets (see Figure 5.4). Nineteen Member States 
use a target based on the indicator ‘people at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion’, and four (Bulgaria, 
Denmark, Estonia and Latvia) base their targets on 
(10) Equivalised disposable income refers to the financial means a household has left for saving and spending. It is calculated by taking a 
household’s income and dividing it by the weighted household size, where each household member receives a weight based on their age.
(11) European Anti-Poverty Network, Poverty and inequality in the EU, EAPN Explainer, 2014, p.17.
(12) European Council, Conclusion from 17 June 2010, 2010.
(13) European Commission, Social Europe — Aiming for inclusive growth. Annual report of the Social Protection Committee on the social situation in 
the European Union (2014), Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2015 (p. 162–461).
Box 5.2: Measuring poverty in 
absolute and relative terms
Absolute poverty refers to the deprivation 
of basic human necessities for survival, 
such as food, clean water, clothing, shelter, 
health care and education. This poverty 
line is considered the same for different 
countries, cultures and technological levels 
and it is often based on a given basket of 
goods and services. For example, absolute 
poverty can be measured as the number 
of people eating less food than needed to 
sustain the human body.
Relative poverty occurs when someone’s 
standard of living and income are much 
worse than the general standard in 
the country or region they live in. They 
may struggle to live a normal life and to 
participate in ordinary economic, social 
and cultural activities. Relative poverty 
measures depend on the standard of living 
enjoyed by most people in the country. 
For example, it can be measured by the 
number of people living below a country-
specific poverty threshold. Relative poverty 
measures are often closely linked to 
inequality (11).
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one or more of its sub-indicators. The remaining 
countries (Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom) define their 
targets based on nationally developed indicators 
not available on the Eurostat database (14).
Three countries using the ‘at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion’ indicator or one of its sub-
indicators (the Czech Republic, Poland and 
Romania) had already reached their national 
poverty targets by 2015. Poland and Romania 
have also made the most progress in integrating 
their most vulnerable members into society with 
a reduction of 7.1 and 6.8 percentage points in 
the share of people affected by poverty or social 
exclusion, respectively. However, Romania still has 
one of the highest rates of people in poverty or 
social exclusion in the EU. Lithuania had also met 
its goal in 2014, but by 2015 it had moved away 
from it again. The other Member States using this 
concept to define their national targets have yet 
to meet their goals. 
Improvements in the number of poor or socially 
excluded people between 2008 and 2015 can also 
be seen among other Member States who have 
either not reached their target (such as France, 
Croatia, Latvia, Austria, Slovakia and Finland) or 
have based their targets on country-specific 
indicators (such as Germany). 
Three southern European countries — Greece, 
Cyprus and Spain — experienced the most 
substantial increases in the share of people at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion, ranging from five to 
eight percentage points.
One reason for the disparity in poverty rates across 
the EU is the uneven impact of the economic 
crisis. Although many factors have influenced 
overall economic performance, much of the 
current divergence results from the way labour 
(14)  Germany and Sweden use targets based on different forms of unemployment, Ireland defined a combined poverty target, the 
Netherlands aims to reduce the amount of jobless households, Sweden’s target refers to different situations of long-term unemployment, 
and the United Kingdom based its numerical targets on a nationally launched Child Poverty Act. 
Figure 5.4: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, by country, 2008 and 2015
(% of population)
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markets and social systems reacted to the severe 
global downturn and to fiscal consolidation 
packages implemented in most Member 
States (15); see also the chapter on ‘Employment’, 
page 25). Differences were further due to the 
effectiveness of the Member States’ existing social 
policies and the extent of their efforts to adapt 
these according to contemporary challenges (for 
more information, see the European Commission’s 
Annual Growth Survey 2017 (16) and its Joint 
Employment Report 2017 (17).
In 2015, 17.3 % of the EU population earned less 
than 60 % of their respective national median 
equivalised disposable income, the so-called 
poverty threshold. This represents a slight increase 
compared with 2008, when 16.5 % fell below this 
threshold.
Most countries also experienced growth in the 
number of people below the monetary poverty 
line, regardless of whether they had low or 
high levels to begin with. Increases were most 
pronounced in Hungary, Sweden and Spain, with 
rises of between 2.3 and 2.5 percentage points. 
Croatia, Finland, Austria, the United Kingdom 
and Latvia were the exception, with monetary 
poverty in these countries decreasing by 0.6 to 
3.4 percentage points between 2008 (Croatia: 
2010) and 2015 (see Figure 5.5). 
Compared with the main economies worldwide, 
the EU average share of people suffering from 
monetary poverty at 17.3 % is low, despite 
increases since 2008. In most non-EU OECD 
countries, this value is roughly between 20 % and 
25 % (see Figure 5.6). Commonwealth countries in 
the OECD outside the EU as well as Asian OECD 
countries including Russia are at the bottom end 
of this range, with 19.1 % in New Zealand, 20.1 % in 
Canada and 20.5 % in Australia as well as 19.8 % in 
South Korea, 21.9 % in Japan and 21.6 % in Russia. 
(15) European Commission, Social Europe — Aiming for inclusive growth. Annual report of the Social Protection Committee on the social situation in 
the European Union (2014), Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2015 (p. 9).
(16) European Commission, Annual Growth Survey 2017, 2016.
(17) European Commission, Joint Employment Report 2017, 2017.
Figure 5.5: People at risk of poverty after social transfers, by country, 2008 and 2015
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(1) 2010 data (instead of 2008).
(2) Break in time series in 2011.
(3) Break in time series in 2012.
(4) Break in time series in 2014.
(5) 2014 data (instead of 2015).
(6)  2013 data (instead of 2015).
Source : Eurostat (online data code: t2020_52)
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Monetary poverty is more prevalent in the Latin 
American OECD countries Chile (23.8 %) and 
Mexico (23.7 %) as well as the Unites States (24.2 %), 
Turkey (24.7 %) and Israel (25.1 %). Conversely, the 
EFTA States and OECD Members Norway (13.7 %) 
and Switzerland (14.6 %) have poverty rates lower 
than the EU average but higher than the EU 
Member States with the lowest shares (18). 
To reduce the risk of poverty or social exclusion 
within their populations, governments provide 
social security in the form of social transfers, 
such as pensions and unemployment benefits, 
among others. The effectiveness of monetary 
social provision can be evaluated by comparing 
the at-risk-of-poverty rate before and after social 
transfers (see Figure 5.7). In the EU, social transfers 
reduced the share of people at risk of poverty 
by 8.7 percentage points in 2015, from 26.0 % to 
17.3 %. However, the extent to which Member 
States were able to reduce this rate through social 
transfers varied greatly. For example, the share 
of poverty before social transfers was similar in 
Finland (at 26.8 %) and in Romania (29.3 %). While 
Finland experienced the second largest decrease 
in the EU after social transfers (14.4 percentage 
points), in Romania the share of monetary poor 
only fell by a small extent (3.9 percentage points) 
as a result of such transfers. 
Over time, the at-risk-of-poverty rates before 
and after social transfers have moved in different 
directions. The rate before social transfers was 
relatively stable in the EU between 2010 and 
2015, while the rate after social transfers increased 
slightly over the same time. This could mean that 
either the amounts of social transfers paid have 
fallen or they have become less effective over time.
According to the European Semester Thematic 
Factsheet (19), differences in the effectiveness 
and efficiency of social protection expenditures 
depend on different factors, such as the level of 
poverty and inequality before social transfers 
and differences in the size and design of these 
expenditures (20).  
(18) These values are taken from the OECD dataset on Income Distribution and Poverty and correspond to the newest data available in this 
set (2014: Australia, Israel, South Korea, Mexico and the United States, 2013: Canada, Chile, Norway and Switzerland, 2012: Japan and New 
Zealand, 2010: Russia). All data except for that of Russia is based on the OECD’s new income definition, which includes the value of goods 
produced for own consumption as a component of self-employed income, an element not considered in the SILC income definition.  
(19) European Commission, European Semester Thematic Factsheet. Poverty and Social Exclusion.
(20) Earnings-related social benefits, for instance in old age, are often not aimed at reducing poverty as maintaining the living standards of those 
facing the risk.
Figure 5.6: Poverty rate after taxes and transfers, poverty line 60 %, by country, 2008 and 2014 (¹)
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Material deprivation covers issues relating to 
economic strain, durables and housing, and 
environment of the dwellings. People living in 
severely materially deprived conditions are greatly 
constrained by a lack of resources. This means 
they live in households unable to afford four or 
more items out of a list of nine considered by 
most people to be desirable or even necessary for 
an adequate life (21).
In 2015, 40.3 million people in the EU were living 
in conditions severely constrained by a lack of 
resources. This was equal to 8.1 % of the total EU 
population, making severe material deprivation 
the second most common form of poverty. 
Provisional estimates point towards a further 
reduction to 39.0 million people in 2016. The levels 
of severe material deprivation differed widely 
across the EU in 2015, from 34.2 % in Bulgaria to as 
low as 0.7 % in Sweden (see Figure 5.8).
These persistent disparities between Member 
States are likely to be due to a mix of factors. 
According to the Annual Report of the Social 
Protection Committee (22), differences in living 
standards and the effectiveness of social policies 
especially all play a part.
Since 2008, the number of people living in 
severe material deprivation has fallen in just 
over half of the Member States. Overall, in the 
EU this rate decreased from 8.4 % (2010 data) by 
0.3 percentage points to 8.1 % in 2015. The most 
distinct improvements in this time period took 
place in Romania, Poland and Bulgaria, where 
severe material deprivation decreased by between 
7 and 10 percentage points. As shown above, the 
decrease in severe material deprivation is the driver 
behind the decrease in the headline indicator 
measuring the share of people at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion. Thus to a large extent the overall 
(21) The nine items are: to pay their rent, mortgage or utility bills; to keep their home adequately warm; to face unexpected expenses; to eat 
meat or proteins regularly; to go on holiday; a television set; a washing machine; a car; a telephone.
(22) European Commission, Review of the social protection performance monitor and developments in social protection policies. Annual report of 
the social protection committee, 2016. 
Figure 5.7: At-risk-of-poverty rate before and after social transfers, by country, 2015
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(²) 2013 data (instead of 2015).
Source: Eurostat (online data codes: t2020_52 and tesov250)
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positive development in the headline indicator is 
due to the large decrease in material deprivation in 
Romania, Poland and Bulgaria.
In a few Member States, the share of people 
living in poor conditions is much higher than 
the share at risk of monetary poverty. This shows 
that the structure of poverty is different across 
the Member States. For example, in Hungary 
and Bulgaria the proportion of people living in 
severely deprived conditions was about 1.5 times 
as high as the share living in monetary poverty. 
However, in a few countries with higher living 
standards, such as Spain, Sweden, Estonia and 
Luxembourg, the monetary poverty rate clearly 
exceeded the rate of people suffering from severe 
material deprivation. 
In 2015, 10.6 % (or 39.6 million) of the EU 
population aged 0 to 59 were living in households 
with very low work intensity. This means the 
working-age members of the household worked 
no longer than 20 % of their potential working 
time during the previous year. Across Europe, this 
figure ranged from 5.7 % in Luxembourg to 19.2 % 
in Ireland (see Figure 5.9). 
Even though on average the share of the 
population aged 0 to 59 who were living in 
households with very low work intensity was only 
1.4 percentage points higher in 2015 than it was in 
2008, the share has changed considerably in some 
individual Member States. Hungary, Germany and 
Poland showed substantial improvements in the 
work intensity of the working age population, 
with reductions in the share of people living in 
households with very low work intensity ranging 
between 2.6 and 1.1 percentage points. The 
opposite was true in the southern European 
countries Greece, Spain, Cyprus and Portugal, 
as well as Ireland, where the shares increased 
between 4.6 and 9.3 percentage points.
In some countries, low work intensity levels 
do not seem to correspond to the extent of 
the other forms of poverty or social exclusion. 
Figure 5.8: Severely materially deprived people, by country, 2008 and 2015
(% of population)
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(1) 2010 data (instead of 2008).
(2) 2015 data are provisional.
(3) 2014 data (instead of 2015).
(4) 2013 data (instead of 2015); break in time series in 2013 
Source: Eurostat (online data code: t2020_53)
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(for more information on employment statistics 
indicators see the chapter on ‘Employment’, 
page 25). In 2015, 7.7 % of the working EU population 
were at risk of poverty despite working full time (the 
so-called working poor). The share of the working 
population at risk of poverty again varied greatly 
among Member States, ranging from 2.9 % in 
Finland to 14.7 % in Romania (24).
With the exception of those aged 18 to 24, men are 
more often among the working poor than women. 
This is because women are more often secondary 
earners, meaning the household income does not 
depend solely on them, and working poverty is 
determined by household income (25).
(23) This can be the case for a number of reasons, such as a high amount of social transfers in one country or a generally low income level in 
another.
(24) Source: Eurostat (online data code: ilc_iw07).
(25) For more information, see European Parliament, In-work Poverty in the EU, accessed [19 June 2017].  
Belgium, the United Kingdom and Denmark, for 
example, had a higher-than-average proportion 
of population aged 0 to 59 living in households 
with very low work intensity (14.9 %, 11.9 % and 
11.6 %, respectively), despite their risk of monetary 
poverty and severe material deprivation being 
below the EU average. In contrast, Latvia and 
Romania were among the Member States with 
the highest proportion of their population at risk 
of monetary poverty in 2015 while having some 
of the lowest shares of households with very low 
work intensity (7.8 % and 7.9 %, respectively) (23).
Poverty and social exclusion do not only affect those 
who are economically inactive or unemployed 
Figure 5.9: People living in households with very low work intensity, by country, 2008 and 2015
(% of population aged 0 to 59)
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(¹) 2008 data refer to EU-27 (instead of EU-28).
(2) Break in time series in 2014.
(3) Break in time series in 2012.
(⁴) 2010 data (instead of 2008).
(⁵) 2013 data (instead of 2015). 
Source: Eurostat (online data code: t2020_51)
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5.3 Which groups are at greater risk of poverty 
or social exclusion?
lives and can also be influenced by gender. 
Thus, age and sex are an interesting breakdown 
to consider when analysing poverty or social 
exclusion (see Figure 5.10).
In 2015, women were more likely to experience 
poverty or social exclusion than men by 
1.4 percentage points (the rate for women was 
24.4 %, while for men it was 23.0 %). Women were 
worse off in all EU countries except for Poland 
and Spain, where men were at higher risk of 
poverty or social exclusion, and Finland, where 
the risk was equal for men and for women. In 
2015, the gender gaps were highest in the Baltic 
States Latvia (5.5 percentage points) and Estonia 
(3.8 percentage points) as well as in Bulgaria 
(3.5 percentage points), the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia (3.3 percentage points each). 
Overall, between 2008 and 2015 the share of 
both men and women at risk of poverty or 
Despite a reduction in the poverty gender 
gap since 2012, the share of women 
suffering from poverty or social exclusion 
was still 1.4 percentage points higher than 
the corresponding share of men in 2015. 
31.3 % of young people aged 18 to 24 and 
26.9 % of those aged less than 18 were at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2015. 
At 17.4 %, this rate was considerably lower 
among the elderly aged 65 or over. 
Of all groups examined based on their 
employment status, the unemployed 
faced the greatest risk of poverty or social 
exclusion, at 66.6 % in 2015. 
Almost 50 % of all single parents were at risk 
of poverty or social inclusion in 2015. This 
was double the average and higher than for 
any other household type analysed. 
34.7 % of adults with at most lower 
secondary educational attainment were 
at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion in 2015. The 
situation is especially dire for 
children of parents with at 
most pre-primary and lower 
secondary education — of 
these, 65.6 % were at risk. 
In 2015, 40.2 % of adults 
born in a country outside the 
EU and 25.2 % of those born in a different 
EU country than the reporting one were 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion. In 
comparison, for native citizens, only 21.7 % 
of the population were at risk.
EU citizens in rural areas were on average 
slightly more likely to live in poverty or 
social exclusion than those living in urban 
areas (25.5 % compared with 24.0 %) in 
2015. However, there is no consistent 
pattern across all Member States.
Identifying groups with a heightened risk of 
poverty or social exclusion and determining 
the reasons behind this vulnerability is the key 
to creating sound policies to fight poverty. 
Compared with the EU average, some groups of 
the population are at a higher risk of poverty or 
social exclusion. The most affected are women, 
children, young people, the unemployed, single-
parent households and those living alone, people 
with lower educational attainment, people born 
in a different country than the one they reside in, 
people out of work, and in a majority of Member 
States those living in rural areas. 
5.3.1 Women and young people are 
more likely to live in poverty and social 
exclusion than men 
People’s roles and responsibilities within families 
and at the workplace change throughout their 
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social exclusion followed a similar path to the 
headline indicator depicted in Figure 5.1. After 
2012, however, the rate decreased more for 
women than it did for men, slightly reducing the 
difference between the genders. The gender gap 
narrowed in almost all EU countries between 2008 
and 2015, except for Sweden, Latvia and Bulgaria, 
where minor increases were observed.
Because the structure of the survey assumes that 
households with more than one member share 
their resources equally, the main drivers behind 
the gender gap are higher poverty rates among 
single female households, mainly those with 
dependent children (26). In a workshop on the 
main causes of female poverty (27), the Directorate 
General for Internal Policies pointed out that one 
reason for this persisting gender gap is that single 
parents are more likely to have very low work 
intensities compared with other households with 
children. Single-parent households tend to be 
far more often headed by women. In 2011, 11.6 % 
of the EU population reported having lived in a 
single-parent household at the age of 14. Almost 
10 % of the respondents lived with their mother 
only, while 1.8 % lived with their father (28). A 
comparison of Member States’ performance in the 
European Semester Thematic Factsheet (29) shows 
two policy measures that could ease this problem: 
child and family-support benefits and access to 
affordable, high-quality childcare.
The long-term effects of reduced work intensity 
among women (both single and married) become 
especially apparent in old age. Although women 
were more likely to be at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion than men in all age groups in 2015, the 
largest differences could be seen in the oldest 
group (65 or over), displaying a gender gap of 
5 percentage points. One explanation for the 
gender poverty gap among elderly EU citizens is 
that on average women receive a lower pension 
income than men. As shown in the European 
Commission’s Pension Adequacy Report (30), this 
is mainly due to childcare-related gaps in their 
employment history and patterns of employment 
with low pension coverage.
For both men and women, young people aged 
18 to 24 are the most likely to be at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion. Almost a third of young 
people were at risk in 2015 (31.8 % of women and 
Figure 5.10: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, by sex and age group, EU-28, 2015 
(% of population)
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Source: Eurostat (online data code: ilc_peps01)
(26) Given that the data does not reveal systematic differences in the risk of poverty or social exclusion between single female and single 
male households without dependent children, the gender gap is expected to be caused by single households with dependent children.
(27) Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Workshop on main causes of female poverty, 2015, (p. 22).
(28) Eurostat, Living condition statistics — family situation of today’s adults as children, accessed [19 June 2017].  
(29) European Commission, European Semester Thematic Factsheet. Social Inclusion, 2016 (p. 7, 8).
(30) European Commission, The 2015 Pension Adequacy Report: current and future income adequacy in old age in the EU, Volume 1, 2015.
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30.8 % of men). People younger than 18 years 
had the second highest risk, at 26.9 %. Moreover, 
the situation of young people aged 18 to 24 has 
deteriorated the most since 2010 compared to 
other age groups. Although their risk of poverty 
or social exclusion had been falling until 2009, it 
climbed back up in the following years. However, 
there was a slight reduction in 2015 compared 
to 2014 (for more information on this group’s 
employment situation see the chapter on 
‘Employment’, page 25). In contrast, older people 
aged 65 or over had the lowest rate of poverty or 
social exclusion, at 17.4 % in 2015 (31). Rates for this 
group showed a steady decline between 2010 and 
2014. As a result, the age gap widened during this 
period and has remained stable after that. 
This widening of the poverty gap between young 
people aged 18 to 24 and older people aged 
65 or over can be seen in more than half the 
Member States. Especially large increases could 
be observed in the southern European countries 
Greece, Spain, Cyprus and Portugal (see the 
chapter on ‘Employment’, page 25) (32). This is to 
a large extent because in most countries during 
the preceding economic crisis, pensions and 
retirement benefits for older people were either 
not reduced or not reduced by as much as was 
the income of the younger population (33).
5.3.2 Lack of work increases the risk of 
poverty or social exclusion
At 66.6 %, exactly two-thirds of unemployed 
people in the EU were at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion in 2015 (34). In the same year, 43.7 % of 
other economically inactive people (35) were also 
at risk. In comparison, the share of employed 
people at risk was just 12.5 %. This shows that 
poverty or social exclusion are more likely to affect 
unemployed people. And the extent to which 
members of a household have the opportunity to 
work will also affect their risk of poverty or social 
exclusion. (For more information on this topic see 
the sub-indicator very low work intensity earlier in 
this chapter.)
However, the risk of poverty or social exclusion 
increased for all groups regardless of their 
employment status between 2010 and 2015, 
except for retired people, where it fell by 
2.8 percentage points. Of the Member States in 
2015, Luxembourg had the lowest risk of poverty 
or social exclusion among the unemployed 
(53.3 %), while Germany had the highest (83.1 %). 
Interestingly, men were more likely than women 
to experience poverty across all employment 
statuses, except for retirees. Among those, the 
share of women at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion was 3.3 percentage points higher than 
that of men. This shows that one of the drivers 
behind the feminisation of poverty and social 
exclusion discussed earlier is the amount of 
women at risk of poverty or social exclusion at 
retirement age. 
5.3.3 Single parents face the highest risk 
of poverty or social exclusion
Single people with one or more dependent 
children had a 47.9 % chance of being at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion in 2015. This was just 
over twice the average rate and higher than for 
other household types. However, this group also 
experienced the largest decline in the percentage 
at risk since 2010 when the rate was 52.1 % and 
well over double the average. 
Figure 5.11 shows that in general households 
with only one adult — both with children and 
without — and households with many children 
are at a higher risk of poverty or social exclusion. 
In single-adult households there is no partner 
to help cushion temporary disruptions such as 
unemployment or sickness. Also, many such 
households are made up of young unemployed 
(31) Reasons for this could include that many elderly people receive regular pensions, have accrued some wealth and have often paid off 
their mortgage. 
(32) Estonia, Croatia, Latvia, Slovenia and Malta were in the opposite situation where poverty was higher among the older than the younger 
age groups in 2015. 
(33) Bertelsmann Stiftung, Social Justice in the EU — Index Report 2015. Social Inclusion Monitor Europe, 2015 (p.10).
(34) Eurostat (online data code: ilc_peps02).
(35) The main economically inactive groups are students, people looking after family and home, long-term sick and disabled, temporarily sick 
and disabled, retired people and discouraged workers (UK Office for National Statistics, A guide to labour market statistics, 2012).
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people or pensioners — often women — which 
have a higher-than-average risk of poverty or 
social exclusion (36). Single parents also face the 
challenge of being both the primary breadwinner 
and caregiver for the family. The group with 
the lowest poverty rate in 2015 was that of 
households with two adults where at least one 
person was aged 65 years or over.
At the Member State level, the at-risk of poverty or 
social exclusion rate for single parent households 
showed varying trends between 2010 and 2015. 
Changes ranged from a rise of 7.4 percentage 
points in Greece to a fall of 17.9 percentage 
points in Malta. Other countries also experiencing 
large increases were Denmark (6.9 percentage 
points) and Finland (6.7 percentage points). 
The biggest falls, besides Malta, were in Latvia 
(– 13.7 percentage points) and Germany 
(– 10.4 percentage points). 
In contrast, for households with two adults with at 
least one aged 65 or over, the at-risk-of-poverty or 
social-exclusion rate decreased, or increased only 
slightly, in a majority of Member States. Hence, 
the absence of children seems to lower the risk of 
poverty or social exclusion.
5.3.4 People with low educational 
attainment are three times more likely to 
be at risk compared with those with the 
highest degrees
In 2015, 34.7 % of people with at most lower 
secondary educational attainment were at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion (see Figure 5.12). In 
comparison, only 11.7 % with tertiary education 
were in the same situation. This shows that the 
least educated people were almost three times 
more likely to be at risk than those with the 
highest education levels (also see the chapter 
on ‘Education’, page 107). This is also reflected 
(36) European Centre for Social Welfare and Policy Research, Poverty Across Europe: The latest evidence using the EU-SILC Survey, 2008.
Figure 5.11: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, by household type, EU-28, 2010 and 2015
(% of population)
2010 2015
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Two adults with three or more dependent children
Two adults younger than 65 years
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Two or more adults with dependent children
Two or more adults without dependent children
Three or more adults with dependent children
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Source: Eurostat (online data code: ilc_peps03)
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social exclusion is how factors leading to these 
situations are transmitted from one generation to 
the next. 
In 2015, 65.6 % of children of parents with at most 
pre-primary and lower secondary education were 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion. This was over 
six times higher than for children of parents with 
first or second stage tertiary education. Moreover, 
between 2010 and 2015 the increase in the risk of 
poverty or social exclusion was particularly high 
for children of parents with the lowest educational 
attainment while the increase was minimal for 
the other children. Thus, education, which is a 
strong determinant of poverty or social exclusion 
for adults, also influences whether children live in 
poverty or social exclusion.
In 2015, children whose parents had the lowest 
educational attainment had the highest risk 
of poverty or social exclusion in Slovakia 
(94.4 %), Bulgaria (89.5 %) and Hungary (83.7 %). 
Furthermore, while the Czech Republic has the 
overall lowest rate of poor or socially excluded 
people in all of the EU, children in the Czech 
Republic born to parents with the lowest 
educational attainment were highly likely to 
suffer from poverty or social exclusion (at a rate of 
in the data on employment which shows 
that the likelihood of being employed rises 
in line with educational level (see the chapter 
on ‘Employment’, page 25, or the Education 
and Training Monitor 2016 of the European 
Commission (37) for more information). 
This situation is even more distinct in Member 
States such as Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, 
Romania, Malta and the Czech Republic. In these 
countries, people with the lowest educational 
attainment were over four to more than seven 
times more likely to be at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion than those with the highest 
educational attainment. In 13 Member States, this 
ratio increased between 2010 and 2015. However, 
a better education did not necessarily offer 
protection from the crisis. Between 2010 and 2015, 
14 Member States also experienced a rise in the 
rate among those with the highest educational 
degrees. 
5.3.5 The risk of poverty or social 
exclusion due to low education is passed 
on to the next generation
An important aspect to consider when analysing 
the overall number of people living in poverty or 
Figure 5.12: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, by educational attainment level, EU-28, 
2010 and 2015
(% of population aged 18 and over)
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(37) European Commission, Education and Training Monitor 2016, 2016 (p. 27). 
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82.3 %). Conversely, in Denmark, Portugal, Estonia 
and Luxembourg the risk of poverty or social 
exclusion for children whose parents had the 
lowest educational attainment was the lowest 
in the EU, between 41.9 % and 49.9 % (for more 
information on the educational levels per country, 
see the chapter on ‘Education’, page 107).
The risk of poverty or social exclusion for children 
whose parents had the lowest educational 
attainment increased between 2010 and 2015 in 
over two thirds of Member States. The increase 
ranged from 19.8 percentage points in Lithuania 
to 0.4 percentage points in Slovakia. In ten of 
these Member States, such an increase took place 
although the overall rate of poverty or social 
exclusion decreased. For instance, in Lithuania the 
overall poverty rate fell by 4.7 percentage points. A 
third of the Member States made progress on this 
issue. For instance, in Estonia, Poland and Romania 
this rate decreased by 10 percentage points or 
more. With the exception of the United Kingdom, 
the overall poverty rate also fell in these countries. 
The socio-economic environment in which 
children grow up does not only affect the 
standard of living in their youth. There is also a 
close link between the socio-economic status of 
adults and the status of their parents during their 
childhood (see Figure 5.13). 
For instance, the ad hoc module on 
Intergenerational transmission of disadvantage 
statistics (38) carried out in the EU Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (SILC) in 2011 
showed that 34.2 % of low-educated adults also 
had low-educated parents in their childhood. 
This can be explained by the parents’ inability to 
financially support their children’s studies and/
or to pass on a perception of the importance of 
education to their children. 
Education is not the only factor transmitted 
from generation to generation. In 2011, 68.9 % 
of adults with a low ability to make ends meet 
grew up in a household in the same situation. 
Moreover, among adults ‘not at work’, 28.6 % also 
grew up in a household with at least one parent 
‘not at work’ (39). Thus, children growing up in 
unfavourable conditions are less likely than their 
better-off peers to do well in school, enjoy good 
health and realise their full potential later in life (for 
(38) Eurostat, Intergenerational transmission of disadvantage statistics, accessed [19 June 2017]  
(39) Parents ‘not at work’ include those who were unemployed, in retirement or in early retirement or had given up business, fulfilling 
domestic tasks and care responsibilities, other inactive person, and those answering ‘don’t know’.
Figure 5.13: Children at risk of poverty or social exclusion by educational attainment level of 
their parents, EU-28, 2010 and 2015
(% of population aged less than 18 years)
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Source: Eurostat (online data code: ilc_peps60)
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more information see Eurostat’s statistical book on 
Living Conditions in Europe (40). 
In a Commission Recommendation (41), the 
European Commission encouraged Member 
States to take action to prevent disadvantages 
being transferred from one generation to another. 
Specifically, it advised them to guarantee that 
children grow up with enough resources, as well as 
assuring their access to quality education including 
childcare services and health services, and to 
enforce children’s rights to access different pastime 
activities. 
5.3.6 People from outside the EU are 
generally worse off than people living in 
their home country
In 2015, people living in the EU but born in a 
non-EU country had a 40.2 % risk of living in 
poverty or social exclusion. The risk was lower for 
people born in an EU-country other than the one 
they were living in, at 25.2 %. Among the people 
whose country of residence corresponded to their 
country of birth, 21.7 % were at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion. Thus, people born outside the EU 
were almost twice as likely to be at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion compared with native citizens. 
Figure 5.14: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by broad group of country of birth, by 
country, 2015
(% of population aged 18 and over)
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(40) Eurostat, Living conditions in Europe. Eurostat statistical books, 2014 (p. 101).
(41) European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 20 February 2013, Investing in children: breaking the cycle of disadvantage, Official 
Journal of the European Union, 2013.
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countries a large share of non-EU migrants did 
not come to their host country primarily for 
work, but rather for family reasons, or, in some 
Member States, for international protection (see 
Employment and Social Development in Europe 
2015 (43)).
Between 2010 and 2015 the risk of poverty or 
social exclusion increased for those living in a 
country other than their country of origin, both 
for those from outside the EU (by 3.3 percentage 
points) and those from inside the EU (by 
2.7 percentage points).
The overall trend could be explained by the fact 
that migrants from non-EU countries have suffered 
the most from rising unemployment in the EU, as 
shown in the Migrant integration statistics. The 
situation of the non-EU-born population in the 
EU is especially relevant in light of the integration 
challenge the EU has been facing due to the influx 
of asylum seekers that increased notably in 2015 
(for more information see the Asylum quarterly 
report). 
5.3.7 In the majority of Member States, 
people in rural areas are more at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion 
On average, EU citizens in rural areas were slightly 
more likely to live at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion than those in urban areas (25.5 % in rural 
areas compared with 24.0 % in urban areas) in 2015 
(see Figure 5.15). Those living in towns or suburbs 
were the least likely to be at risk (22.1 %). However, 
the figures vary greatly between Member States. 
In 15 Member States, people living in rural areas 
were at the highest risk of being poor or socially 
excluded. The countries with the highest poverty 
rates in rural areas compared with urban areas 
are Romania (26.7 percentage points higher) 
and Bulgaria (23.1 percentage points higher) (44). 
In other countries, such as Denmark, Austria, 
Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands 
(42) Eurostat, First and second-generation immigrants — obstacles to work, accessed [19 June 2017].  
(43) European Commission, Employment and Social Development in Europe 2015, 2016 (p. 14). 
(44) The same holds true for Malta, but the data is of low reliability. 
Compared to migration from a country from 
outside the EU, migration within the EU bears a far 
smaller risk of poverty or social exclusion.
A cross-country comparison shows that this 
‘origin gap’ differs strongly across EU Member 
States. The countries with the greatest difference 
in at-risk-of-poverty rate between people from 
non-EU countries and those living in their home 
country are Greece (34.3 percentage point gap), 
Belgium (33.7 percentage point gap) and Spain 
(31.3 percentage point gap). Conversely, the 
Czech Republic and Malta showed the smallest 
differences between these two groups. In 
these countries, foreign citizens from a non-EU 
country were around six percentage points more 
likely to be at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
compared with citizens living in their country of 
birth. In Poland the opposite pattern could be 
seen, where people from non-EU countries had 
a 10.7 percentage point lower risk of poverty or 
social exclusion compared with native citizens 
in 2015. Finally, in some Member States foreign 
citizens from other EU countries fare better in 
terms of poverty or social exclusion than native 
citizens. This is the case in Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal, Croatia and Germany. 
Country differences in the ‘poverty origin gap’ 
could be explained by a number of factors, 
such as the level of education, labour market 
access and employment status of foreign citizens 
residing in a given Member State. Difficulties in 
labour market access among foreign citizens 
can be due to migration-specific work obstacles: 
problems with credential recognition, language 
and communication barriers, or discrimination on 
social and religious grounds (for more information, 
see the Eurostat Article on First and second-
generation immigrants — obstacles to work (42)). 
Furthermore, the socio-economic outcomes of 
the foreign-born population in Member States 
may also reflect the different reasons for migrating 
to a specific country. For instance, in many EU 
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and Germany, the opposite is true: a clearly larger 
share of urban residents live in poverty or social 
exclusion compared with residents in rural areas 
or towns. There are also countries, such as the 
Czech Republic, Finland and Slovenia, where the 
poverty rates in urban, rural or suburban areas 
differ only slightly. 
In a study report on poverty and social exclusion 
in rural areas (45), the European Commission 
identified four main categories of problems 
that characterise rural areas in the EU and 
determine the risk of poverty or social exclusion: 
(45) European Commission, Poverty and social exclusion in rural areas. Final study report, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, 2008.
demography (for example, the exodus of 
residents and the ageing population in rural 
areas), remoteness (such as lack of infrastructure 
and basic services), education (for example, lack 
of preschools and difficulty in accessing primary 
and secondary schools) and labour markets 
(lower employment rates, persistent long-term 
unemployment and a greater number of seasonal 
workers). For more information on the different 
employment rates across different types of 
municipalities, see the chapter on ‘Employment’, 
page 25). 
Figure 5.15: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by degree of urbanisation, by country, 
2015
(% of population)
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5.4 Outlook towards 2020
reforms. Appropriate economic, employment, tax 
and education policies could support economic 
growth, raise employment (48) and help tackle 
in-work poverty, and guarantee adequate levels of 
social protection and access to quality services. 
As the most widespread form of poverty, 
monetary poverty is one of the major challenges 
to achieving the Europe 2020 target. The 
proportion of people at risk of monetary poverty 
is closely linked to income inequality. As stated in 
the Synthesis Report of the 2011 Peer Review in 
Social Protection and Social Inclusion, this is not 
reduced by simply raising the average income. 
Therefore, action needs to be taken in the areas 
of social protection and improving the efficiency 
and effectiveness of income support schemes. 
This is further emphasized by the Active Inclusion 
Recommendation calling on EU governments to 
establish an integrated strategy based on three 
social policy pillars, namely adequate income 
support, inclusive labour markets, and access to 
quality services.
To make progress towards the Europe 2020 
poverty goal it will be particularly important to 
focus on groups that are at high risk of poverty 
or social exclusion. With the Social Investment 
Package, the European Commission has set forth 
an integrated policy framework aiming to reach 
out to various vulnerable target groups. It focuses 
on simplifying and better targeting social policies, 
ensuring that social protection systems respond 
to people’s needs, and investing in people’s skills 
and capacities. Within this policy framework, the 
European Commission put forward a specific 
Recommendation on Investing in children: 
breaking the cycle of disadvantage (49). 
(46) European Commission, Taking stock of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, Brussels, 2014 (p.14).
(47) European Commission, Social Europe — Aiming for inclusive growth. Annual report of the Social Protection Committee on the social situation in 
the European Union (2014), Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2015 (p. 9).
(48) However, some research also shows that the positive employment development before the economic crisis did not strongly contribute 
to reducing poverty (see Taylor-Gooby, P., Gumy, J. and Otto, A. 2015, Can ‘New Welfare’ address poverty through more and better jobs?, 
Journal of Social Policy [Online] 44:83-104 and Cantillon, B., Luigjes, C. and Marchal, S. 2015, Decent incomes for the poor: which role for 
Europe?, Discussion Paper No. 15/18). 
(49) European Commission, Investing in Children: breaking the cycle of disadvantage, Commission Recommendation of 20 February 2013.
Despite progress in reducing poverty or social 
exclusion levels, aided by the incipient economic 
recovery, the number of poor or socially excluded 
people still needs to fall by 22.9 million people 
in the EU by 2020 to fulfil the poverty goal of 
the Europe 2020 strategy. 
In its stocktaking of the Europe 2020 strategy (46), 
the European Commission acknowledges there 
is no sign of a rapid improvement in the situation 
and expects that the number of people at risk 
of poverty might remain at about 100 million 
by 2020. The European Commission expresses 
a concern that ‘the situation is particularly 
aggravated in certain Member States, reckoning 
that ‘the crisis has demonstrated the need for 
effective social protection systems’.
In accordance with the principles of the EU 
2020 strategy governance, common efforts are 
taken by EU institutions and Member States, fully 
respecting the subsidiarity principle in policy 
development, as reinforced by the European 
Pillar of Social Rights. The EU complements and 
supports the Member States’ policies by policy 
guidance in various domains and Country Specific 
Recommendations within the European Semester. 
Furthermore, between 2014 and 2020, at least 
20% of the European Social Fund is earmarked for 
measures combating poverty and social exclusion 
(for more information, see the information 
provided by the European platform against 
poverty and social exclusion). 
In order to reach the objective of the Europe 2020 
strategy of reducing the amount of people at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion by 20 million 
people, the Annual Report of the Social Protection 
Committee (47) emphasises there needs to be 
a shift from short-term measures to structural 
5Poverty and social exclusion
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Specific actions to reduce poverty or social 
exclusion have been outlined in the Youth 
Guarantee Programme, a commitment by all 
Member States to ensure that all young people 
under the age of 25 receive employment 
opportunities or further education after having 
finished formal education. One of the main 
financial resources to support the implementation 
of national Youth Guarantee schemes is the Youth 
Employment Initiative. It has been established to 
directly support young people not in education, 
employment or training in regions with a youth 
unemployment rate above 25 %. Also, the Council 
Recommendation on the integration of the 
long-term unemployed into the labour market is 
working towards a simplified and better access 
to support for those out of work for long periods. 
Finally, the Fund for European Aid to the Most 
Deprived (FEAD) supports EU countries’ actions 
in providing food, clothing and other essential 
goods to the most deprived and finance non-
material social inclusion measures for the poorest 
in society.
Additionally, the EU agency Eurofond, which has 
been providing knowledge to assist in the 
development of social and work-related policies 
since 1975, supports the Europe 2020 strategy with 
research to identify factors for successful changes. 

Country profiles
Country profiles
  Smarter, greener, more inclusive?156
This section provides an overview of each 
Member State’s situation in relation to the Europe 
2020 headline indicators and national targets. 
Member States define their national targets 
in their National Reform Programmes (NRPs), 
taking into consideration their current situation. 
These programmes outline the actions and 
measures they plan to undertake to meet their 
national targets. The European Commission 
assesses each NRP and provides country-
specific recommendations to support the 
programmes. The full NRPs and country-specific 
recommendations can be downloaded from the 
European Commission’s Europe 2020 website.
This chapter illustrates the current situation of 
each Member State with the help of radar charts. 
The charts show how far a country is from its 
national targets as a percentage of the targets 
by comparing the national target (red line), the 
country’s situation in 2008 (yellow line) and the 
most recent situation (blue line). The distance 
between the blue line and the red line for a 
particular indicator shows how far a country 
currently is from its national target. Data points 
on or outside the red line mean the country has 
met or exceeded this target, while those inside 
show it still has some way to go. Comparing 
a country’s most recent performance with 
the yellow line reveals whether it has moved 
closer towards or further away from its targets 
since 2008 (1). In the case of greenhouse gas 
emissions, some countries were allowed to 
increase their emissions compared to 1990 levels, 
although the EU-level target is a reduction of 
emissions. This is why for some countries, this 
target had already been reached in 2008, and 
therefore, the yellow line showing 2008 levels is 
outside the red target line.
National targets that are not harmonised with 
the overall EU targets are not presented in the 
diagram. For example, this is the case with the 
poverty and social exclusion targets adopted by 
some countries. Regarding the indicator on energy 
efficiency, Member States have set indicative 
national targets based on different indicators 
Country profiles
(1) Please note that in a few cases, some countries have changed their national targets since 2008, therefore comparisons with earlier 
editions of this publication may be misleading.
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(primary or final energy consumption, or primary 
or final energy savings, or energy intensity) in line 
with the Energy Efficiency Directive. These have 
been translated into absolute levels of primary 
energy consumption, expressed in million tonnes 
of oil equivalent (Mtoe).
Progress towards the national greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions targets is analysed based on 
emissions in sectors not covered by the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and in relation 
to the base year defined in the Effort Sharing 
Decision (ESD) (2). For further details on the EU ETS 
and the ESD see the chapter ‘Climate change and 
energy’ on page 81.
The national targets (as defined in the NRPs) and 
the latest available national data for the headline 
indicators are presented in a separate table. Data 
on Europe 2020 headline indicators, targets and 
related issues are disseminated by Eurostat on a 
dedicated section of its website. 
(2) The Effort Sharing Decision (406/2009/EC) originally defined 2005 as base year for Member States’ GHG emissions reductions. However, 
due to recent recalculations with improved methodologies used at national level to measure the estimated emissions, 2005 values of 
countries are not necessarily equal to the value of the ESD base year.
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In 2016, Belgium surpassed its targets on early 
leavers from education and training by 0.7 
percentage points. The country almost reached 
its energy efficiency target, which foresees a 
reduction in primary energy consumption to 
43.7 Mtoe. The country has also increased its R&D 
expenditure as a share of GDP, but in 2015 it was 
still 0.6 percentage points from its 3 % national 
target. The share of renewable energy in gross 
final energy consumption more than doubled 
between 2008 and 2015, but the country remains 
five percentage points below its 13 % national 
target. Similarly, the 2.7 percentage point increase 
in the share of tertiary graduates since 2008 was 
not enough to reach the 47 % national target. 
Although the country reduced its GHG emissions 
in non-ETS sectors between 2008 and 2015, it 
is still 6.7 percentage points from its national 
target. Lack of progress on the employment 
rate between 2008 and 2016 means it is still 5.5 
percentage points away from its target. Between 
2008 and 2015, the number of people at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion increased by about 6 %, 
moving the country further from its 2020 target. 
Belgium
Table 6.1: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 67.7 2016 73.2
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 2.45 (1) 2015 3
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 8.3 (1) 2015 – 15
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 7.9 2015 13
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 45.7 2015 43.7
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 8.8 2016 9.5
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 45.6 2016 47
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 2 336 2015 1 814
(1) Estimate/provisional data. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Figure 6.1: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Bulgaria reduced its non-ETS GHG emissions by 
2.9 % between 1990 and 2015, staying within its 
national target to limit the rise in non-ETS sector 
GHG emissions to 20 % by 2020. In 2015, the 
country surpassed its renewable energy target 
and almost met its target on primary energy 
consumption. Although Bulgaria moved towards 
its national targets on early school leavers and 
tertiary education, it was still further away from 
both targets than the EU as a whole was to its 
respective EU target in 2016. The employment rate 
in Bulgaria deteriorated sharply between 2008 
and 2011; the subsequent increase up to 2016 was 
not enough to bring the country closer to its 76 % 
target. Despite a steady rise in R&D expenditure 
between 2008 and 2015, Bulgaria would need 
to double its expenditure in the coming years to 
reach its goal of 1.5 % of GDP. Progress towards the 
country’s poverty reduction target has been slow 
since the start of the crisis; in 2015, the number of 
people at risk of poverty after social transfers — 
used as a national target in the area of poverty 
reduction — was 2.8 % below its 2008 level but 
13.5 % above the national 2020 target. 
Bulgaria
Figure 6.2: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Table 6.2: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 67.7 2016 76
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 0.96 (1) 2015 1.5
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 2.9 (1) 2015 20
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 18.2 2015 16
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 17.9 2015 16.9
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 13.8 2016 11
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 33.8 2016 36
People at risk of poverty after social transfers (thousands) 1 586 2015 1 372 (2)
(1)  Data are provisional.
(2)  National target differs from the overall EU target on ‘risk of 
poverty or social exclusion’ as it refers to the sub-indicator 
‘people at risk of poverty after social transfers’ only.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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The Czech Republic reduced its non-ETS GHG 
emissions by 8.8 % between 1990 and 2015, 
remaining within the national GHG emissions 
target to limit increases to 9 % by 2020. In 2015, 
the country had already met its national target 
on renewable energy. In 2016, the Czech Republic 
exceeded its national targets on employment 
and tertiary educational attainment by 1.7 and 
0.8 percentage points, respectively. The dramatic 
reduction in the number of people at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion in 2015 helped the 
country surpass its national target of lifting 
100 000 people out of the risk of poverty or 
social exclusion compared to 2008 levels with 
22 000. The six percentage points decrease in 
primary energy consumption in the period 2008 
to 2015 brought the Czech Republic very close 
to its national target. The gradual increase in 
the share of early school leavers from education 
and training between 2008 and 2016 narrowed 
the distance to the national target to only 1.1 
percentage points.
Czech Republic
Table 6.3: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 76.7 2016 75
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.95 (1) 2015 1 (²)
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 8.8 (1) 2015 9
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 15.1 2015 13
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 39.9 2015 39.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 6.6 2016 5.5
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 32.8 2016 32
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 1 444 2015 1 466
(1)  Provisional data.
(2)  National target refers to public sector expenditure only. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Figure 6.3: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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In 2016, Denmark exceeded its national targets 
on early school leavers and tertiary educational 
attainment by about 3 and 8 percentage points, 
respectively. Denmark was the only Member 
State to exceed its national R&D expenditure 
target of 3 % of GDP in 2015. With a 15 % 
reduction in primary energy consumption and 
a 12.2 percentage point increase in the share 
of renewable energy in gross final energy 
consumption between 2008 and 2015, the 
country also surpassed its targets on energy 
efficiency and renewable energy. Despite a 
steady reduction in GHG emissions in non-ETS 
sectors since 2011, Denmark had not met its GHG 
emissions target by 2015. Although the country’s 
employment rate has been rising since 2012, by 
2016 it was still below the 2008 level and some 
distance from the national target of 80 %. The 
number of people living in households with 
very low work intensity  — used in Denmark as a 
national target in the area of poverty and social 
exclusion — increased by 35 % between 2008 
and 2015, pushing the country further from its 
national target.
Denmark
Table 6.4: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 77.4 (1) 2016 80
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 3.03 (2) 2015 3
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 15.0 (2) 2015 – 20
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 30.8 2015 30
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 16.5 2015 17.4
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 7.2 (1) 2016 10
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 47.7 (1) 2016 40 (3)
People living in households with very low work intensity (thousands) 470 2015 325 (4)
Figure 6.4: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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(1)  Break in time series in 2016. 
(2)  Estimated/provisional data. 
(3)  National target: more than 40 %. 
(4)  National target differs from the overall EU target on ‘risk of 
poverty or social exclusion’ as it refers to the sub-indicator 
‘people living in households with very low work intensity’ only. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Long-term unemployment, used in Germany as 
a national target for poverty and social exclusion, 
reduced by 56 % between 2008 and 2015. This 
allowed the country to exceed its target of reducing 
long-term unemployment by 20 % by 2020. 
Germany had already met its 77 % employment 
target by 2013 and continued to increase its 
employment rate until 2016. The country slightly 
exceeded its target on reducing early leavers from 
education and training in 2016. In that year it also 
surpassed its national target on tertiary educational 
attainment by nearly 6.1 percentage points, with 
48.1 % of 30 to 34 year olds having completed 
post-secondary level education or equivalent. 
Germany’s national target differs from that of other 
Member States because it includes post-secondary 
non-tertiary education (ISCED level 4) in addition 
to ISCED levels 5 to 8. Germany has almost closed 
the gap on its national targets for R&D expenditure. 
Between 2008 and 2015, it reduced the distance to 
its national targets on primary energy consumption 
and renewable energy by more than half. But a 
4.7 percentage point gap to its target on GHG 
emissions in non-ETS sectors persisted in 2015. 
Germany
Figure 6.5: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Table 6.5: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 78.7 2016 77
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 2.87 (1) 2015 3
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 9.3 (1) 2015 – 14
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 14.6 2015 18
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 292.9 2015 276.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 10.2 2016 10 (2)
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 48.1 (3) 2016 42 (3)
Long-term unemployment (thousands) 723 2015 1 306 (4)
(1)  Estimated/provisional data. 
(2)  National target: less than 10 %. 
(3)  Indicator and target refer to ISCED levels 4–8. 
(4)  National target differs from the overall EU target on ‘risk of 
poverty or social exclusion’ as it refers to long-term unemployed 
people.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators and lfsa_ugad), DESTATIS
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By 2015, Estonia had decreased its GHG emissions 
by 2.5 % compared to 1990 levels, remaining well 
below its national target, which allows emissions to 
increase by 11 % by 2020. In the same year, Estonia 
surpassed its targets on renewable energy and 
primary energy consumption by 3.6 percentage 
points and 4.8 %, respectively. In 2016, the country 
also exceeded its targets on tertiary education and 
employment by 5.4 and 0.6 percentage points, 
respectively. Despite a sizeable reduction in the 
share of early school leavers since 2008, Estonia was 
1.4 percentage points below its national target in 
2016. Gross expenditure on R&D has increased only 
slightly since 2008 and in 2015 the country was 
further from its national target than the EU was as 
a whole from its respective EU target. Since 2010 
the share of the population living at risk of poverty 
after social transfers has increased gradually, 
pushing Estonia further from its national target to 
reduce monetary poverty to a rate of 15 %. 
Estonia
Figure 6.6: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
2008
National target
Most recent data
Employment rate
R&D
expenditure 
Greenhouse
gas emissions
Share of renewable energy in 
gross final energy consumption  
Primary energy
consumption
Early leavers from 
education and training
Tertiary educational
attainment
Table 6.6: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 76.6 2016 76
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.5 (1) 2015 3
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 2.5 (1) 2015 11
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 28.6 2015 25
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 6.2 2015 6.5
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 10.9 2016 9.5
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 45.4 2016 40
People at risk of poverty after social transfers (% of population) 21.6 2015 15 (2)
(1)  Estimated/provisional data. (2)  National target differs from the overall EU target on ‘risk of 
poverty or social exclusion’ as it refers to the sub-indicator 
‘people at risk of poverty after social transfers’ only.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Ireland surpassed its employment target by 1.3 
percentage points in 2016. The country also 
exceeded its target for early leavers from education 
and training, achieving a 5.1 percentage point 
reduction between 2008 and 2016. Although the 
share of tertiary graduates increased more or less 
steadily in the same period, Ireland has yet to meet 
its 60 % target — the second most ambitious 
tertiary education target among Member States. 
Ireland’s R&D expenditure as a share of GDP has 
been fairly stable since 2009, maintaining a 0.5 
percentage point gap to the national target of 
about 2 % (2.5 % of GNP) in 2014. Although Ireland 
had already met its primary energy consumption 
target in 2011, a slight increase in consumption 
in 2016 put the country just above its target 
again. Despite the gradual increase in the share 
of renewables in gross final energy consumption 
since 2008, a gap of 6.8 percentage points still 
needs to be closed in the next five years for the 
country to reach its 16 % target. Ireland would 
need to double its efforts in reducing its GHG 
emissions in non-ETS sectors compared to 1990 to 
meet its respective national target of – 20 %. 
Ireland
Table 6.7: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 70.3 2016 69 (1)
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.51 (2) 2014 2 (3)
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 10.5 (2) 2015 – 20
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 9.2 2015 16
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 14.0 2015 13.9
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 6.3 2016 8
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 52.9 2016 60
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 1 207 2015 : (4)
Figure 6.7: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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(1)  National target: 69–71 %.
(2)  Estimated/provisional data. 
(3)  National target: 2.5 % of GNP (approximately 2 % of GDP). 
(4)  National target: Reduce by a minimum of 200 000 the 
population in combined poverty (either consistent poverty,  
at-risk-of-poverty or basic deprivation).
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Partly as a result of the economic slowdown, by 
2015 Greece had reduced its GHG emissions in 
non-ETS sectors by 30.2 % compared to 1990 
levels, significantly exceeding its national target for 
a 4 % reduction by 2020. Greece had already met 
its target on primary energy consumption in 2013 
and has stabilised its energy efficiency at almost 
the same level since then. In 2016, the country 
also surpassed its national targets on tertiary 
education and early leavers from education 
and training, by 10.7 and 3.8 percentage points, 
respectively. Between 2008 and 2015, Greece 
almost doubled its share of renewable energy in 
gross final energy consumption and increased 
its expenditure on R&D as a share of GDP, thus 
narrowing the distance to the respective national 
targets. In contrast, in 2016 it was the EU country 
with the lowest employment rate and the greatest 
distance to its employment target. Moreover, the 
number of people living at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion increased by about 783 000 between 
2008 and 2015, increasing the distance to the 
national target to more than 1.2 million people. 
Greece
Figure 6.8: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Table 6.8: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 56.2 2016 70
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 0.96 (1) 2015 1.2
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 30.2 (1) 2015 – 4
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 15.4 2015 18
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 23.7 2015 24.7
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 6.2 2016 10 (2)
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 42.7 2016 32
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 3 829 2015 2 596
(1)  Provisional data. 
(2)  National target: less than 10 %.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Spain exceeded its national target on GHG 
emissions in non-ETS sectors by 6.2 percentage 
points in 2015. The country also surpassed its 
primary energy consumption target and closed 
the distance to its renewable energy target to 
3.8 percentage points. By reducing the school 
drop-out rate by 12.7 percentage points between 
2008 and 2016, Spain made substantial progress 
towards its 2020 national target. In contrast, the 
share of 30 to 34 years olds with tertiary education 
fell slightly in 2015 and 2016, increasing the 
distance to the national target to 3.9 percentage 
points. Since 2008, the number of people at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion has risen sharply. 
Spain would need to lift some 3.8 million people 
out of risk of poverty to meet its 2020 objective. 
Although the country’s employment rate has 
picked up since 2014, in 2016 it was still 10.1 
percentage points behind its national target — 
the second largest gap in the EU. R&D spending 
has also fallen, however, the country was closer to 
its national target than the EU as a whole was to 
the EU 2020 target in 2015.  
Spain
Table 6.9: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 63.9 2016 74
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.22 2015 2
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 16.2 (1) 2015 – 10
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 16.2 2015 20
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 117.1 2015 119.8
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 19.0 2016 15 (2)
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 40.1 2016 44
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 13 175 2015 9 386 (3)
Figure 6.9: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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(1)  Provisional data. 
(2)  National target refers to school drop-out rate. 
(3)  National target: reduce the number of people at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion by 1 400 000 to 1 500 000 people (compared 
to 2008).
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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In 2016, France met its Europe 2020 target for 
early leavers from education and training for a 
third consecutive year. By 2015 the country had 
moved closer to its target on primary energy 
consumption. Progress has also been achieved 
in tertiary educational attainment; however, the 
indicator used at EU level cannot directly be 
compared to the French target value of 50 %, 
which refers to the population aged 17 to 33. In 
terms of renewable energy, in 2015 France was the 
EU Member State with the second largest distance 
to its national target (7.8 percentage points). 
Despite an overall reduction in GHG emissions 
in non-ETS sectors, by 2015 the country was still 
1.4 percentage points away from its Europe 2020 
goal. In 2016, France was also further from its 
employment target than the EU as a whole was 
from the EU target but slightly closer to its target 
on R&D expenditure (2015 data). Between 2008 
and 2015, the number of people at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion was reduced by about 102 000, 
moving the country only slightly closer to its 2020 
goal to reduce the number of people at risk by 1.9 
million (compared to 2007). 
France
Table 6.10: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 70.0 2016 75
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 2.23 (1) 2015 3
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 12.6 (1) 2015 – 14
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 15.2 2015 23
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 239.4 2015 219.9
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 8.8 2016 9.5
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 43.6 2016 50 (2)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 11 048 2015 9 482 (3)
Figure 6.10: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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(1)  Provisional data. 
(2)  National target differs from the overall EU target on ‘tertiary 
educational attainment’ as it refers to 17–33 year olds. 
(3)  National target: reduce by 1 900 000 the population living in 
poverty or social exclusion by 2020 (compared with 2007).
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Croatia not only had by far the lowest rate of early 
leavers from education and training across the 
EU in 2016, but it also exceeded its 2020 target 
by 1.2 percentage points. A gradual reduction in 
the number of people at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion since 2013 helped the country reach 
its 2020 target in 2015. By 2015, the country had 
remained well within its target on GHG emissions 
in non-ETS sectors, which allows emissions to 
increase by up to 11 % by 2020 compared to 
1990 levels. In 2015, the country also surpassed 
its national targets on renewable energy and 
primary energy consumption. The share of 
the population aged 30 to 34 with tertiary 
education increased by 11 percentage 
points in the period between 2008 and 2016, 
substantially reducing the distance to the 
national 2020 target. In 2015, Croatia slightly 
increased the distance to its national target 
on R&D expenditure compared to 2008 levels. 
The employment rate in Croatia started to pick 
up again in 2014 and the country has reduced 
the distance to its 62.9 % national target to 
1.5 percentage points.  
Croatia
Table 6.11: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 61.4 2016 62.9
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 0.85 2015 1.4
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 25.3 (1) 2015 11
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 29.0 2015 20
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 8.0 2015 11.5
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 2.8 (2) 2016 4
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 29.5 2016 35
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 1 216 2015 1 220
(1)  Provisional data. 
(2)  Data with low reliability. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Figure 6.11: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Italy achieved a 19.5 % reduction in GHG emissions 
in non-ETS sectors between 1990 and 2015, 
exceeding its national target by 6.5 percentage 
points. In 2015, the country also surpassed its 
national targets on renewable energy and 
primary energy consumption for a second and 
third consecutive year, respectively. Regarding 
education, Italy had exceeded its goals on early 
leavers from education and training and tertiary 
education by 2016; nevertheless, the country had 
the second lowest share of tertiary graduates in 
the EU in 2016 (26.2 % of 30 to 34 year olds). R&D 
expenditure has increased slightly since 2008 and 
in 2015 Italy was closer to its national target than 
the EU as a whole was to the EU target. In contrast, 
it has moved further away from its national targets 
on employment and poverty reduction since 2008 
as a result of the economic crisis. 
Italy
Table 6.12: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 61.6 2016 67 (1)
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.33 (2) 2015 1.53
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 19.5 (2) 2015 – 13
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 17.5 2015 17
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 149.6 2015 158
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 13.8 2016 16 
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 26.2 2016 26 (3)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 17 469 2015 12 882
(1) National target: 67–69 %. 
(2) Provisional data. 
(3) National target: 26–27 %.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Figure 6.12: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Cyprus exceeded its national target on tertiary 
educational attainment by 7.4 percentage 
points in 2016. In the same year, the country 
had also surpassed its target on early leavers 
from education and training by 2.3 percentage 
points and by 2015 had met its goal on primary 
energy consumption. Additionally, by 2015, 
Cyprus had recorded a reduction in non-ETS GHG 
emission compared to 1990 that was six times 
larger than the one envisaged in its Europe 2020 
commitment. By 2015, the country was close to 
meeting its target on R&D expenditure and had 
reduced the distance to its renewable energy goal 
to 3.6 percentage points. However, its progress 
on employment and poverty reduction has 
reversed since the start of the economic crisis 
in 2008. In 2016, Cyprus’s employment rate was 
6.2 percentage points below its 75 % national 
target. The country would also need to lift 90 000 
more people out of the risk of poverty and social 
exclusion to meet its 2020 commitment. 
Cyprus
Table 6.13: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 68.8 2016 75 (1)
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 0.46 (2) 2015 0.5
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 30.6 2015 – 5
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 9.4 2015 13
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 2.2 2015 2.2
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 7.7 2016 10
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 53.4 2016 46
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 244 2015 154
(1)  National target: 75–77 %. 
(2)  Provisional data.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Figure 6.13: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Latvia has made notable progress on reducing the 
rate of early leavers from education and training 
and raising the share of tertiary graduates. The 
country reached its respective targets in 2013 and 
2011 and continued to meet them in 2016. By 
2016, it had already reached its national poverty 
reduction target by limiting the number of people 
at risk of poverty after social transfers and/or in 
households with very low work intensity to 606 000. 
Unlike the EU-level target, Latvia’s poverty target 
refers to monetary poverty and very low work 
intensity only and does not take into account severe 
material deprivation. The country’s GHG emissions 
in non-ETS sectors did not rise notably between 
1990 and 2012, staying within the national target 
to limit emissions increases to 17 % by 2020. Since 
2008, Latvia has fulfilled its commitment on primary 
energy consumption and has steadily moved 
towards its target of 40 % renewable energy in gross 
final energy consumption; this is the second most 
ambitious target for this indicator in the EU. By 2016, 
the country had also met its employment target of 
73 %. Progress on R&D intensity has been slower, 
with only a slight increase between 2008 and 2015. 
Latvia
Table 6.14: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 73.2 2016 73
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 0.63 (1) 2015 1.5
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) 9.1 (1) 2015 17
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 37.6 2015 40
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 4.3 2015 5.4
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 10.0 2016 10.0
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 42.8 2016 34 (2)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 606 (3) 2015 619 (3)
Figure 6.14: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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(1)  Provisional data. 
(2)  National target: 34–36 %.
(3)  Indicator and national target differ from the overall EU target on 
‘risk of poverty or social exclusion’ as they refer to the two sub-
indicators ‘People living at risk of poverty after social transfers’ and 
‘people living in households with very low work intensity’ only
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Country profiles
  Smarter, greener, more inclusive?172
In 2016, Lithuania had by far the highest share of 
30 to 34 year olds with tertiary education in the 
EU (58.7 %) and exceeded its national target by 
10 percentage points. In addition, its share of early 
leavers from education and training was almost 
half the EU rate and well below the 9 % national 
target. Notable progress has also been made on 
climate change and energy. By reducing its GHG 
emissions in non-ETS sectors by 9.9 % between 
1990 and 2015, Lithuania has stayed well below 
its target to limit emission increases to 15 %. The 
country had also exceeded its renewable energy 
and primary energy consumption targets by 
2015 for a second and fourth consecutive year, 
respectively. After a sharp drop in its employment 
level between 2008 and 2010, the rate climbed up 
again and in 2016 Lithuania surpassed its Europe 
2020 goal by 2.4 percentage points. The country 
was also close to meeting its poverty reduction 
target by lifting around 857 000 people out of the 
risk of poverty and social exclusion between 2008 
and 2015. In terms of R&D expenditure, a gap of 
0.9 percentage point remains to be closed for the 
target of 1.9 % of GDP to be reached.
Lithuania
Table 6.15: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 75.2 2016 72.8
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.04 (1) 2015 1.9
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 9.9 (1) 2015 15
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 25.8 2015 23
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 5.8 2015 6.5
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 4.8 2016 9 (2)
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 58.7 2016 48.7
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 857 2015 814
(1)  Provisional data. 
(2)  National target: less than 9 %.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Figure 6.15: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Luxembourg has continuously exceeded its target 
on early leavers from education and training since 
2009. It has also met its target on primary energy 
consumption since 2011. The country has the 
most ambitious tertiary education target of the 
EU, aiming for 66 % of the population aged 30 to 
34 having attained tertiary education by 2020. 
Despite a 14.8 percentage point rise between 
2008 and 2016, it still has further to go to meet 
its national target than other Member States. 
Although in 2016 Luxembourg was closer to its 
employment target than the EU as a whole, a gap 
of 2.3 percentage points persists. In 2015, it spent 
relatively less on R&D as a percentage of GDP than 
the EU overall and it has moved further from its 
national target since 2008. The number of people 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion rose by 32 % 
between 2008 and 2015, pushing Luxembourg 
further from its national target. It also did not reach 
its national target on expansion of renewable 
energy and had one of the lowest shares of 
renewables in gross final energy consumption in 
the EU in 2015. And its 13.6 % reduction in non-ETS 
GHG emissions in 2015 (compared to 1990) was 
not enough for the country to reach its target to 
reduce emissions by 20 %.
Luxembourg
Figure 6.16: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Table 6.16: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 70.7 2016 73
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.31 (1) 2015 2.3 (2)
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 13.6 2015 – 20
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 5.0 2015 11
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 4.1 2015 4.5
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 5.5 2016 10 (3)
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 54.6 (4) 2016 66
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 95 2015 66
(1)  Estimated/provisional data.
(2)  National target: 2.3–2.6 %. 
(3)  National target: less than 10 %. 
(4)  Data has low reliability.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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By reducing its GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors 
by 22.5 % between 1990 and 2015, Hungary 
remained well within its target to limit emission 
increases to 10 % by 2020. The country has also 
remained within its target on primary energy 
consumption and has fulfilled its commitments 
on renewable energy. Progress towards the 
national education targets has been ambiguous 
since 2008. Although Hungary met its national 
target on tertiary education in 2014, a reduction 
in the attainment rate in 2016 reopened the gap 
by one percentage point. An increase in the 
share of early school leavers from education and 
training over the past two years also widened 
the target gap. In terms of R&D expenditure, 
Hungary was just 0.4 percentage points below 
its national target in 2015, putting it closer to 
its target than the EU was to its overall target. 
Poverty levels have deteriorated since the onset 
of the economic crisis, meaning about 391 000 
people still need to be lifted out of the risk of 
poverty or social exclusion for Hungary to meet 
its 2020 target. Despite an improvement in the 
employment rate between 2011 and 2016, the 
country was still 3.5 percentage points from its 
national target of 75 %.
Hungary
Table 6.17: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 71.5 2016 75
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.38 2015 1.8
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 22.5 2015 10
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 14.5 2015 13
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 22.3 2015 24.1
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 12.4 2016 10
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 33 2016 34
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 2 735 2015 2 344
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Figure 6.17: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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A steady increase in the employment rate 
between 2014 and 2016 brought Malta within 
reaching distance of its respective Europe 
2020 target. The share of 30 to 34 years olds 
with tertiary education increased continuously 
between 2008 and 2015, bringing it within 3.2 
percentage points of the national target. In 
2015, the country shortened the distance to its 
primary energy consumption target to 0.1 Mtoe. 
In contrast, between 1990 and 2015, it increased 
its GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors by 25.1 %, 
greatly exceeding its Europe 2020 target of 
limiting emission increases to 5 %. Malta also lags 
behind the EU as a whole in terms of renewable 
energy and R&D expenditure. The number of 
people at risk of poverty and social exclusion 
increased by 16 % between 2008 and 2015, 
moving the country further away from its Europe 
2020 goal. Despite a significant drop in the share 
of early leavers from education and training since 
2008, in 2015 Malta had further to go to reach its 
national 2020 target than other Member States.
Malta
Table 6.18: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 69.6 2016 70
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 0.77 (1) 2015 2
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) 25.1 (1) 2015 5
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 5 2015 10
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 0.8 2015 0.7
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 19.6 2016 10
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 29.8 2016 33
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 94 2015 74.44
(1) Provisional data. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Figure 6.18: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below. The 2008 value for early leavers from education and training exceeds the 
axis range. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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The Netherlands had already exceeded its target 
on tertiary educational attainment in 2008 and 
the share of 30 to 34 year olds with tertiary 
educational attainment has continued to rise. In 
2016, the country also reached its national targets 
on early leavers from education and training and 
surpassed its target on reducing GHG emissions 
in non-ETS sectors by at least 16 % compared 
to 1990 levels. Despite a deterioration in labour 
market conditions since 2008, the Netherlands 
was closer to its employment target in 2016 than 
the EU overall was to its target. Since 2008, the 
country has also moved closer to its target on 
R&D expenditure than the EU has to its overall 
target. In contrast, the Netherlands was the 
country furthest from its renewable energy 
target and still had a gap of 3.6 Mtoe to close 
before reaching its primary energy consumption 
target. The situation concerning the number 
of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
has deteriorated since 2008. However, it is not 
possible to make a comparison with the national 
target as it refers to people aged 0 to 64 living in 
a jobless household.  
Netherlands
Figure 6.19: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Table 6.19: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 77.1 2016 80
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 2.01 (1) 2015 2.5
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 20.0 2015 – 16
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 5.8 2015 14
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 64.3 2015 60.7
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 8 2016 8
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 45.7 2016 40 (2)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 2 744 2015 : (3)
(1)  Provisional data. 
(2)  National target: more than 40 %. 
(3)  National target: Reduce by 100 000 the number of people (aged 
0–64) living in a jobless household (compared to 2008).
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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In 2016, Austria continued to meet both of its 
education targets, with only 6.9 % of pupils 
leaving school early and 40.1 % of 30 to 34 year 
olds having completed tertiary education. Since 
2009, Austria has continuously met its primary 
energy consumption target and in 2015 the 
country moved to within reaching distance 
of its renewable energy target. With a 74.8 % 
employment rate in 2016, the country was closer 
to its national target of 77 % than the EU was to 
its overall target of 75 %. Despite having one of 
the highest R&D intensities (R&D expenditure as 
a share of GDP) across the EU, in 2015 Austria was 
still 0.7 percentage points away from its target, 
partly because this target was very ambitious to 
begin with. In spite of a 15.2 % reduction in GHG 
emissions in non-ETS by 2015 compared to 1990 
levels, the country remained further from its 
national target than the EU was from its overall 
target. Progress in the area of poverty reduction 
has been slow since 2008; Austria would need 
to raise about 87 000 people out of the risk of 
poverty and social exclusion to meet its Europe 
2020 commitment.
Austria
Table 6.20: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 74.8 2016 77
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 3.07 (1) 2015 3.76
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 15.2 (1) 2015 – 16
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 33 2015 34
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 31.3 2015 31.5
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 6.9 2016 9.5
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 40.1 2016 38
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 1 551 2015 1 464
(1) Estimated/provisional data.  
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Figure 6.20: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Despite a 2.3 % increase in GHG emissions 
in non-ETS sectors between 1990 and 2015, 
Poland remained within its target of limiting 
emissions to a 14 % increase by 2020. Against 
the backdrop of the economic crisis, Poland has 
continuously reduced the number of people 
living at risk of poverty or social exclusion since 
2008 and in 2015 exceeded its target for a third 
consecutive year. The country also surpassed 
its goal on primary energy consumption and 
came within reaching distance of its tertiary 
education target, which foresees 45 % of 30 to 34 
years olds having completed tertiary education 
by 2020. The country performed slightly better 
than the EU as a whole in terms of boosting 
employment and R&D expenditure. Poland was 
a similar distance from its renewable energy and 
early school leavers targets as the EU, although 
the EU has more ambitious targets for both of 
these indicators. 
Poland
Table 6.21: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 69.3 2016 71
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1 (1) 2015 1.7
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) 2.3 (1) 2015 14
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 11.8 2015 15
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 90 2015 96.4
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 5.2 2016 4.5
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 44.6 2016 45
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 8 761 2015 9 991
(1) Estimated/provisional data. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Figure 6.21: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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By 2015, Portugal had reduced its GHG emissions 
in non-ETS sectors by 23.9 % compared to 1990 
levels, remaining well below its target for no 
more than a 1 % increase by 2020. Since 2011, the 
country has continuously met its primary energy 
consumption target. By 2015 it had reduced the 
distance to its renewable energy target to three 
percentage points. Portugal has also achieved 
a notable reduction in the share of early leavers 
from education and training, narrowing the gap 
to its respective target by 20.9 percentage points 
between 2008 and 2016. Despite a steady increase 
in tertiary educational attainment since 2010, 
it was still 5.4 percentage points away from its 
respective Europe 2020 target. Portugal’s progress 
towards its national employment and poverty 
reduction targets was hit hard by the economic 
crisis. Although the employment rate has been on 
a slow upward path since 2014, the country has 
not been able to close the gap to its Europe 2020 
target or to return to its 2008 level. The number 
of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
would need to be reduced by 208 000 by 2020 for 
Portugal to meet its national commitment. 
Portugal
Table 6.22: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 70.6 2016 75
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.28 (1) 2015 2.7 (2)
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 23.9 (1) 2015 1
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 28 2015 31
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 21.7 2015 22.5
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 14 2016 10
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 34.6 2016 40
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 2 765 2015 2 557
(1)  Provisional data. 
(2)  National target: 2.7–3.3 %. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Figure 6.22: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below. The 2008 value for early leavers from education and training exceeds the 
axis range. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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By 2015, Romania had reduced its GHG emissions 
in non-ETS sectors by 5.8 % compared to 1990 
levels, remaining well within its 2020 target to limit 
the increase to 19 %. It also significantly reduced 
the number of people at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion by 1.7 million between 2008 and 2015, 
and had already met its national target in 2013. 
In 2015, the country exceeded its commitment 
to reaching a 24 % share of renewable energy in 
gross final energy consumption and remained 
well below its national target on primary energy 
consumption. Although it fell 1.1 percentage 
points short of its tertiary education target in 
2016, Romania has made strong progress by 
raising the tertiary educational attainment rate by 
9.6 percentage points between 2008 and 2016. In 
contrast, its share of early leavers from education 
and training increased to 18.5 % in the same time 
period, widening the distance to the national 
target to 7.2 percentage points. Despite a slow 
rise in the employment rate between 2013 and 
2016, a 3.7 percentage point gap remains to be 
closed by 2020. Romania’s R&D intensity fell by 
0.08 percentage points between 2008 and 2015, 
pushing it further form its national target than 
other Member States.
Romania
Table 6.23: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 66.3 2016 70
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 0.49 2015 2
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 5.8 (1) 2015 19
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 24.8 2015 24
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 31.3 2015 43.0
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 18.5 2016 11.3
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 25.6 2016 26.7
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 7 435 (1) 2015 8 535
(1) Provisional data. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Figure 6.23: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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By reducing its GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors 
by 11.6 % between 1990 and 2015, Slovenia 
remained within its target to limit increases to 4 % 
by 2020. Since 2009, the country has continuously 
met its energy efficiency target, which caps 
primary energy consumption at 7.3 Mtoe. 
Slovenia has already met both of its education 
targets, with only 4.9 % of the population aged 
18 to 24 leaving school early and 44.2 % of 30 
to 34 year olds having tertiary educational 
attainment in 2016. In 2015, Slovenia was slightly 
closer to meeting its R&D expenditure and 
renewable energy commitments than the EU as 
a whole was to its overall commitments. After 
deteriorating continuously between 2008 and 
2013, the employment rate increased to 70.1 % 
in 2016, putting it within 4.9 percentage points 
of its national target. Between 2008 and 2015, 
the number of people at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion in Slovenia increased by 24 000, 
which translates to a gap of 64 000 people to its 
national target.
Slovenia
Table 6.24: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 70.1 2016 75
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 2.21 (1) 2015 3
Greenhouse gas emissions  in non-ETS sectors (% change since  ESD base year ) – 11.6 (1) 2015 4
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 22 2015 25
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent ) 6.5 2015 7.3
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 4.9 2016 5
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 44.2 2016 40
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 385 2015 321
(1) Provisional data. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Figure 6.24: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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By 2015, GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors in 
Slovakia had fallen by 14 % compared to 1990 
levels. The country thus remained well below 
its long-term commitment of limiting emissions 
growth to 13 % by 2020. Since 2011, Slovakia 
has met its energy efficiency target, which caps 
primary energy consumption at 16.4 Mtoe. In 2015, 
it was close to its R&D target and it was nearer to 
its target on renewable energy than the EU as a 
whole was to the respective EU target. Although 
Slovakia had already met its early leavers from 
education and training target in 2008, the indicator 
has since deteriorated and by 2015 the country 
was 1.4 percentage points away from its respective 
target. The country has recorded a substantial rise 
in the share of 30 to 34 year olds with a tertiary 
education since 2008 but a gap of 8.5 percentage 
points remains to be closed by 2020. The country’s 
employment rate, after stagnating at around 65 % 
between 2010 and 2013, increased to 69.8 % in 
2016, thus reducing the gap to the national target 
to 2.2 percentage points. Since 2008, Slovakia 
has moved closer to its poverty reduction target, 
which is expressed as the share of the population 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion, and was in 
2015 within 1.2 percentage points of its 2020 goal.
Slovakia
Table 6.25: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 69.8 2016 72
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.18 2015 1.2
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 14.0 (1) 2015 13
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 12.9 2015 14
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 15.4 2015 16.4
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 7.4 2016 6
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 31.5 2016 40
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (% of population) (2) 18.4 2015 17.2
(1)  Provisional data. 
(2)  The national target uses ’% of the population’ instead of ‘number of people’.  
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Figure 6.25: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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With 46.1 % of the population aged 30 to 34 
having completed tertiary education in 2016, 
Finland continued to exceed its national target of 
42 %. However, its target is defined more narrowly 
than the EU target as it excludes former tertiary 
Vocational Education and Training. In the same year, 
the country also reached its target on early leavers 
from education and training. With a 39.3 % share 
of renewable energy in final energy consumption, 
Finland exceeded its 2020 commitment by 1.3 
percentage points in 2015. The country’s primary 
energy consumption amounted to 32 Mtoe in 
2015, which was below its 35.9 Mtoe target. As a 
result of a continuous fall in R&D expenditure as 
a share of GDP since 2009, Finland lost its leading 
position in terms of R&D intensity and moved away 
from its ambitious national target. The country’s 
employment rate fell from 75.8 % in 2008 to 73.4 % 
in 2016, increasing the distance to its 78 % national 
target. Despite a notable 8.4 percentage point 
reduction in GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors 
between 1990 and 2015, the gap to the national 
target remained larger than for most other EU 
countries. Finland would also need to lift 134 000 
more people out of the risk of poverty and social 
exclusion to meet its 2020 commitment. 
Finland
Table 6.26: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 73.4 2016 78
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 2.9 2015 4
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 11.2 (1) 2015 – 16
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 39.3 2015 38
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 32.0 2015 35.9
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 7.9 2016 8
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 46.1 2016 42 (2)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 904 2015 770
(1)  Provisional data. 
(2)  Narrower national definition. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Figure 6.26: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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With 51 % of its population aged 30 to 34 years 
having attained a tertiary education in 2016, 
Sweden exceeded its national 2020 target by 
6 percentage points. In the same year, it exceeded 
its employment target by 1.2 percentage points 
and had one of the highest employment rates 
in the EU. In 2015, Sweden also surpassed its 
renewable energy target by increasing the share 
of renewables in gross final energy consumption 
to 53.9 % — by far the best performance in the 
EU. The country had reduced its primary energy 
consumption to 43.7 Mtoe by 2015, bringing it 
close to its 2020 target of 43.4 Mtoe. By reducing its 
GHG emissions by 24.2 % between 1990 and 2015, 
Sweden met its respective national target for a 
third consecutive year. It also met its commitment 
on early leavers from education and training in 
2015, but the slight increase in the share of early 
school leavers in 2016 nudged the country away 
from its target. Despite having the highest R&D 
intensity across the EU, a 0.74 percentage point 
gap remains to be closed between 2015 and 2020 
to meet the ambitious national target of spending 
4 % of GDP on R&D.
Sweden
Figure 6.27: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets (*)
(*) Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Table 6.27: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 81.2 2016 80 (1)
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 3.26 (2) 2015 4
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 24.2 2015 – 17
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 53.9 2015 49
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 43.7 2015 43.4
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 7.4 2016 7 (3)
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 51 2016 45 (4)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 1 555 2015 : (5)
(1) National target: More than 80 %. 
(2) Provisional data. 
(3) National target: less than 7 %. 
(4) National target: 45–50 %. 
(5) National target: Reduction in the percentage of women and 
men (aged 20–64) who are not in the labour force (except 
full-time students), the long-term unemployed or those on long-
term sick leave to well under 14 %.  
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Country profiles
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The United Kingdom has not adopted specific 
national Europe 2020 targets apart from the 
already existing climate change and renewable 
energy commitments (as a consequence, no 
radar chart can be shown for the UK). After rising 
continuously since 2011, the country’s employment 
rate reached a decade high of 77.6 % in 2016, 
exceeding the EU aggregate performance of 
70.1 %. In the period between 2008 and 2016, the 
UK managed to increase its tertiary educational 
attainment rate from 39.5 % to 48.1 %. The indicator 
on early school leavers recorded a 3.7 percentage 
point reduction over a five-year period, from 14.9 % 
in 2011 to 11.2 % in 2016. Although nearly 243 000 
people were lifted out of the risk of poverty 
between 2014 and 2015, there were still 0.9 million 
more people at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
compared to 2008. R&D expenditure increased 
to 1.7 % of GDP in 2015, a value close to the 2008 
level. Between 1990 and 2015, the country had 
reduced its GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors by 
15.6 %, putting it within reaching distance of its 
Europe 2020 reduction target of 16 %. Regarding 
renewable energy, the UK was the third furthest 
country (after France and the Netherlands and 
along with Ireland) from its renewable energy 
target in 2015 with a gap of 6.8 percentage points. 
Between 2008 and 2015, it reduced its primary 
energy consumption by 27.7 Mtoe, shortening the 
distance to its 2020 target of 177.6 Mtoe.
United Kingdom
Table 6.28: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 77.6 2016 : (1)
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.7 (2) 2015 :  (1)
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 15.6 (2) 2015 – 16
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 8.2 2015 15
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 183 2015    177.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 11.2 2016 :  (1)
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 48.1 2016 :  (1)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 15 028 2015 :  (3)
(1) No target in the National Reform Programme.
(2) Estimated/provisional data.
(3) Existing numerical targets under the umbrella of the 2010 Child Poverty Act and the Child Poverty Strategy 2011-2014. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)

Abbreviations  
and acronyms
Geographical aggregates and countries
EU-28  The 28 Member States of the European Union since 1 July 2013 (BE, BG, 
CZ, DK, DE, EE, IE, EL, ES, FR, HR, IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, HU, MT, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, 
SI, SK, FI, SE, UK)
EU-27  The 27 Member States of the European Union from 1 January 2007 to 30 
June 2013 (BE, BG, CZ, DK, DE, EE, IE, EL, ES, FR, IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, HU, MT, NL, 
AT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK, FI, SE, UK)
G20   Group of 20 (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, 
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the 
European Union)
Note that EU aggregates are back-calculated when enough information is 
available — for example, data relating to the EU-28 aggregate is presented when 
possible for periods before Croatia joined the EU in 2013 and the accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, as if all 28 Member States had always been members 
of the EU. The label is changed if the data refer to another aggregate (EU-27).
European Union Member States
BE Belgium
BG Bulgaria
CZ Czech Republic
DK Denmark
DE Germany
EE Estonia
IE Ireland
EL Greece
ES Spain
FR France
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HR Croatia
IT Italy
CY Cyprus
LV Latvia
LT Lithuania
LU Luxembourg
HU Hungary
MT Malta
NL Netherlands
AT Austria
PL Poland
PT Portugal
RO Romania
SI Slovenia
SK Slovakia
FI Finland
SE Sweden
UK United Kingdom
European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
IS Iceland
LI Liechtenstein 
NO Norway 
CH Switzerland 
EU candidate countries
ME Montenegro
MK The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
AL Albania
RS Serbia
TR Turkey
Abbreviations and acronyms
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Potential Candidates
BA Bosnia and Herzegovina
XK Kosovo (1)
Units of measurement
% Per cent
° C Degree Celsius
EUR Euro
Mtoe Million tonnes of oil equivalent
PPS Purchasing power standards
Abbreviations
AGS Annual Growth Survey
AMR Alert Mechanism Report
AROPE People at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
Cedefop European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training
CIS Community innovation survey
CO
2
 Carbon dioxide
COP Conference of the Parties
EAPN European Anti-Poverty Network
ECEC Early childhood education and care
Eco-IS Eco-Innovation Scoreboard
EDP Excessive Deficit Procedure
EEA European Environment Agency
EED Energy Efficiency Directive
EFTA European Free Trade Association
EIT European Institute of Innovation and Technology
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EPO European Patent Office
ERA European Research Area
ESD  Effort Sharing Decision
ESS European Statistical System
(1) This designation is without prejudice to position or status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ 
Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.
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ET 2020 ‘Education and Training 2020’ Framework
ETS Emissions Trading System
EU European Union
EU ETS EU Emission Trading System
EU LFS EU Labour Force Survey
EU SILC EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
FEAD Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived
GDP Gross domestic product
GHG Greenhouse gas
GNP Gross national product
ICT Information and communications technology
IEA International Energy Agency
ILO International Labour Organisation
IPC International Patent Classification
ISCED International Standard Classification for Education
LPG Liquefied petroleum gas
LULUCF Land use, land-use change and forestry
MIP Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure
NACE  Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European 
Community
NB Nota bene (to be noted)
NEET Not in education, employment or training
NREAP National renewable energy action plans 
NRP National Reform Programmes
NUTS Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PEC Primary energy consumption
PhD Doctor of Philosophy
PISA Programme for International Student Assessment
RED Renewable Energy Directive
R&D Research and development
SCP Stability and Convergence Programme
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
Abbreviations and acronyms
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SGP Stability and Growth Pact
STEM Science, technology, engineering, mathematics
UN United Nations
UNEP United Nations Environment Program
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNSC United Nations Statistical Commission
US United States
USA United States of America
VET Vocational Education and Training

Getting in touch with the EU
In person
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct Information Centres. 
You can find the address of the centre nearest you at: http://europa.eu/contact
On the phone or by e-mail
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You 
can contact this service 
— by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
— at the following standard number: +32 22999696 or 
— by electronic mail via: http://europa.eu/contact
Finding information about the EU
Online
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available 
on the Europa website at: http://europa.eu  
EU publications
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
http://bookshop.europa.eu. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by 
contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact).
EU law and related documents
For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1951 in all the 
official language versions, go to EUR-Lex at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu
Open data from the EU
The EU Open Data Portal (http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data) provides access to 
datasets from the EU. Data can be downloaded and reused for free, both for commercial 
and non-commercial purposes.
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INDICATORS TO SUPPORT THE EUROPE 2020 STRATEGY
The 2017 edition of Smarter, greener, more inclusive? — 
Indicators to support the Europe 2020 strategy continues the 
series of Eurostat flagship publications providing statistical 
analyses related to important European Commission policy 
frameworks and relevant economic, social and environmental 
phenomena. This publication supports the Europe 2020 
strategy by monitoring progress towards the targets and goals 
defined under the three mutually reinforcing priorities of 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. 
The analysis in this publication is based on the Europe 2020 
headline indicators chosen to monitor progress towards 
the strategy’s targets. Other indicators focusing on specific 
subgroups of society or on related contextual issues are also 
used to deepen the analysis and present a broader picture. 
The data used mainly come from official European Statistical 
System sources and are disseminated by Eurostat. The updated 
2017 edition covers the period from 2002 or 2008 up to the 
most recent year for which data are available (2015 or 2016). 
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